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This dissertation examines Islamic banking in Jordan.  It is argued that institutions 
perceived as culturally authentic may play important political roles in a post-colonial 
society.  Islamic banking in particular can both function in a modern, globalized economy 
and express cultural tradition.  It may help to legitimate Jordan’s political structures and 
overcome social and economic bifurcations between traditional and modern sectors of 
society. 
Jordan is a part of a region of the world in which the colonial experience 
continues to have an enduring legacy. What had previously been a tribal Bedouin society 
was transformed almost overnight. Its modern banking system transgressed Islamic 
norms and laws and excluded huge portions of the population who continued to see 
meaning in the religious values and principles rooted in the social and cultural institutions 
that had just been trampled upon. 
This dissertation looks into how Islamic banks that interact in a global economy 
while remaining true to culturally authentic beliefs and practices can begin to close the 
gaps between state practice and popular beliefs. The strongest opposition to the monarchy 
in Jordan has come from political Islamists who feed upon popular discontent and 
 ix 
alienation caused by the practices and actions of a ruling elite that does not share the 
same cultural values as the majority of the population. Much of what the Islamists 
espouse, while culturally authentic, is removed from the political, financial, and 
economic realities of the modern era. Islamic banking thus has the potential to play a 
mediating role between a modernizing elite and this Islamist backlash. 
This dissertation will test the extent to which cultural authenticity matters by 
observing how Islamic banks in Jordan have been able to tap into a latent demand for 
alternative financial practices and how the Islamic financial movement relates to Islamist 
political movements. Although Islamic banking has not achieved its full potential, the 
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INTRODUCTION: The Political Impact of Islamic Banking in Jordan 
 
 Islamic banks and financial institutions constitute an increasingly important 
segment of the financial sector of a number of Muslim countries. In November of 2010 
there was approximately $895 billion deposited in Islamic banks1 while total assets of the 
Islamic financial system throughout the world were estimated to be around 1.3 trillion 
dollars and both the banks and other Islamic financial instruments are expected to 
continue growing at an annual rate of 10 - 20%. The size and growth of these Islamic 
banks and financial institutions has important ramifications for the societies, economies 
and politics of the regions in which they are located. 
 Different kinds of financial systems have been shown to have different political 
effects, especially in terms of the relationships between state and society in general and 
state and business in particular. Financial innovations often lead to changes in markets, 
the means of commerce, and the economic life of societies. Economies exist in a cultural 
context and therefore financial innovations also impact wider aspects of culture and 
society. Financial power also translates more directly into political power and therefore 
                                                 
1 The $895 Billion figure comes from Joseph DiVanna and Brian Caplen, The Banker: Top 500 Islamic 
Financial Institutions, (The Banker, Nov. 2, 2010) an annual survey of Islamic financial institutions which 
has been published by The Banker magazine since 2007. For an early estimate of the size of the Islamic 
financial sector see Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 
2000), 1 where he estimated that the sector had increased more than forty-fold from 1982 to 2000 to exceed 
$200 billion. From 2000 to 2010, the sector has grown an additional six-fold and the $1.3 trillion figure 
comes from the second edition of Warde‘s book published in 2010. The $895 Billion that The Banker 
accounts for includes some but not all of the Islamic finance assets in conventional banks with Islamic 
windows and thus should be seen as a very conservative figure. Furthermore, in addition to Islamic banks, 
there are growing Islamic capital market activities involving Islamically-compliant mutual funds and the 
sukuk market (which is the closest thing there is to an Islamic bond). 
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through both direct and indirect means, finance affects the state, society, power relations 
and elite formations. The growth in many Muslim countries of an alternative Islamic 
financial system existing side-by-side with conventional banking systems is having 
profound political effects. 
Islamic banks have allowed for what is seen as authentic financial practices in a 
region of the world where all banks had previously been seen as representing foreign 
influences. This has led large segments of the populations of a number of countries, 
especially from the lower classes, to enter into financial systems that they had previously 
excluded themselves from. It has in turn helped in the strengthening of new conservative 
business elites not tied to colonial or outside powers in a region of the world where most 
large business interests have traditionally had strong foreign ties. 
The rise of Islamic banks has also provided governments with a means to increase 
their legitimacy through the permission and support of what is seen as a non-threatening 
form of Islamic expression in a region where most governments lack legitimacy largely 
because they are perceived as not being Islamic enough. Such banks have also given new 
importance to the Ulama (Islamic religious scholars), a class whose power had waned in 
the past century. After decades of being shunted aside to deal only with family law 
matters, the Ulama have once again taken center stage in the very important arena of 
economic and financial affairs as their advice is sought concerning what constitutes truly 
Islamic financial practices.  
The rise of Islamic banks has also given new legitimacy to the idea that Islam is 
applicable to all areas of life, an idea that can have profound political implications, 
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especially since it is the central idea of the Islamist political movements that constitute 
the strongest political opposition in most Muslim countries. While the success of Islamic 
financial institutions provides legitimacy to the ideas espoused by the Islamic political 
movements, these same financial institutions also represent an alternative channel of 
Islamic work, a channel that is seen by many as more practical than the work undertaken 
by Islamist movements and a channel that often has strong interests in both maintaining 
good relations with the state authorities and preserving state stability, interests that are 
not always shared by Islamist political movements. How Islamist movements and Islamic 
financial institutions deal with their common and conflicting interests has important 
ramifications on both the activities and ideas of the movements and financial institutions 
themselves as well as on larger political issues, such as the state‘s relations with Islamic 
movements and the development of democratic institutions in countries where Islamic 
movements constitute the strongest political opposition. 
In many ways the alternative financial practices represented in Islamic Banking 
represent a civil society countermovement occurring in a region of the world where the 
colonial experience resulted in the rise of new internal elites while former elites were 
stripped of the institutional frameworks that had formerly sustained them. The dis-unified 
and fragmented elite structures that have arisen in most Middle Eastern societies in the 
wake of the colonial experience largely pits traditional elites against newer commercial 
and political elites whose sources of authority and wealth are often closely linked with 
the former colonial powers. The cultural alienation felt by the more traditional elites has 
often manifested itself in Islamist political opposition movements – which have at times 
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taken on radical, even violent, overtones. Islamic banking can potentially provide the 
older, more traditional elites with an institutional framework that can enable them to 
compete with the newer elites on a different playing field – one of finance and business 
and perhaps even competitive politics. 
 The rapid rise of Islamic banking has led to a massive literature on Islamic 
economics. This literature deals extensively with the technical jurisprudential matters 
concerning non-interest banking but almost totally ignores the important political effects 
that such banking is having on the politics and societies of the Muslim world. This 
dissertation will analyze the political side of Islamic banking through a case study 
analysis of Jordan. The dissertation will have three main focuses. 
 First, it will analyze the general social and economic effects of Islamic banking 
and financial practices on Jordanian society. By providing financial services to important 
societal segments that had earlier been excluded from all forms of organized finance, 
Islamic financial institutions are bringing about important social changes in Jordan.    
The dissertation will also closely look into the relationship between Islamic 
banking and political Islam in Jordan and how the two affect and influence each other. 
While there are few direct ties between Islamist political actors and Islamic financial 
actors, the two share many indirect ties. Analyzing these ties and looking in detail at the 
economic program of the Islamist political actors in Jordan will provide important 
information about a side of Islamism that has not been studied in detail in the past. 
Finally, the dissertation will analyze the confluence of these two societal-based 
aspects and discuss what the existence of Islamic banking means for the Jordanian state 
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and its future political structure. Islamic banking is still a young and dynamic 
phenomenon that is forcing Muslim states to pass creative financial legislation that deals 
with Islamic issues at a time when globalization is providing such countries with new 
financial challenges and when those countries are facing strong opposition by Islamists.  
This confluence of issues brings up some interesting dichotomies. While political 
Islamists often rail against the neo-liberal economic reforms associated with 
globalization, Islamic financiers have strong interests in globalization reforms. The 
manner by which Muslim regimes deal with these conflicting pressures will have 
important long-term effects on their political legitimacy and stability as well as on the 
overall political and economic development of their countries. 
Particularly in Jordan, Islamic financiers seem well-positioned to play an 
important intermediary role between Jordan‘s globalizing secular business elite and the 
country‘s traditional conservative business elite as well as between the angry urban 
Islamist political opposition and the Jordanian Monarchy. To successfully manage such 
an intermediary role will result in a more unified elite structure in the country in a way 
that facilitates important political and economic reform. 
By looking into the political side of Islamic banking, the dissertation will thus fill 
important gaps in the study of the politics and economics of the Muslim world and will 
be of interest to Middle Eastern specialists and those studying Islamic Movements as well 
as those interested in developmental economics and finance and how finance affects 
politics in developing countries. It will also prove useful to the growing number of 
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scholars interested in the economic and financial side of Islamic banking by adding an 
important new dimension to their field of study. 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 The first chapter of the dissertation will undertake a review of the literature in 
three important fields. First, the review will cover the theoretical work that deals with the 
power of capital and the influence financial institutions have on politics and political 
institutions. The contributions a further understanding of the political side of Islamic 
capital can make to this theoretical literature will be pointed out. Second, the literature on 
Islamic banking will be discussed with a view to showing where that literature can be 
expanded and enriched by bringing in a political dimension. Finally, the political 
economic literature on Jordan as well as the work on Islam in Jordan will be reviewed so 
as to show where a further understanding of the political role of Islamic banks can add 
important insights into broader political and economic concerns in an important Middle 
Eastern country. 
 The second and third chapters will provide important historical and political 
background to the field of study. The second chapter will provide a historical overview of 
Islamic banks, discussing their origin, their growth, and the current problems and 
challenges they are facing. The chapter will include data on the number, size, and 
location of Islamic banks in the world, on the kinds of financial instruments Islamic 
banks use and on the disputes taking place in the field of Islamic banking. The third 
chapter will provide a historical, political, and economic overview of Jordan. Political 
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decision-making and the role of Islam and Islamic Movements in Jordan will be stressed 
as will the economic situation in the country. The economic problems Jordan is facing, 
the system of finance in Jordan, and specific information about Jordanian banks including 
the role and place of Islamic banking in Jordan, will be discussed. 
 The fourth and fifth chapters will deal with the political effects of Islamic banking 
in Jordan. The fourth chapter will look into the general effects Islamic banking has had 
on Jordanian society. It will analyze the extent to which Islamic banking has affected 
class relations in Jordan and allowed for the emergence of new elites in the country. The 
fifth chapter will deal with the Islamic movement in Jordan. It will analyze the economic 
agenda of Jordan‘s Islamists, look into the effects Islamic banking has had on the actions 
and ideas of Jordan‘s Islamic Movement, and discuss the relations and potential future 
relations of Islamist political and Islamic banking leaders in Jordan. 
 The sixth chapter will use the data gathered by the Jordanian case to make a 
theoretical argument about the political role of Islamic banking. The importance of 
Islamic banking and finance in understanding larger political concerns will be stressed as 
will the role that Islamic banking can play in healing some of the longstanding wounds 
left over from the colonial era by bringing about changes in the structure of Jordanian 






CHAPTER ONE:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
FINANCE AND POLITICS: FROM IBN KHALDUN TO MONTESQUIEU 
 Political scientists have long recognized the influence of economics and 
commerce on political systems. In the 14
th
 Century Ibn Khaldoun asserted that dynasties 
flourish when there is a healthy level of commercial activity and noted that a sign of 
dynastic decline was evident whenever governments began overtaxing their citizens, thus 
making commerce less able to succeed.2 He also made the observation that governments 
themselves that tried to engage in commerce and agriculture with the intent of increasing 
state revenues would lead to the inevitable ―destruction of civilization‖ and 
―disintegration of the dynasty‖ as such activities would make it impossible for private 
merchants to undertake successful commerce.3 Ibn Khaldun also noted that in the 14
th
 
Century milieu in which he was writing, the accumulation of too much capital could be a 
dangerous thing for any individual as it would inevitably lead government officials to 
become avaricious and ultimately expropriate wealth in a manner that would ―spell harm 
and hardship to its owners.‖4   
 Ibn Khaldun‘s cyclical theory of the rise and fall of dynasties was thus closely 
linked to the manner by which commerce was able to flourish and was then subsequently 
checked by the authorities. The lack of a financial system that could protect capital from 
                                                 
2 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967), 
231. 
3 Ibid., pgs 232-234.  
4 Ibid., pgs 280-281. 
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the hands of the authorities ultimately meant that dynasties could not last more than a few 
generations.5 
 In The Spirit of the Laws (1748), a book that laid the theoretical foundations for 
the separation of powers, Montesquieu found that financial systems were changing the 
political nature of some European nations. Montesquieu asserted that certain financial 
instruments had a profound impact on limiting the arbitrary rule of leaders, forcing them 
to accept more democratic rule.6 In Part I of The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu notes 
that an exception existed to the classical idea that democracies could only survive when 
wealth is not too abundant or too unequally distributed. Montesquieu‘s exception was for 
what he called democracies based on ―commerce.‖ 
 In Book XXI of the treatise, it becomes clear that Montesquieu‘s conception of 
commerce involved the existence of important financial instruments. In a chapter entitled 
―How Commerce Broke through the Barbarism of Europe,‖ Montesquieu explains how 
commerce had long been hampered in Europe by church prohibitions on interest-taking 
until Jewish money-lenders, who had previously been persecuted for their money-lending 
activities, invented ―letters of exchange.‖ Montesquieu argues that the invention of this 
simple financial concept enabled commercial activities to take place without violence as 
wealthy traders could quickly, easily, and without hindrance send invisible wealth 
anywhere in the world. Montesquieu notes that since the invention of letters of exchange, 
                                                 
5 In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun states that ―as a rule no dynasty lasts beyond the life span of three 
generations.‖ See page 136. 
6 For a discussion of Montesquieu‘s The Spirit of the Laws see Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the 
Interests, (Princeton University Press, 1977).  For an English translation of the French Esprit des lois see 
www.constitution.org/cm/sol.htm. 
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rulers have been less able to arbitrarily confiscate the wealth of their citizens and have 
subsequently been compelled to govern with greater wisdom. Letters of exchange solved 
the dilemma that Ibn Khaldun had earlier described and thus – if Ibn Khaldun was correct 
- could have a profound impact on not only the spread of commerce but also on political 
stability. 
In Book XXII of the same treatise, Montesquieu further explains how another 
simple financial concept further weakened rulers when he discussed the ability of bankers 
to undertake foreign exchange transactions. Prior to such transactions, rulers could 
arbitrarily debase their coinage by using smaller percentages of gold and silver and larger 
percentages of copper or other metals and then, through the use of such debased 
currencies, extract more from their subjects with less compensation. Montesquieu notes 
that:  ―It is evident that such violent proceedings could not take place in the present age; a 
prince might deceive himself, but he could deceive nobody else. Foreign exchange 
operations have taught bankers to draw a comparison between all the money in the world, 
and to establish its just value.‖7 
In a work whose main concern was discovering ways to check the abuse of 
unlimited powers in the hands of arbitrary rulers, Montesquieu found that the 
development of simple banking institutions had historically played a crucial role in 
establishing structural impediments to the abuse of power. The importance placed on 
banking and commerce in bringing about more liberty and checking oppressive 
                                                 
7 See Book XXII, Chapter 13; ―Proceedings with Respect to Money in the Time of the Emperors‖ of Spirit 
of the Laws with English translation at www.constitution.org/cm/sol.htm 
 11 
tendencies was picked up and further developed by other classical political economists 
and historical sociologists such as Adam Smith, John Millar, and Sir James Steuart.8 All 
of them argued that the ability of bankers to hide and quickly move wealth placed 
restraints on rulers and thus had a profound impact on bringing about more liberty in 
society. With the invention of simple banking procedures a financial system could be 
derived that made it no longer rational for tyrants to engage in the kinds of barbaric 
actions that they had employed in both Europe as well as the North African and Middle 
Eastern countries discussed by Ibn Khaldun.   
Karl Marx also recognized the power of bankers as holders of capital though he 
came to different conclusions than those arrived at by Montesquieu and the classical 
political economists.9 Marx concluded that the holders of capital were endowed with a 
power that no political institutions could overcome. Banks were a means of concentrating 
capital and thus could serve to solidify the power of those who own the productive wealth 
of society. 
 
POLITICS INFLUENCING FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the classical recognition of the importance of financial institutions on 
political systems, finance and banking have not always been seen as independent 
variables in the political science or even political economy literature. Goldsmith is 
                                                 
8 Hirschman, pgs 81 – 101. 
9 Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, Capital Vol. III.   See especially ―Part V: Division of Profit into Interest 
and Profit of Enterprise. Interest Bearing Capital.‖  An online version can be found at: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/index.htm 
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representative of the early political economy literature that discussed the connections 
between finance and development.10 While Goldsmith finds clear parallels between 




 Century establishment of the modern 
financial system characterized by the existence of several kinds of financial institutions 
and financial instruments, he does not look at the political side of the equation. Political 
repression of the financial system is not discussed nor is the manner by which 
developments in finance and financial institutions have affected political development. 
Later political economists recognized the important linkages between politics, 
economics and finance but still largely ignored delving into the possibility that financial 
systems could affect political systems. Haggard and Kaufman‘s work is representative of 
most of the political economy literature of the 1980s and 1990s that looked at the extent 
to which political decisions affected the success or failure of economic adjustment and 
reform.11 While some of the essays in the Haggard and Kaufman volume (most notably 
that of Barbara Stallings) argue about the power of international financial institutions 
over the policy process of indebted nations, there is no real analysis of how the local 
banking and financial structure affects the political decision-making process. Haggard 
and Kaufman also note that the economic changes that took place in the 1980s in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America had important effects on the establishment and consolidation of 
democratic governance. They however explain differences in such effects on the 
institutional arrangements for managing political conflict and not on financial 
                                                 
10 Raymond Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969) 
11 Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Politics of Economic Adjustment, (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1992). 
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institutional arrangements. Again, banking and the financial system is not discussed as an 
independent variable. 
 
STRUCTURAL POWER OF FINANCE 
Marxist writers continued discussing what Przeworski and Wallerstein described 
as the theory of the ―structural dependence of the state on capital.‖12 Most Marxist writers 
however spent more time describing capital in terms of its owners with very little 
discussion on the financial system through which the power of capital is channeled.  
Banks are often seen as mere intermediaries with little real power.   
Winters makes a powerful argument for the power of capital over the political 
decision-making process in his study of Indonesia.13 He shows how radical policy 
changes took place in Indonesia from 1965 to the mid-1980s based on the extent to which 
capital was in the hands of private investors rather than the state. As long as investors had 
the ability to supply the capital needed to stabilize Indonesia‘s economic system in the 
1960s and early 1970s, they held tremendous political power over the state, which was 
forced to establish a set of economic policies favorable to the desires of the investors. 
During the oil boom from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the Indonesian state itself 
became awash in its own state-controlled financial resources and was thus free to change 
its economic policies, making them less responsive to the private owners of capital. 
                                                 
12 Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, ―Structural Dependence of the State on Capital,‖ The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1. (March, 1988), pp. 11-29. 
13 Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion:  Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State, (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1996). 
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When oil prices fell dramatically in the mid-1980s, the Indonesian state again became 
structurally dependent on the private investors and policies shifted back to becoming 
favorable to their interests.   
Winters shows how the huge policy swings that took place in Indonesia cannot be 
explained by changes in leadership or ideological orientation or on military, party, or 
regional politics and power or on changes in the institutional structure of the state, 
demographic pressures, or international politics. The changes can only be explained by 
the structural power that capital controllers have over the economic policy decision-
making process. Winters shows how the structural power of capital occurs as a natural 
result of those controlling capital satisfying their interests and does not require conscious 
coordination among investors. The imperative for investment to sustain a social system 
provides the holders of capital with a deep and structural power to decide whether or 
where to invest. 
The financial system is described as a mediator in the process of capital 
exercising power. While Winters notes that the form of mediation that the capital takes is 
less important than the fact that it is capital itself, he does recognize that the financial 
system existing in a country or society makes an important difference in both making a 
jurisdiction more or less vulnerable to the structural pressures capital controllers can 
create and in making decision makers more or less likely to respond to the demands of 
investors. Private and portfolio capital is described as the most powerful forms of capital 
while capital that is channeled through commercial banks is seen as much weaker since 
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banks do not have the capacity to adequately monitor how the funds they provide are 
used by policymakers. 
Winters‘ finding that the holders of capital can wield influence over the policy-
making process is also found in both the literature that deals with the relationship 
between business and the state and in the interest group literature. In much of this 
literature, institutions are looked at more closely and banks are seen as an institution with 
political ties that can make them more influential – even if structurally weaker – than the 
holders of portfolio capital. While Winters notes that the power of capital acting in its 
self-interest is powerful enough to wield influence even in the absence of conscious 
coordination among the holders of finance, others have described instances in which 
actual coordination does take place.   
Maxfield describes an alliance of private bankers in Mexico that in coalition with 
large-scale traders and industrialists and public sector monetary authorities have 
historically been able to shape economic policy-making in the country.14 Maxfield argues 
that the power of the Bankers Alliance waxes and wanes based on a number of factors 
that are similar to factors described in the interest group literature. In addition to the 
argument that the characteristics of similar alliances in other countries can explain 
differences in economic policy patterns in a comparative perspective, Maxfield argues 
that the alliances and the policies they shape can explain the differences in the impact of 
international financial integration on different countries. 
                                                 
14 Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital:  International Finance and Mexican Politics, (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1990). 
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BANKS AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Alexander Gershenkron takes the argument about the power of banks a step 
further, seeing them as an independent variable explaining not only economic policy-
making but actual regime type. In 1962, Gershenkron explained the establishment and 
long tenure of a dictatorial regime in Russia as having emanated from the lack of a strong 
banking system.15 He argued that the lack of robust banking systems in some ―relatively 
backward economies‖ led governments to take the place of banks in accumulating capital 
and directing it toward investment in heavy industry. Whereas industrial banking was 
able to develop in countries like France and Germany (both of which were relatively 
backward in relation to England in the 19
th
 Century), no such banking system developed 
in Russia and Gershenkron points out that that lack of industrial banking can explain the 
long period under which the Russians were led by a dictatorial Soviet government which 
could only undertake the kind of capital accumulation necessary for industrialization 
through coercive taxation policies. Gershenkron extends his argument from Russia to 
other non-European countries whose lack of strong banking systems is a determining 
factor in the establishment of dictatorial regimes. 
 Zysman expanded upon Gerschenkron‘s argument about how the existence or 
lack of a strong banking system could shape the political structure of a country by 
arguing that different financial systems have a profound impact upon the capacity of the 
political authorities to intervene in the industrial economy of a nation and is thus an 
                                                 
15 Alexander Gershenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1962). 
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important determinant of a country‘s political structure.16 While Gershenkron argued that 
the lack of a robust banking system could delay democratic development, Zysman looked 
only at different democratic industrialized nations and found that differences within the 
structure of the financial systems in those countries constitute an important variable in 
how their political structures differ. Zysman asserts that there are three distinct types of 
financial systems among the democratic industrialized nations, typified by the Anglo-
American system with strong capital markets, the heavily statist credit-based French 
financial model, and the German credit-based system dominated by financial institutions 
rather than the state. He then shows how the different financial systems put different 
constraints on a government‘s ability to intervene in the economy and have an important 
effect on the role that business interests can play in the politics of a country.    
 The Anglo-American financial system prevents state authorities from intervening 
in the economy and creates institutional circumstances that favor business-led 
adjustment. The French model requires the state to play an active role in orienting the 
economy and influencing the position of particular sectors. The German model 
establishes conditions that warrant the establishment of strong business cartels in which 
political decisions concerning the economy are the result of a bargaining process 
involving finance, labor, government, and industry. Zysman thus takes Gershenkron‘s 
argument a step further by showing that not only the strength or weakness of banking but 
                                                 
16 John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth:  Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial 
Change, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1983) 
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actually the differing kinds of banking have important consequences on the political 
structure of countries. 
 Zysman thus expanded upon the idea of Montesquieu, the classical Economists, 
the Marxists and Gershenkron that finance influenced politics by showing that even 
relatively slight differences in the manner, organization and makeup of financial 
institutions could profoundly impact the political decision-making process in a country. 
Contrary to the globalization narrative that market expansion will inevitably lead to 
financial standardization along the lines of the Washington consensus,17 Zysman also 
shows that even within the capitalist West there exist profound differences in how 
financial systems are organized and that those differences are based on historical, 
cultural, and social norms of the countries in which they originated.   
 The idea that historical, cultural and social norms of a society are important to 
economic life echoes the anthropological theories of Karl Polanyi.18 Polanyi argues that 
economies are embedded in both economic and non-economic social institutions, such as 
religion and government, and that any analysis of an economy that ignores these 
institutions will be flawed. Polanyi further argues that when radical economic 
transformations take place they hold the potential to disembed economies from their 
social bases leading to widespread cultural alienation that can result in political turmoil. 
                                                 
17 For a concise explanation of the different principles making up the Washington Consensus see John 
Williamson, ―In Search of a Manual for Technopols,‖ in John Williamson ed., The Political Economy of 
Policy Reform, (Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 1994).  
18 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, (Boston: 
Beacon, 1944). Also see Gregory Baum, Karl Polanyi on Ethics and Economics, (Quebec, McGill Queen‘s 
University Press, 1996). 
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 Henry expounded upon Zysman‘s institutional argument by applying it to 
developing countries while also bringing into it the findings of Winters and others about 
the deep structural power of capital. He shows how different financial systems influenced 
political structures in different ways not only in the industrialized Western democratic 
nations but also in the Middle East, Africa, East Asia and Latin America. Henry 
explained how variants of the Anglo-American, French, and German financial models 
can be seen in the developing nations and that the specific model adopted by developing 
countries has a profound impact on the democratization process.19 Henry argues that the 
power of financial institutions to invest or withhold financing of projects of its choice can 
be substantial enough to push for governmental accountability thus underscoring the 
important role that banks and financial systems play in the political structure and 
development of countries.  
 In his book, The Mediterranean Debt Crescent, Henry posits a strong theoretical 
argument about the potential power of commercial banks because of their roles both as a 
mediator between rulers and businesses and between local rulers and the international 
financial system.20 Drawing from the insights of both Zysman and Winters, Henry 
describes the conditions under which a commercial banking system can foster sufficient 
business autonomy and organization to transform a political regime making it more 
democratic.   
                                                 
19 Clement Henry, ―The Financial Arms of Industrial and Political Activity,‖  paper presented at the 
International Conference on the Role of the Business Sector in Economic and Political Change, (Tunis, 
August 30 – Sept. 2, 1998). 
20 Clement Henry, The Mediterranean Debt Crescent:  Money and Power in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia and Turkey, ( University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1996). 
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 He notes that the economy must be sufficiently developed to have generated a 
powerful array of business enterprises and that those enterprises must be indebted to the 
commercial banking system. He further points out that the banks must be organized into 
an oligopoly with the finance capital concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
commercial banks capable of engaging in collective action and containing a critical 
nucleus who have enough market power to discipline weaker banks. Henry believes that 
these conditions coupled with pressure from international financial institutions for more 
financial liberalization will allow for the rise of strong business conglomerates that will 
have the structural power and interests to challenge state authorities and force them 
toward greater accountability. 
 Taking this into account brings up the question of how an increasingly Islamized 
financial system – or how dual Islamic and conventional financial systems existing side-
by-side – will affect the political makeup and decision-making process in Muslim 
countries. Has the Islamic prohibition on certain conventional banking practices – similar 
to earlier Christian prohibitions discussed by Montesquieu - made financial institutions in 
the Muslim world too weak to affect political processes in favor of democratization and 
will the growth of new Islamic financial institutions empower the financial sector in a 
way that can influence political change? Will a strong Islamic banking sector put the 
structural power of capital into the hands of Islamists that have political and ideological 
interests that are different from the purely financial interests that Winters and Maxfield 
described as existing in the conventional financial systems; and if so, how will this play 
out in terms of political and social change in Muslim societies? Are there structural 
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aspects of Islamic finance that will either facilitate or impede political reform in the ways 
that different financial systems led to different political outcomes described by Zysman? 
 My theoretical goal in this dissertation is to look into all of these issues to come to 
a better understanding of the impact the growth of Islamic financial institutions is having 
on the political and social landscape of the Muslim world. In light of the literature 
positing the kind of impact that capital and financial institutions can have on political 
structures it becomes relevant to look into how the estimated 1 trillion dollars that are 
already invested in Islamic financial institutions and the continued rapid growth of the 
Islamic financial sector is impacting upon the political institutions and norms of the 
countries where Islamic finance is important.  
 
ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 
 While there is an extensive literature on Islamic banking and finance, very little in 
that literature actually touches upon the political aspects of these increasingly important 
institutions. Islamic legal scholars currently debate, modify, and pass new judgments 
concerning financial issues more than they do in perhaps any other area of Islamic law.21  
Much of the literature on Islamic banking deals with either these legalistic issues or with 
the technicalities of the Islamic financial and banking instruments and the means of 
making them work within the global financial order.   
                                                 
21 Another growing field of new Fiqh interpretations concerns medical practices. 
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 The most comprehensive treatment of the Islamic legal framework through which 
Islamic banks operate was undertaken by Vogel and Hayes.22 In their work, Vogel and 
Hayes explain the religious textual basis of rulings concerning Islamic finance and detail 
what is and what is not Islamically permissible in terms of financial transactions. They 
explain what is meant by the forbidden practices of usury or interest (riba), gambling or 
pure speculation (maysir) and uncertain risk (gharar). The terms have highly technical 
meanings and thus modern transactions require Islamic legal scholars to distinguish 
between them and perfectly legitimate profit-sharing and risk-taking transactions. Vogel 
and Hayes then explain in detail some of the permitted contracts and conclude with an 
explanation of the debates concerning possible innovations in Islamic financial products. 
The book is representative of the vast literature on the subject of Islamic banking in that it 
deals with these complex subjects from a purely technical and legalistic framework and 
avoids any discussion of the political ramifications of Islamic banking in the countries in 
which it is taking place.  
 
ISLAMIC BANKING’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 Chapra is representative of another genre of literature on Islamic banking that 
deals with the social and even political ramifications of Islamic banking but from a purely 
theoretical viewpoint that tries to define the societal benefits that Islamic banking will 
                                                 
22 Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, III, Islamic Law and Finance:  Religion, Risk, and Return (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 1998). 
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bring about in modern countries.23 Works of this sort are written largely by devoted 
Muslims who defend Islamic legal rulings by discussing their assumed positive societal 
impact but rarely provide real life examples of how Islamic banking has actually affected 
a society or country.  
 One of the biggest critics of this type of work and of the whole project of Islamic 
banking is Timur Kuran.24 Kuran argues that the practical applications of Islamic 
economics – including in addition to Islamic banking such practices as Zakat (religiously 
required alms) collection and distribution - have had no positive effects on efficiency, 
growth, or poverty reduction in the Muslim world. He further argues that the Islamic 
financial movement has sprung up as a means of resisting globalization and Western 
capitalism and has no real economic or even religious basis. He traces the genesis of 
Islamic economic thought to prominent Islamist ideologues such as Abul-Ala Mawdudi 
(founder of the Jamaa Islamia Islamic movement in Pakistan), Sayyid Qutb (prominent 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (prominent 
Shiite Islamist in Iraq) in the early 20
th
 Century. He asserts that their notion of an 
economics discipline that is distinctly Islamic is a very modern concept that cannot be 
found in the classical sources of Islam. Kuran asserts that this new discipline had much 
more to do with fulfilling the Islamist political agenda of its founders than with truly 
discovering Islamically acceptable means of finance in the modern world. 
                                                 
23 M. Umer Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, (The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1992). 
24 Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon:  The Economic Predicaments of Islamism, (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2005). 
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 Kuran‘s critique provides an empirical analysis that will in the future force those 
writing in the genre of Chapra to look for more comparative and empirical studies to 
buttress their theoretical claims. However, Kuran‘s analysis of the genesis of Islamic 
banking in the past forty years is simplistic. While Islamists such as Mawdudi were the 
first to write about Islamic economics, the field has taken on a life of its own and its rapid 
growth is a reality that cannot be dismissed as a mere attempt by Islamists to protect 
themselves from Western domination.   
 Islamic economics is a modern discipline but that is because it is only in modern 
times that the global financial system has reached so extensively into the Muslim world. 
In fact, the establishment of Islamic banking and other financial institutions in the manner 
that it has come about can be seen more as an attempt to find Islamically acceptable ways 
to participate in the international financial system than to isolate themselves from it.   
 Kuran‘s critique that Islamic finance is not having any positive effect on 
efficiency, growth, or poverty reduction is echoed by El-Gamal.25  Rather than conclude 
that the practice of Islamic finance is an attempt by Islamists to isolate themselves from 
the West, El-Gamal shows that it is more an attempt to provide Islamic legitimacy for 
what is essentially the same thing as conventional financial practices with added 
transaction costs in the form of jurist and lawyer fees. El-Gamal is critical of the industry 
because of its obsession with using pre-modern contract forms and even adopting their 
classical names and then using jurists, economists, and lawyers to tweak those contracts 
                                                 
25 Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance:  Law, Economics, and Practice, (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2006). 
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in ways that make them appear as close as possible to conventional financial practices 
without ever delving deeper into the original objectives of the Islamic laws concerning 
which the pre-modern contracts were first formulated.   
 El-Gamal finds that those original objectives are actually being violated as the 
Islamic financial industry chases form over substance. Looking closely into the classical 
Islamic jurisprudence, El-Gamal finds that the original objectives involved enhancing 
fairness and economic efficiency. He asserts that with advances in modern 
communication and legal structures these objectives are currently being served in 
conventional financial systems and the use of pre-modern contract structures in the 
current financial milieu is having the opposite effect, leading to losses in efficiency and 
potentially unfair practices. El-Gamal calls for moving Islamic finance away from finding 
avenues for putting an Islamic face on conventional practices and more toward a 
reflective look at the original objectives of the Islamic laws and applying them in such 
things as community banking, microfinance and socially responsible investment. El-
Gamal‘s work is inspiring a new genre of literature that is more reflective of Islamic 
finance and financial practices.26  
While the critiques of the Islamic banking industry are merited, they were 
considerably weakened by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.27 The crisis focused 
attention on important differences between Islamic and conventional finance, 
undermining the idea that the differences were only cosmetic. In the 1990s as El-Gamal 
                                                 
26 See for example Maha-Hanaan Balala, Islamic Finance and Law, (I.B. Tauris, London, 2010). 
27 Nisreen Malley, ―Islamic Banking: An Innovation that Altered the Financial Structure of the Muslim 
World,‖ Texas Historian LXXI, 2010-2011, 18. 
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rightly points out, regulations that did not allow Islamic banks to undertake leveraged 
investments were seen as a hindrance to the growth of the industry that Islamic financial 
jurists and lawyers were trying to work around. After the crisis, however, these 
restrictions came to be seen by many Islamic jurists as a positive factor that made Islamic 
banking inherently more stable than conventional banking. Islamic scholars became 
much more confident about the merit of Islamic restrictions on the role of finance and 
more critical of attempts to put an Islamic face on conventional practices.28   
The long-term future trajectory that the still young industry takes cannot be 
foreseen. However, whether Islamic financial professionals, lawyers and religious jurists 
become more conservative or they go back to working to find ways to make conventional 
financial practices Islamically legitimate, large and growing sums of capital will likely 
continue to flow into Islamic financial institutions. This dissertation aims less at engaging 
in the debate about what is Islamically permissible and more at looking at the political 
effects the industry is having on the societies of the Muslim world.  
 
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
 Ibrahim Warde and Clement Henry have written more extensively than any others 
on the political aspects of Islamic banking. Warde undertook a comprehensive study of 
the historical, political, economic, social, and cultural context in which Islamic banks and 
other forms of Islamic finance operate.29 He finds that there is great diversity in all of 
                                                 
28 See 2010 edition of Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy , 89. 
29 Ibid. 
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these aspects of Islamic finance. He especially points out that it would be misleading to 
make generalizations about their ties to or impact upon Islamist political movements or 
governments.  
 Clement Henry dealt with Islamic banking from a more politically theoretical 
angle.30 He discusses the possibility that the introduction of financial pluralism through 
Islamic banking could establish powerful business coalitions in support of political 
change. He also notes that the legal and institutional structure needed for successful 
Islamic banking requires a high degree of transparency and accountability on the part of 
the bankers. Since interest rates cannot be fixed by Islamic banks but must be tied to the 
profitability of the investments they make, such banks require an even higher degree of 
transparency than conventional Western banks. As a result, depositors in Islamic banks 
demand access to more information and hold bankers to a higher degree of accountability 
than is the norm in conventional banks, especially in developing countries. Henry argues 
that the institutional requirements for successful Islamic banking hold the prospect for 
Islamic banking bringing about the kinds of changes in finance that could ultimately lead 
countries toward more transparent and accountable political systems.   
 He further argues that Islamic bankers hold the potential of shifting the political 
weight within Islamic Movements away from oppositional politics and more toward 
responsible business elements ready to coexist with the capitalist order. This shift would 
provide them with strong interests in maintaining the stability of a country‘s banking 
                                                 
30 Henry, 1996.  See also Clement Henry and Rodney Wilson ed., The Politics of Islamic Finance, 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004) for a series of articles on the impact of Islamic Banking on 
the politics of a number of countries. 
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system and the autonomy of the private business sector. Henry tested this theory in Egypt 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s but found that Egypt proved to be an unfair test due to a 
unique situation in Egypt in which large amounts of ostensibly ―Islamic‖ capital were 
never incorporated into the Islamic banking system as well as the degeneration of 
political competition between Islamists and the government into violent armed 
confrontations. 
 This dissertation will test Henry‘s theory in Jordan, looking more deeply into the 
actual political and social impact that Islamic banking has had on the country. While 
from the purely financial perspective, as Kuran and El-Gamal show, Islamic financial 
practices may be less efficient than conventional practices, and the practice of Islamic 
economics in countries like Sudan, Iran, or Pakistan - where technically it is the only 
permissible form in the country - has not had any positive impact on growth or poverty 
reduction, it remains to be seen from the political and sociological perspective what 
effects the existence of Islamic banking is having on Muslim societies in which 
significant sections of the population remain distrustful of conventional financial 
practices.   
 Are Islamic bankers in Jordan more transparent and accountable than 
conventional bankers and are the structural aspects of Islamic banking having any impact 
on the worldview of Islamists? Can evidence be found in Jordan that Islamic finance is 
leading to positive social change, not so much because of anything inherent to the Islamic 
practices that make them superior to conventional practices but because they are bringing 
segments of the population that avoided finance in the past into the country‘s financial 
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system? While the extensive technical literature on Islamic financial instruments and 
economics is important, this dissertation will focus on an aspect of Islamic banking that 
has been less studied but that in the long run - as more reflective discussions on Islamic 
banking take place - could help frame future discussions of where Islamic finance will be 
heading. 
 
JORDAN AS A CASE STUDY 
 For a number of reasons, Jordan is an optimal case for looking at the relations 
between Islamic movements and Islamic banks, as well as the larger question of what 
implications the Islamic financial sector has and will have for the political economies of 
Muslim countries. First, Jordan has a very strong and well-established Islamic movement 
that has historically been allowed a greater level of political freedom and maneuver than 
the Islamic movements of most other Arab countries. This relative political freedom has 
also enabled the Islamic movement of Jordan to have some space in which they can 
influence the political process. This is especially true since the 1990s during which the 
Jordanian Parliament was restored and the Islamic Action Front became, by far, the 
largest political party in the country. In addition, Jordan has a strong Islamic banking 
sector, with the Jordan Islamic Bank, established in the late 1970s, being one of the 
pioneers in the field. In the late 1990s, the Arab Bank, one of the largest, strongest, 
oldest, and most well-respected conventional banks in the Arab world, also opened a new 
Islamic bank in the country. 
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 Having both a strong Islamic political movement and a strong Islamic financial 
movement thus makes Jordan an optimal case study for looking at the relations between 
these two movements. In addition, the nature of the Jordanian economy makes it a good 
case study. Jordan is a middle-income country that neither suffers extreme poverty nor 
enjoys the luxury of abundant natural resources. The country‘s ruling elite has long been 
economically dependent on the continuation of huge rents in the form of direct monetary 
aid from the Gulf Arab states and the large remittances that flow into Jordan from 
expatriate workers. When the price of oil declined in the late 1980s and then Jordan was 
seen to support the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, both these forms of rent were lost, 
leading to major economic and political crises in the country. These large rents had long 
distorted the Jordanian economy and their loss forced Jordan to begin tackling some 
major structural problems. What is especially interesting is that this transformation and 
these major economic policy decisions took place at the same time that the Islamic 
movement enjoyed substantial representation in Parliament and thus was able to (or 
perhaps forced to) participate openly in the economic debates that were taking place in 
the country.  
With the rise in oil prices after the turn of the century (and a concomitant rise in 
remittances from Jordanians working in the oil-exporting countries) as well as increased 
foreign aid from the West, Jordan has regained the rents that it historically relied upon. 
The political and economic crises of the late 1980s and 1990s subsided with the increase 
in rents and, in the absence of crisis, Jordan has witnessed a political de-liberalization. 
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The country, however, remains dangerously dependent on outside sources of revenue 
(and the kind of patronage networks that they have enabled the monarchy to establish). 
 While taking Warde‘s caveat into account that the experience of one country 
cannot be generalized to others, Jordan provides a good case study of a country which has 
allowed enough political space for both an Islamist political movement and an Islamic 
financial movement to thrive while at the same time neither is truly co-opted into the 
government. There has been relatively little Islamist-inspired violence in Jordan; and 
while the Islamic movement in the country has at times felt repressed by the government, 
the kind of repression in Jordan has never reached the level of other states in the region.  
At the same time, the Islamic Movement is considered an opposition movement. Even if 
the movement has been careful to avoid direct attacks against the monarchy, the 
movement is clearly critical of many aspects of the kingdom and has been in the forefront 
of calling for political, social, and economic change.  
 
JORDAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 The political liberalization that has taken place in Jordan since the parliamentary 
elections of 1989 has led to a number of studies about the Jordanian political system and 
how the Jordanian state has managed its Islamist movement. Rex Brynen in a 1998 book 
about political liberalization throughout the Arab world notes that Jordan has proceeded 
along the path of political liberalization ―faster (and perhaps farther) than any other 
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country in the Arab World.‖31 Brynen discusses at length the factors that have pushed 
Jordan toward liberalization, including a discussion of the economic factors, as well as 
the impact the Islamist movement has had on liberalization.   
 Wiktorowicz has written an in depth study of the relationship between the 
Jordanian state and various kinds of Islamic expression in Jordan.32 He notes that the 
financial crisis the country suffered from in the 1980s was an important catalyst for 
democratization and political liberalization and explains how in the aftermath of the crisis 
the state has been able to use its bureaucratic codes and procedures to regulate and 
manage the scope and content of Islamist groups in the country. It would be interesting to 
look further into whether the political processes used by the state have also been 
attempted in the field of Islamic finance.   
 The potential implications that Islamic finance could have on both political 
liberalization and economic reform was posited in a survey of the Arab world that 
discusses the effects of globalization on political liberalization in different Middle 
Eastern countries. Henry and Springborg note that Jordan is more amenable to accepting 
economic reform than most other countries in the region.33 They also find that Islamists 
in Jordan offer the monarchy useful political cover during the process of structural 
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economic reform and note that ―it may also not be coincidental‖ that Jordan is ―in the 
forefront of Arab states hosting Islamic banking.‖34   
 The authors recognize the potential connections in Jordan between Islamic 
banking, economic reform, political liberalization, and the relations between the state and 
the Islamist movement. While noting that not enough research has yet been done to gauge 
the level to which Jordanian Islamic banks are linked to Islamist politicians, the authors 
posit that in Jordan it is likely that a variety of Muslim Brothers and other Islamists 
connected with business and financial circles can provide King Abdullah with cover as he 
takes what could potentially be unpopular political and economic decisions. The authors 
assert that:  ―In Amman and elsewhere, coalitions between Islamic financiers and Islamist 
political oppositions could be useful safety valves for incumbent regimes. ... Not only can 
Islamic finance moderate Islamist political oppositions, by giving them stakes in the 
economic system, but it can also legitimate government efforts to reform their respective 
economies.‖35 The potentially far-reaching implications of Islamic finance on a country 
like Jordan have however not been fully researched by studies on the Jordanian economy. 
 Since the late 1990s a number of books have been written about the Jordanian 
economy and business and investment conditions in Jordan. In a book about the 
economic challenges in Jordan and the need for market reform, Piro asserts that there is a 
need to look at the country‘s domestic political structure to understand what will make 
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market reform succeed or fail.36 He discusses the political factors that led to the rise of an 
interventionist state in Jordan and the political factors that sustain such intervention. 
While he notes that the Muslim Brotherhood have called for letting the forces of the free 
market help Jordan cope with its economic problems,37 he doesn‘t look in depth at what 
led to such a political decision by the Brotherhood parliamentarians. Piro also does not 
discuss the financial system in Jordan – much less the potential role Islamic banking is 
playing or can play in market reform - at any length.   
 Like Piro, Carroll makes similar comments about Islamists being generally 
supportive of economic reform and the private sector though she notes that the lack of 
personal ties between the Islamist and business communities has led to 
misunderstandings and tension on some political issues.38 In a book aiming to discuss 
how state-business relations characterized by reciprocity and trust can be fostered in the 
service of development, Carroll declines to mention how governmental support for 
Islamic banking could potentially play a role in fostering trust between the state and the 
country‘s Islamist business elite. 
 Moore also looks at state-business relations in Jordan and how those relations 
have affected economic and political reform.39 Moore however gives more weight to the 
role played by Islamists in the overall evolution of business-state relations in the 
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kingdom. Moore is critical of prevailing social science theories that rely on the 
assumption that domestic business reactions can be explained by structured incentives. 
He asserts that there is a need for a more systematic analysis of the historical-institutional 
legacy of business-state relations and the political context in which businesses are 
operating.   
 In looking at business-state relations in Jordan and Kuwait, Moore finds that the 
outcomes diverge from expectations in that Jordanian business has not been nearly as 
successful as Kuwaiti business in coordinating with the state despite the fact that Jordan 
is a less sectorally and rent-dependent state. Moore asserts that such divergences can be 
explained by looking at political context and most importantly the calculations political 
elites have to make concerning the relative strength of other social rivals for business 
privilege and state power, which in the case of both Jordan and Kuwait is political Islam. 
By bringing political context into the equation of business-state relations, Moore 
underscores the importance of the Islamist factor in Jordanian political and economic 
developments. In light of such an analysis, a further study of how Islamic bankers could 
mediate between the state, business, and the Islamic movement becomes even more 
pertinent.  
 In this dissertation, the role Islamic finance has played in Jordan‘s political 
liberalization, the Islamic movement in Jordan, and the relationship between Islamism 
and political liberalization will be looked at in depth. What has the role of Islamic banks 
been in Jordan and what is their relationship with the political Islamists in the country? 
Do they serve the role of a safety valve for the regime as Henry and Springborg said they 
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could? Have they played the role of giving Jordanian Islamists a stake in the economic 
system and thus moderated Islamist opposition to the state, especially in the area of 
unpopular economic reform legislation? What is the relationship of Islamic bankers in 
Jordan with the country‘s business elite and what role have they played in fostering or 
sabotaging business-state coordination? This dissertation will borrow from Moore‘s 
insights into the role of political context in explaining economic change but look more 
deeply into an area that Moore ignored, namely the role of Islamic banks in the wider 












CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC 
BANKING 
THE MUSLIM WORLD’S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH CONVENTIONAL FINANCE 
 Foreign branches of European commercial banks were established in various parts 
of the Muslim world in the 19
th
 Century.40 The establishment of the banks was part of a 
broader phenomenon of increasing European encroachment on Muslim lands and the 
finance they forwarded was generally geared toward serving the infrastructural and 
commercial needs of foreign trade.41 In the second half of the 19
th
 Century, many Muslim 
governments accumulated huge debts, at unfavorable terms, that in many cases ultimately 
led to bankruptcy and either precipitated foreign occupation, as in Egypt, or resulted in 
foreign control over government finance, as in Turkey. The Muslim world‘s first 
encounter with modern banking and finance was thus a sordid one and provided much of 
the impetus for the call by Muslim intellectuals and Islamic activists for the establishment 
of an alternative system of finance that would not violate Islamic prohibitions on interest-
taking. 
 
ISLAMIC LEGAL CODE 
 The religion of Islam is based on the Qur‘an and the sayings and actions of 
Prophet Muhammad (known as the Sunnah). Muslim religious jurists compiled and 
                                                 
40 The East India Company established a bank in India as early as 1809 and the French began opening 
branches of French banks in Algeria in 1851. The Banque de Constantinople was established as the first 
bank of the Ottoman Empire in 1840 during the period of European inspired reform in the Ottoman state. 
See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (Oxford University Press, London, 1968), 111. 
41 Charles Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa, (Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1982.) 
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organized all the collected sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad and then using 
them along with the Qur‘an developed an Islamic legal code known as the shari’a. In 
addition to religious affairs (the correct way to pray, fast etc.) the shari’a covers personal 
matters (to the extent of how to eat, sleep etc.) as well as important social, political, and 
economic affairs of state and government. While the shari’a is not clear on every matter 
and there are certainly many issues that are open to more than one interpretation, Islamic 
religious scholars overwhelmingly agree that it is a religious obligation upon all Muslims 
to follow the shari’a in all aspects of their lives.    
 The most explicit aspect of the shari’a that deals with economic affairs is the 
prohibition on riba. The Arabic word riba, which is usually translated as interest, occurs 
in the Qur‘an and was mentioned by Prophet Muhammad a number of times. The most 
explicit Qur‘anic verses occur in Chapter 2. In verses 275 and 276 of Chapter 2, the 
Quran states:   
 
―Those who take riba will not stand except as stands someone who has 
been driven to insanity by the touch of Satan. That is because they say: 
‗Trading is like riba, whereas God has permitted trading and forbidden 
riba. Those who after receiving the admonition from their Lord stop 
taking riba shall not be punished for the past, their cases are for God to 
judge, but whoever repeats, they are the dwellers of the Fire – they will 
abide therein forever. God will destroy riba and will give increase for 
sadaqaat (deeds of charity).‖  
 
 After these general verses, the Qur‘anic prohibition on riba is continued. In verses 
278 and 279, the Quran states:  ―Oh you who believe, be cognizant of God and give up 
what remains (due to you) from riba if you are really believers. If you do not, then be 
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warned of a war from God and His Messenger, but if you repent, you shall have your 
capital sums. Deal not unjustly and you shall not be dealt with unjustly.‖ 
 One of the companions of Prophet Muhammad, Jabeer, reported that: ―The 
Messenger of God – peace be upon him – cursed the one who takes riba, the one who 
pays it, the one who writes a contract in which it is mentioned and the witnesses to such a 
contract. He said that they are all equal in sin.‖  
 In addition to these clear prohibitions against riba, the prophet also prohibited 
gharar, or ambiguous sales. The prohibitions against gharar are derived from sayings of 
Prophet Muhammad that forbade such things as the sale of fish in the sea (i.e. selling for 
a determined price whatever is caught by a fisherman on a particular day), horses still in 
the wombs, or a crop yield on a certain field before the crop has actually grown. The fact 
that the prophet prohibited both riba and gharar was indicative of the fact that both 
practices were widespread in the society in which he lived. In fact, the prophet‘s uncle 
Abbas was a moneylender who had derived substantial wealth from lending on interest 
and in one of the prophet‘s famous speeches, he asserted that henceforth all 
moneylenders must give up the interest owed to them and he said that the money owed to 
Abbas was the first to be forgiven. 
 During the prophet‘s lifetime and for hundreds of years afterwards, the shari’a 
was truly the main source of legislation for commercial and civil matters in Islamic 
states. Muslim jurists subjected commercial practices to close scrutiny and derived a 
number of contractual templates that enabled Islamic states to become commercial and 
trading leaders of the world while not violating the prohibitions against riba and gharar.  
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 Until today the constitutions of nearly all Muslim majority countries have a clause 
stipulating that the shari’a is the major source of legislation in the country. However, in 
reality, when most of these countries came under occupation during the colonial era, new 
legal systems adopted from European models were derived and have remained even after 
the countries gained formal independence. The shari’a continues to be used for family 
law matters (such as marriage and divorce) but for almost nothing else. The dichotomy 
between claiming to follow the shari’a and actually following European derived legal 
codes is a lingering source of tension in many Muslim countries and many Muslims see 
the commercial laws of their countries - in which interest-based banking systems are the 
predominant and state-supported form of finance - as one of the clearest examples of the 




 CENTURY:  DEBT AND THE CRITIQUE OF CONVENTIONAL FINANCE 
 The Muslim world‘s first encounter with modern banking and international 
finance came in the context of 19
th
 Century colonial practices that weakened Muslim 
countries and tied them into an international financial system in a manner that did not 
serve their developmental or economic interests. The fact that such financial practices 
also contradicted fundamental Islamic religious beliefs opened them up to early criticism 
from Muslim scholars who saw them as clear deviations from the shari’a. The critique 
was most pronounced in Egypt, which was the most economically developed country in 
the Muslim world in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century and also the center of Islamic 
learning, being the seat of Al-Azhar, the world‘s most prestigious Islamic university.   
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 Looking at the historical situation in Egypt helps in understanding the context in 
which this critique started. Having taken its first foreign loan in 1859, Egypt was in so 
much debt by 1865 – largely incurred to build the Suez Canal - that it could no longer 
even pay the interest on its loans.42 Egypt‘s financial crisis led to the establishment of the 
Caisse de la Dette Publique in 1876 which constituted a body of four European 
commissioners appointed to supervise Egyptian state revenue and expenditure. When the 
Egyptian ruler, Ismail, refused to abide by some of their demands he was deposed by the 
British in 1879. Under his successor a nationalist movement that was critical of Egypt 
having come under European financial control grew in strength and the British army took 
formal control over Egypt in 1882 with the argument that they were needed to protect 
British investments in the country. The British occupation of Egypt lasted until 1954. 
    During the early years of the British occupation, the debate over banking and 
finance became pronounced. While most of the Muslim scholars from Al-Azhar 
University continued to argue that interest and banking was forbidden in all their forms, 
many Egyptian nationalists began arguing that there was a need to establish an Egyptian 
– as opposed to foreign-owned bank - that would serve the industrial needs of the 
country. Talaat Harb led the movement calling for the establishment of a national bank 
that would be financed with Egyptian capital. Harb was very critical of the European 
banks but noted that Egypt needed a national bank to provide the financing needed for 
industrialization.   
                                                 
42 Afaf Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1985), page 
68. 
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 Some Muslim scholars, including the well-respected Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, 
found Harb‘s arguments about the necessity for a national bank convincing and, looking 
deeper into how modern financial practices worked, concluded that interest on savings 
accounts and for investment purposes did not constitute the forbidden riba.43 The 
scholars who opposed Abduh‘s interpretation of riba were weakened by the fact that they 
could not forward any alternative financial practice or system that could take the place of 
modern banking institutions. The support of Abduh and like-minded Muslim scholars 
was an important factor that enabled Harb to found Bank Misr in 1920. Similar national 
conventional banks were founded in other Muslim countries at around the same time. 
 
ISLAMIC ECONOMICS 
 Largely as a reaction against increasing foreign cultural and economic 
encroachments on Muslim lands and in response to the 1924 abolishment of the Caliphate 
– the last remaining symbol of Muslim political unity and rule by the shari’a - Muslim 
intellectuals and activists in the early 20
th
 Century began calling for rediscovering Islam 
as the basis for a new social and political system. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded 
in Egypt in 1928 with the goal of establishing a truly ―Islamic State‖ that would rule in 
accordance with Islamic precepts. The Jamaat-e-Islami was founded on the Indian 
subcontinent in 1941 with the same goals.  
                                                 
43 Randolph Peters, ―Divine Law or Man-Made Law? Egypt and the Application of the Sharia,‖ Arab Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1988, page 234. 
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 As part of the larger call for a return to Islam and away from Western influences, 
the economic system of the West was heavily criticized and Islamic parties, groups, and 
intellectuals began calling for the establishment of an Islamic economic system that 
would be more just than either the prevailing Capitalist or Communist systems. Sayyid 
Abul A‘la Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami coined the term ―Islamic 
economics‖ in the 1940s and wrote profusely on the evils of interest and theorized that an 
interest-free economy would be more just.44 Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Muhammad Baqir 
Al-Sadr in Iraq also wrote on the subject of Islamic economics and in the 1940s and 
1950s the idea that Islam could provide an alternative economic and financial system to 
the prevailing systems that had recently been incorporated into the Muslim world from 
the West became popularized and the promotion of such a system became one of the 
main planks of Islamic movements that aimed at the comprehensive return to Islamic 
principles in all walks of life.45 
 These early writers on Islamic economics were either religious scholars or 
journalists and had no formal training and very little actual understanding or knowledge 
of economics.46 They made only casual references to banking in the discussion of wider 
issues relating to the Islamic economic system as a whole.47 However, as the idea of an 
                                                 
44 Timur Kuran, ―Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy,‖ The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 9, no. 4, (Autumn, 1995), pp. 155-173. 
45 The most prominent books written in this genre were Sayyid Qutb, al-Adalat al-ijtima’iyah fi l-Islam, 
(Social Justice in Islam), first published in 1948 and Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr‘s book Iqtisaduna (Our 
Economics) first published in 1961. See Muhammad Siddiqui, Muslim Economic Thinking:  A Survey of 
Contemporary Literature, (The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1981). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Muhammad Ariff, ―Islamic Banking,‖ Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2, no. 2, (September 
1988), pp. 46-62. 
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alternative Islamic economics became more popularized, trained economists in the 
Muslim world began offering theoretical models of banking and finance as a substitute 
for interest-based banking.   
 In 1955, Mohammad Uzair developed a model based on classical Islamic laws 
and commercial contracts that allowed Muslims to invest partnership capital with others 
who would use the capital in a productive manner.48 In Uzair‘s model, the Islamic bank 
would undertake two such contracts – the first with the depositor and the second with an 
entrepreneur. Rather than charging an interest-rate to the entrepreneur, the Islamic bank 
would be entitled to a percentage of the entrepreneur‘s profits. Rather than giving an 
interest rate to the depositor, the bank would distribute a percentage of its overall profits 
to its depositors. While there were many practical difficulties in applying Uzair‘s model, 
it laid the framework for a plethora of later studies in which trained economists discussed 
banking and other financial practices within the confines of Islamic law. 
 The first modern experiments applying the principles of Islamic finance were 
undertaken in the 1960s in Egypt and Malaysia. The efforts in Egypt were pioneered by 
Ahmad El Najjar who established a savings bank in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr in 
1963.49 The bank invested in trade and industry, directly or in partnership with others, 
and shared its profits with depositors. The bank was founded at a time in which Islamists 
were being severely repressed by the Egyptian state and El Najjar thus undertook his 
experiment without labeling it Islamic. Despite his attempt to keep the Islamic nature of 
                                                 
48 Mohammad Uzair, An Outline for Interestless Banking (Raihan Publications, Karachi, 1955) cited by 
Frank Vogel and Samuel Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance:  Religion, Risk and Return, (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1998), pp. 130-131. 
49 Ariff, 1988, p. 46. 
 45 
the bank secret, many known Islamists worked at the bank and while the bank closed 
after five years, the experiment continued to motivate Islamists in Egypt, Jordan and 
elsewhere.   
 The Malaysian experiment, Tabung Haji Malaysia, began in 1962 as an 
investment fund that enabled Malaysians to save the money needed to undertake the 
Islamically mandated pilgrimage to Mecca.50 Rather than provide an interest rate on the 
savings, the fund invested the money and provided depositors with a share of the profit. 
Similar to a mutual fund account, the Tabung Haji Malaysia was touted as an Islamic 
alternative to interest-based financial institutions and continues to exist until today 
making it the oldest Islamic financial institution in modern times. The success of the fund 
encouraged Muslims throughout the world to work for the adoption of Islamic 
alternatives to interest-based financial practices. 
 
ISLAMIC BANKS 
 Islamic banking took a major leap in the mid to late 1970s with the establishment 
of a number of modern Islamic banks.51 The first was the Dubai Islamic Bank (1975) 
followed by the Kuwait Finance House (1977), the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (1977), 
the Islamic Bank of Sudan (1977), the Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment 
(1978), the Bahrain Islamic Bank (1978), and the International Islamic Bank for 
Investment and Development in Egypt (1980). A number of international Islamic 
                                                 
50 Mervyn Lewis and Latifa Algaoud, Islamic Banking, (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2001), 6. 
51 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
2000), 75. 
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investment banks were also established at around the same time including the Islamic 
Investment Company in Nassau (1977), the Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf in 
Sharjah (1978), the Shariah Investment Services in Geneva (1980), and the Bahrain 
Islamic Investment Bank in Manama (1980). 
 The rapid rise in oil prices after 1973, which led to abundant capital accumulation 
in the Arabian Gulf countries, was a major impetus to the establishment of the Islamic 
banks. While by the 1970s, conventional banks had existed in the Muslim world for 
nearly a century, there were still many Muslims who refused to place their funds in 
interest-bearing accounts and the Islamic banks were a means of incorporating many of 
those idle funds into a financial system. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was also a strong 
proponent of the establishment of a pan-Islamic Bank and at the 1974 Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Pakistan he led the effort to establish the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB), which came into existence in 1975. The IDB was primarily 
used to facilitate the flow of investment and assistance from the oil-exporting countries to 
other Muslim nations and as a means of promoting trade and development among the 
members of the OIC. While at least initially the majority of the bank‘s profits came from 
interest bearing deposits with foreign banks, the IDB also engaged in Islamic financing 
practices with member countries and has over the years been the foremost promoter of 
studies on Islamic economics and financial practices.52    
                                                 
52 Nicholas Dylan Ray, Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law, (Graham and Trotman, 
London, 1995) p. 6. 
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 Since the establishment of the first Islamic banks in the mid-1970s, the industry 
has continued growing at a rapid pace. The establishment of new banks has corresponded 
with the growth of publications and academic studies on the concept of Islamic 
economics with numerous international conferences being held annually as well as the 
establishment of specialized research institutions and increasingly university departments 
that teach and provide degrees in Islamic economics. Concomitantly, there has been a 
rapid rise in the amount of time Islamic shari’a scholars spend debating and writing 
about the Islamic permissibility and prohibitions of certain economic practices. 
 Throughout the 1980s the governments of three countries, Pakistan, Iran and 
Sudan, all of which claimed legitimacy through Islam, declared their intention and 
worked toward the full Islamization of their economies including prohibiting interest-
based banking in their countries. In other Muslim countries, Islamic banks continued 
proliferating alongside conventional banks with different degrees of governmental 
assistance and support. Malaysia and Bahrain are marked out as countries in which the 
governments made deliberate attempts to help their Islamic financial sectors become 
world leaders in the field and in which Islamic finance became a principal tool in the 
country‘s overall developmental policies.53 
 In 1991 the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions was founded in Bahrain and counted most Islamic banks throughout the 
world as members working toward establishing agreed-upon standards for Islamic banks 
                                                 
53 Warde, (2000), pgs. 123-129. 
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in the areas of accounting, auditing, governance, and shari’a compliance.54 The felt need 
to establish such standards is an indicator of the increasing international recognition 
accorded to Islamic banking.   
 This recognition is also apparent in the fact that the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund published numerous working papers and articles on Islamic 
banking starting in the mid-1980s. Harvard University became a major center for 
research on Islamic finance with the establishment of the Harvard Islamic Finance 
Information Program in 1995. Harvard University has since held annual conferences on 
Islamic finance and published numerous books and articles on the subject. Large 
international conventional banks in the United States and Europe began opening Islamic 
financial windows in the 1990s to cater both to investors from the Muslim world as well 
as increasingly to the Muslim populations in the Western countries. Muslims living in the 
United States and in many Western European countries can now purchase homes through 
American and European banks using Islamic financing methods. The United Kingdom 
has gone further than any other Western country in accommodating Islamic finance and 
even changed its tax laws in 2005 and 2006 to provide the same kinds of incentives and 
advantages to those dealing in Islamic finance as those dealing in conventional financial 
practices.55   
 
                                                 
54 See the webpage for the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions at: 
http://www.aaoifi.com. 
55 Mohammed Amin, ―The Taxation of Islamic Finance in Major Western Countries,‖ Arab Banking 
Review.  The article can be found on the website: http://pwc.blogs.com/mohammed_amin/files/.pdf 
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BANKING WITHOUT INTEREST:  PROFIT-SHARING CONTRACTS 
 Avoiding riba is the central tenet of Islamic banking. While there is some 
disagreement over the meaning of riba, most religious scholars have interpreted it as 
interest in all its forms. To avoid interest, Muslim scholars, economists, and lawyers have 
established a number of interest-free contracts that Islamic banks then adopt in their 
dealings with depositors (investors) and entrepreneurs.56 Most of these contracts are 
named after pre-modern financial contracts that were used hundreds of years ago as part 
of the commercial law in the Muslim world. While Islamic law forbids interest, the 
undertaking of commerce and the making of profits is encouraged in Islamic law and 
there are many details about how the companions of Prophet Muhammad and later 
generations of Muslims undertook financial transactions while avoiding riba. While the 
modern contracts now used by Islamic banks share many aspects of the pre-modern 
commercial contracts they emulate, they are also modified to act as alternatives to 
conventional financial and banking practices in ways that Islamic scholars have judged to 
be within the purview of Islamic prohibitions on riba.  
 
Mudaraba 
 The mudaraba is the most basic form of Islamic banking contract and lies at the 
heart of the theory of Islamic banking. It was widely used throughout Islamic history, 
                                                 
56 For a good description of these various contracts see:  Frank Vogel and Samuel Hayes, Islamic Law and 
Finance: Religion, Risk and Return, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998), pgs. 138-154; Mervyn 
Lewis, and Latifa Algaoud, Islamic Banking, (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2001), pgs. 39 – 61; 
and Nicholas Ray, Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law, ( Graham and Trotman, London, 
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including by Prophet Muhammad himself, and is the kind of contract that was discussed 
by Maududi and other Pakistani scholars in the 1940s as the alternative to interest-based 
systems. It is also the kind of contract that Mohammed Uzair developed a model for in 
1955, thus laying the groundwork for the later establishment of Islamic banks. The 
mudaraba is a contract based on the premise that while Islam forbids interest, it allows 
for the use of capital to earn profit through legitimate business ventures. In Islamic law, 
there is a difference between a fixed ―rate of interest‖ and a ―rate of return‖ based on the 
amount of profit or loss that a business enterprise experiences.   
 In a mudaraba contract, a financier entrusts funds to an entrepreneur to undertake 
commercial activities in return for a specified share in the profit of those activities. The 
specified share of the profit must be on a proportional basis and cannot provide for a 
lump-sum or guaranteed return to the investor. If the activities lose money, the financier 
will have to bear the full weight of those losses while the entrepreneur loses the time and 
effort that has been expended. The main difference between interest-based finance and 
financing based on profit-sharing, is that in the former the financial losses fall upon the 
borrower who must repay the capital plus a fixed interest rate while in the latter any 
financial losses that accrue are born completely by the lender while the borrower loses 
only human capital (in the form of time and effort).57 
 The model that Uzair developed in 1955 has been called the two-tier mudaraba 
with the Islamic bank acting as the intermediary between the depositors (or investors) and 
the entrepreneurs. The bank receives funds from the public on the basis of unrestricted 
                                                 
57 Lewis and Algaoud, p. 42 
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mudaraba in which the depositors trust the banks judgment in properly investing the 
money (in this situation, the bank is acting as the entrepreneur). The bank then acts as the 
financier in providing funds to other entrepreneurs for the undertaking of specified 
projects of specified duration with a separate mudaraba contract in which a pre-
determined percentage of the profit returns to the bank as well as the eventual return of 
the capital (unless there was a capital loss in which the bank cannot demand a return that 
would require the entrepreneur to suffer any financial loss). The bank then aggregates all 
of the profits it accrues from its various investments with entrepreneurs and returns a 
percentage to its depositors. In the event of a loss, it is possible that depositors will lose a 
proportional share or potentially even their entire deposit.  
 
Musharaka 
 A second related type of contract is the musharaka, or partnership contract. The 
main difference between a mudaraba and a musharaka contract is that in a musharaka 
contract both parties (the financier and the entrepreneur) contribute capital to a venture 
and thus can both suffer capital losses. According to most interpretations of Islamic law, 
those losses must be divided strictly according to capital investment, whereas a larger 
proportion of the profit can be allocated to the party responsible for most of the 
partnership‘s work.58 Musharaka contracts are very similar to venture capital schemes in 
which financiers are given equity in the venture in which they invest. As partners in the 
venture the banks accept the risk of loss by the firms. In the event the firm succeeds, the 
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bank has a permanent equity investment in the venture that can yield a pre-determined 
percentage of the profit. The bank‘s initial investment provides it with shares in the 
venture that the bank can keep - and thus continue accruing profits - or sell back to the 
entrepreneur to recover its capital. 
 While mudaraba contracts remain the basis for the deposit side of the banking 
equation, Islamic banks are much more likely to engage in musharaka contracts with 
investors since the risk that the venture will fail – and the bank will thus lose its 
investment – is mitigated substantially when entrepreneurs provide a portion of the 
capital for a venture. However, both mudaraba and musharaka contracts are far 
overshadowed by a third type of contract known as murabaha, which while far from the 




 The murabaha is a sale contract in which a bank buys a good and then sells it to a 
customer at a marked up price with a delayed payment. For example, a bank could 
purchase a home for $150 thousand and then sell it to a customer for $200 thousand due 
in 10 years. While it would seem closer to the spirit of the shari’a for Islamic banks to act 
as merchants in which they purchase many goods and sell them to customers in the 
market, in reality nearly all murabaha contracts undertaken by Islamic banks are 
commissioned in the sense that a customer commissions a bank to make a specific 
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purchase which the customer agrees in advance to purchase from the bank at a pre-
determined markup.59    
 In economic terms, murabaha contracts are very similar to interest finance, and 
Islamic banks base their markup price – even if they don‘t openly acknowledge it – on 
LIBOR and other economic indicators. In legal terms however, there are some important 
differences. Technically, the Islamic bank must own the good which it later sells to the 
customer and cannot offer a purely monetary loan to a customer. By owning the good, the 
Islamic bank bears some risks – such as that the goods will be destroyed or that they have 
defects or that the seller may ultimately decide not to purchase it. Islamic banks have 
come up with means to avoid these risks – most notably by agreeing with the customer in 
advance that the second sale (in which the bank sells the good to the customer) occurs at 
the same instant as the bank gains title under the first sale. 
 While the theoretical work on Islamic banking focuses on the profit-sharing 
contracts of mudaraba and musharaka, about 80 percent of actual Islamic bank 
investments are consumed in the trade-financing murabaha contracts60 and most of the 
actual legal and economic discussions about Islamic banking – especially in the initial 
years - dealt with how to make murabaha contracts a shari’a-compliant modern 
alternative to interest finance. As a result of criticisms by some Islamic scholars that 
many murabaha transactions were intentional tricks by bankers aiming at providing 
interest finance, many Islamic institutions vowed to lower their murabaha portfolios.   
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 In the 1990s, leasing (or ijara) became the fastest growing activity of Islamic 
financial institutions.61 Ijara contracts are very similar to conventional leasing contracts 
and became increasingly used by Islamic banks in the 1990s for the retail financing of 
home mortgages and the purchases of cars and other household needs through lease-to-
purchase agreements. In an ijara contract, the banks ownership of the good being leased 
is not in any doubt and is thus less controversial than the murabaha contract. In an 
example of a lease-to-purchase agreement for a home worth $100 thousand, the bank 
would pay $90 thousand and the customer would pay a $10 thousand down payment and 
thus own 10% of the home as opposed to the bank‘s 90%. The bank would then rent out 
its 90% of the home to the customer at 90% of the standard rental rate for properties of 
that nature. In addition to the rental payment, the customer could pay an additional 
amount that would enable him to own an increasing percentage of the home and thus 
lower his rental payments over time until taking over complete ownership of the home.   
 Islamic law demands certain things in an ijara contract that make them slightly 
less flexible than conventional leasing arrangements. For example, the duty to repair the 
goods always falls on the lessor in Islamic law and Islamic law clearly gives the lessee 
much broader scope to cancel the lease than is sometimes found in conventional leasing 
arrangements.62 In practice many Islamic banks sidestep these Islamic requirements by 
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requiring the lessee to insure the property (which is itself controversial in Islamic law) 
and to require valid legal reasons for breaking a lease. 
 
Sukuk 
 One of the most important recent innovations in Islamic finance has been the 
development of an instrument akin to a tradeable bond that for the first time has allowed 
for the establishment of an Islamic capital market. The sukuk can be based either on the 
ijara lease-to-purchase concept or on a musharaka basis and involves a number of 
individual steps – all of which are shari’a-compliant – resulting in security instruments 
that are acceptable to conventional investors and even rated by international rating 
agencies like Moody‘s and Standard & Poor‘s.63 One of the main differences between a 
sukuk and a conventional bond is that the sukuk must be asset-based.   
 For example, if a government needed to finance the construction of a road, it 
could sell a stretch of land for say $500 million to an Islamic financial institution or a 
special purchasing company (SPC) established solely for the purpose of the transaction. 
The SPC would then lease back the land to the government for say $25 million a year for 
five years with an agreement that the government could fully repurchase the land after 
five years for the originally paid $500 million. The SPC would then create a trust in 
respect of the land and issue a 5-year sukuk to raise $500 million. Beneficiaries could 
purchase trust instruments that would confer upon them ownership of the land but would 
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require that they accept the conditions of the trust. These instruments would entitle them 
to a share in the rental income derived from the use of the land and could be bought and 
sold in a capital market. As the government pays the rental income on the land the sukuk 
holders would gain a proportion of the payments and after the conclusion of the five 
years when the SPC sells the land back to the government for $500 million, the proceeds 
from the sale would be returned to the sukuk holders. 
 
SIZE AND GROWTH OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 The first sukuk was issued by the State of Bahrain in 2001 for $250 million 
marking a major milestone in Islamic finance.64 The innovation of the sukuk has led to 
the birth of a rapidly growing Islamic capital market that is allowing Islamic banks to 
overcome one of the major challenges they have faced since their inception in the 1970s, 
mainly the inefficiencies caused by having high levels of liquidity - confronted because 
of the difficulties Islamic banks face in locating short-term investment opportunities. By 
2007, Standard & Poor‘s estimated that the total sukuk market had reached $70 billion.65 
In 2008 and 2009 new sukuk issuance fell from the 2007 high but in 2010 it regained its 
rapid growth trajectory and by the end of the year the total sukuk market was estimated at 
$100 billion.66 
                                                 
64 Haneef, p. 30. 
65 Roula Khalaf and Gillian Tett, ―Backwater Sector Moves Into Global Mainstream,‖ Islamic Finance:  
Financial Times Special Report, May 23, 2007, p. 1. 
66 Querbin Minas, ―Prospects for Sukuk Market Brighter,‖ Saudi Gazette, Dec. 27, 2010, 
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010122489885 
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 Since the turn of the century, high oil revenues, an increasing sense of Islamic 
identity across the Muslim world, and innovative new products such as the sukuk which 
have made Islamic finance more competitive, have all contributed to phenomenal growth 
in Islamic finance. Accurately tracking that growth is difficult since there are currently no 
aggregate data on Islamic banking across countries. The lack of standardization also 
presents a problem. There are different definitions of what constitutes true Islamic 
banking or finance and Islamic banks – lacking the kind of standardization that is present 
with conventional banks – measure their assets in different ways. Thus while data on the 
size of individual Islamic banks can be found, just adding them up will not provide an 
accurate picture of the size of Islamic finance globally.   
 The best estimate of the size of the assets held in Islamic financial institutions in 
the year 2000 was $200 billion.67 In 2005, the General Council of Islamic Banks and 
Financial Institutions released an Islamic Finance Directory that estimated total assets in 
Islamic Banks and Islamic banking windows of conventional banks at $450 billion.68 In 
2007, The Banker began publishing an annual report – Top 500 Islamic Financial 
Institutions – that became recognized as the most accurate rendering of the overall size of 
the Islamic financial industry. In 2010, the Banker estimated that Islamic financial assets 
                                                 
67 Warde, p. 1. 
68 The information on the General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBAFI) is 
quoted as the most accurate estimate by the Islamic Research & Training Institute of the Islamic 
Development Bank, the Islamic Financial Services Board, and the Islamic Research and Training Institute 
in a joint paper entitled, ―Islamic Financial Services Industry Development:  Ten-Year Framework and 
Strategies,‖ which was posted on the website of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in June, 2007 
at the site: http://www.ifsb.org/view.php?ch=4&pg=261&ac=26&fname=file&dbIndex=0&ex= 
1179827227&md=%D1Na%FC%E76%3D%2C%C4%EF.t%60%80%27%BF 
 58 
had reached $895 billion.69 Assuming the accuracy of these numbers, it shows an annual 
increase in Islamic financial assets of nearly 17%. The Banker has made an attempt to 
include non-commercial banking financial institutions such as Islamic insurance 
companies and investment banks in its survey but notes that there are clear shortcomings 
in their ability to fully account for these institutions contribution to the industry as a 
whole while the Banker also left out some important conventional banks with large 
Islamic finance windows. The institutions included in their survey do not fully account 
for the $100 billion sukuk industry nor for the totality of money invested in shari’a-
compliant mutual funds and shari’a-compatible stocks which some had estimated at more 
than $300 billion in 2005.70 During the March, 2007 annual meeting of the Islamic 
Financial Services Board, it was estimated that the entire Islamic Financial Services 
industry had topped one trillion dollars.71 Warde, using the same method he used to come 
up with the $200 billion figure in 2000, estimates that the total size of Islamic financial 
instruments had reached $1.3 trillion by 2010.72  
 Table 2.1 explains some of this growth over the ten-year period from 1993 to 
2003 in comparison to the commercial banking sector which was also growing rapidly in 
the countries under question. The data for the Islamic bank assets was taken from the 
Islamic Banks Information System (IBIS) online database which does not include data  
                                                 
69 Joseph DiVanna and Brian Caplen, The Banker: Top 500 Islamic Financial Institutions, (The Banker, 
Nov. 2, 2010). 
70 These figures come from the ten-year framework discussed in the above footnote. 
71 The estimate was made by the Governor of the Malaysian Central Bank. 
72 Warde (2010), 1. 
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Table 2.1   Islamic Bank assets as a share of total bank assets in selected countries 
  1993 1998 2003  
Egypt Islamic Bank Assets 5460.7 6843.63 13946.49 millions of 
Faisal Islamic Bank Total Bank Assets 198250 329562 577937 Egyptian 
pounds 
 Islamic Bank Share 2.75% 2.08% 2.41%  
      
including: Islamic Bank Assets  16727.58  
Egypt-Saudi Finance 
Bank 
Total Bank Assets   577937  
 Islamic Bank Share   2.89%  
      
Jordan Islamic Bank Assets 528.26 706.67 1159.2 millions of 
Jordan Islamic Bank Total Bank Assets 6747.5 10460.3 15701.5 Jordanian 
dinars 
 Islamic Bank Share 7.83% 6.76% 7.38%  
      
including:  Islamic Bank Assets 843.96 1544.7  
Islamic Int. Arab Bank Total Bank Assets  10460.3 15701.5  
 Islamic Bank Share  8.07% 9.84%  
      
Saudi Arabia Islamic Bank Assets 28598.49 38055.45 64678.32 millions of 
Al-Rajhi Total Bank Assets 320754 404306 545208 Saudi Riyals 
 Islamic Bank Share 8.92% 9.41% 11.86%  
      
including: Islamic Bank Assets 42982.04 73667.01  
Bank al-Jazira Total Bank Assets  404306 545208  
 Islamic Bank Share  10.63% 13.51%  
      
Kuwait Islamic Bank Assets 1156.01 1669.21 3041.11 millions of  
Kuwait Finance House Total Bank Assets 9068.55 12965 18329.85 Kuwaiti 
Dinars 
 Islamic Bank Share 12.75% 12.87% 16.59%  
      
including other Islamic Bank Assets 1175.97 1794.66 4075.81  
Islamic investment 
houses 
Total Bank Assets 9068.55 12965 18329.85  
 Islamic Bank Share 12.97% 13.84% 22.24%  
      
Sources:  The Islamic Banks Information System of the Islamic Banks and Finance Division of the  
Islamic Development Bank, Annual bank reports, and the Central Banks of Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
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for the conventional banks that have Islamic window operations and that are prominent in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt.73 The table measures bank assets rather than the 
Islamic bank shares of commercial deposits since the lack of standardization means that 
different Islamic banks measure deposits in different ways. Henry and Wilson have 
shown that the shares Islamic banks have in commercial bank deposits is higher than 
these figures on shares in bank assets.74 The total assets of the Islamic banks as measured 
by the IBIS database was compared to the overall assets held by the commercial banks in 
the selected countries as measured by those countries central banks.   
 In each of the four selected countries, a major Islamic bank had been prominent 
for a number of years and another Islamic bank was then established during the period of 
study (in the case of Kuwait, during the period of study three other financial institutions 
registered with IBIS in addition to the Kuwait Finance House). The table measures both 
the evolving share of the major Islamic bank as well as the overall share when including 
the newer financial institutions. 
 The table shows that growth in the assets held by Islamic banks in Egypt and 
Jordan as a percentage of overall banking assets is much slower than it is in the wealthier 
oil-exporting countries of the Gulf. This is also true for non-banking Islamic financial 
                                                 
73 The online database can be found at: http://www.ibisonline.net.  The Islamic Banks Information System 
is a project of the Islamic Banks and Finance Division of the Islamic Development Bank.  The data in the 
database was compared against the annual statements of the JIB and the Islamic International Arab Bank 
and was found to be the same in all cases except the 2003 figures for the JIB, in which the JIB annual 
statement showed a higher figure for total assets ( JD1159.2 million) than shown in the IBIS database (JD 
975.49 million).  Assuming that a mistake was made in the database figures, the chart shows figures from 
the JIB annual report for JIB total assets in 2003. 
74 Clement Henry and Rodney Wilson, ―Introduction,‖ in The Politics of Islamic Finance (Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 2004) p. 7.  
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practices such as sukuk, Islamic insurance (takaful), and Islamic mutual funds and other 
forms of Islamic investments that have grown rapidly in the Arab gulf countries but much 
more slowly in less wealthy Muslim countries. Since 2003, the share of Islamic banking 
and other financial practices as an overall share of banking and finance has continued 
growing, especially in the oil wealthy countries of the Gulf, and – though it may seem 
overly optimistic - some analysts are now predicting that it could capture half the overall 
savings of Muslims throughout the world by 2020.75 
 
CHALLENGES FACING ISLAMIC BANKING 
 Since its inception, Islamic banking has been closely linked with the oil market.  
The first banks were started after the 1973 oil price hike. Many pious Muslims suddenly 
had excess capital and while they did not want to contradict their religious beliefs they 
were no longer willing to place their money in non-interest bearing accounts. The clear 
need for an institutionalized Islamic way to invest such excess capital was largely 
responsible for the early success of Islamic banks. While Islamic banks stagnated 
somewhat in the late 1980s and early 1990s during the oil price slump, since the turn of 
the century they have again witnessed phenomenal growth in the oil wealthy countries of 
the Gulf where another oil price hike again resulted in excess capital in the region. While 
certainly there have been a number of important innovations in Islamic finance in the past 
five years that have made the industry more competitive and enabled it to begin tackling 
                                                 
75 See May 23, 2007 ―Backwater Sector‖ article by Roula Khalaf. 
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some of the challenges it faced since its inception,76 the fact that the recent spurt is again 
linked to an oil price hike partially masks the fact that many important challenges and 
problems remain.  
 
Excess Liquidity  
 A perennial challenge that has faced Islamic banks since their inception has been 
that they receive more deposits than they can readily and easily invest. Part of the 
problem is due to the fact that the ideal profit-sharing Islamic investments using 
mudaraba and musharaka contracts are inherently risky ventures, especially in non-
transparent and accountable political and economic environments in which it is relatively 
easy for an investor taking a loan from an Islamic bank to hide real profits and thus not 
pay the bank their full due. The banks are thus left with undertaking simple murabaha 
and ijara trade-financing schemes that cannot absorb all the capital deposited in Islamic 
banks.   
 Furthermore, the inability of Islamic banks to borrow money in the interest-
denominated interbank market means that Islamic banks must keep a comfortable amount 
of capital on hand to be able to meet the withdrawal demands of clients. The real 
challenge facing Islamic banks is thus the lack of a well-developed Islamic capital market 
that can provide Islamic banks with an avenue for liquidity management and more 
                                                 
76 For a good recent article on the kinds of innovations that are now being developed for the Islamic 
financial industry see, Gillian Tett, ―Innovation:  Frenzied Race to Develop New Ideas,‖ Islamic Finance:  
Financial Times Special Report, May 23, 2007, p. 2. 
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efficient use of their excess funds.77 The recent developments in the sukuk market may 
help Islamic banks alleviate this problem as they potentially serve as an Islamic 
alternative to fixed-interest government treasury bills or bonds, a second major source of 
secure short-term investments for conventional banks. Currently the sukuk market is still 
very new however and the potential for trading sukuk in a secondary market has not yet 
been realized.78 The inability to participate in the interbank market or to trade in 
government treasury bills and bonds and the continued lack of a strong sukuk secondary 
market means that the most viable avenue for Islamic banks to solve their excess liquidity 
problem is through international commodity transactions based on murabaha contracts 
which pay a lower return than the interbank market.   
 
Competitive Disadvantage 
 By adopting shari’a restrictions on how to place their funds, Islamic banks face a 
major competitive disadvantage when compared to conventional banks.79 As a result, 
Islamic banks pay depositors ―profits‖ on their ―investments‖ that are typically lower 
than the interest rate – despite the fact that depositors in Islamic banks accept a factor of 
risk that depositors in conventional banks do not face. The Islamic banks themselves also 
                                                 
77 See page 26 of the IFSB ten-year framework for a discussion of this challenge. 
78 See Standard & Poor‘s Commentary Report, ―The Islamic Financial Industry Comes of Age,‖ Oct. 25, 
2006, page 4 where it is mentioned that the secondary market for sukuk remains virtually nonexistent. 
79 For a good discussion of the kinds of competitive disadvantages faced by Islamic banks and empirical 
analyses comparing the performance of Islamic and conventional banks see Clement Henry, ―Financial 
Performances of Islamic versus Conventional Banks,‖ in Clement Henry and Rodney Wilson ed., The 
Politics of Islamic Finance, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004) pgs. 104-128 and Munawar 
Iqbal, ―Islamic and Conventional Banking in the Nineties:  A Comparative Study,‖ Islamic Economic 
Series, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 2001. 
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invest in comparatively riskier private sector investments than do their conventional 
counterparts who impart a substantial proportion of their funds in guaranteed t-bills, 
bonds and the interbank market. Islamic banks also have more monitoring and transaction 
costs than do conventional banks. All of these competitive disadvantages make it difficult 
for Islamic banks to compete with conventional banks and move beyond a niche market 
of pious Muslim customers who are willing to accept less (and pay more for 
loans/investment capital) than can be obtained from conventional banks. The growth of 
Islamic banking until very recently was thus more an indicator of the percentage of 
Muslim faithful willing to pay that premium than the performance of the Islamic banking 
sector as a whole.   
 Recent financial and legal innovations may allow Islamic banks to use not only 
something akin to bonds but even derivatives and other kinds of structured finance80 that 
will lessen the competitive disadvantages faced by Islamic banks. Such innovations 
however remain controversial from the religious perspective and as new innovations 
make Islamic banking look closer and closer to conventional banking it may lose its 
raison d‘etre and its most loyal customer base. 
 
The Lack of Standardization 
 One of the biggest challenges facing Islamic banks is the lack of a common 
framework for governing, supervising, and regulating them. This has become an 
increasingly serious issue with the internationalization of financial markets over the past 
                                                 
80 See Tett, p. 2. 
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20 years and the birth of a truly global regulatory regime, marked by the 1988 Basle 
Accord and the 2004 Basle II Accord.81 The Basle Accords have established a number of 
regulatory rules and norms that banks must adopt before they can become part of the 
global financial system. Those rules and norms were however established for interest-
based dealings and Islamic financial institutions have faced a number of challenges in 
meeting them with interest-free products. These challenges are mitigated somewhat by 
the fact that the international financial regulatory bodies have proven to be flexible in 
allowing for differences across regulatory systems and have worked closely with Islamic 
bankers and economists to find shari’a-compliant ways to meet the regulatory demands 
of the international system.   
 The real challenge is for Islamic bankers throughout the world - as well as the 
governments in which those banks exist - to agree on a common system and principles 
for regulation and supervision, accounting and shari’a-compliance. This challenge is 
well-recognized and has been the subject of numerous conferences and summits over the 
past few years. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), established in Bahrain in 1991, was the first organization to 
attempt to construct internationally acceptable standards for Islamic banking. According 
to its website, the AAOIFI has ―now issued 56 standards on accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethical, and shari'a standards, including a statement on capital adequacy.‖82  
                                                 
81 For an exposition of the global financial regulatory regime and the place of Islamic institutions within it 
see Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
2000) pgs. 180 – 204. 
82 See website for the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions at: 
http://www.aaoifi.com 
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However, only eight countries have adopted the AAOIFI standards as mandatory though 
many Islamic financial institutions in other countries have voluntarily adopted them.83   
Since no universally accepted accounting standards for Islamic banks yet exist, it is 
difficult to compare Islamic banks across countries or to obtain accurate aggregate data 
on Islamic banking.84    
 The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has also been playing a key role in 
developing internationally acceptable regulatory standards and procedures for Islamic 
banks and getting them adopted in member countries. The IDB and AAOIFI began an 
extensive consultative process with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a number 
of central bank governors in 2000 that culminated in the establishment of the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) in 2002 with the primary objective of setting and 
disseminating standards for the supervision and regulation of Islamic banks that are 
consistent with both the shari’a and international standards and norms.85 While the 
organizational structure for the establishment of Islamic financial regulations and norms 
has expanded tremendously over the past few years, the hurdles they face in coming up 
with agreed upon standards and norms remain large.   
 One of the major complicating factors is that there is no agreed upon definition of 
what is shari’a-compliant and the definitions of certain Islamic financial products differ 
from one country to another or even within two Islamic institutions in the same country.  
                                                 
83 Roula Khalaf, ―Supervision and Regulation:  Experts See Need for a Common Approach,‖ Islamic 
Finance:  Financial Times Special Report, May 23, 2007, p. 3. 
84 Mohammed El Qorchi, ―Islamic Finance Gears Up,‖ Finance and Development, (IMF, Dec. 2005), Vol. 
42, no. 4. 
85 International Monetary Fund, ―IMF Facilitates Establishment of Islamic Financial Services Board,‖ 
News Brief no. 02/41, May 1, 2002 seen at:  http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2002/nb0241.htm  
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Currently nearly every Islamic bank has their own shari’a board which passes rulings on 
what kinds of products a specific bank can or cannot engage in. The religious scholars 
that sit on different boards often disagree with each other on what constitutes shari’a-
compliance with the result that some Islamic banks practice financial dealings that other 
banks consider religiously forbidden and that certain Islamic financial products are 
defined very differently in one bank than they are in another. 
 
Appropriate Legal Framework 
 The challenge of excess liquidity, many of the competitive disadvantages faced by 
Islamic banks, and the problems of standardization and regulation are all linked in one 
way or another to the manner by which the state deals with Islamic banks. While in many 
countries, conventional banks complain that the state provides ―special privileges‖ to the 
Islamic banking sector,86 Islamic banks face the challenge of working in legal 
environments in which commercial codes were established to accommodate interest-
based financing. In nearly all Muslim countries today, civil and commercial codes were 
inspired by European laws and in situations in which Islamic prescriptions contradict 
national laws the national laws will almost always be enforced.87   
 In addition to the problems of legal enforceability, there are other practical 
problems in the government-Islamic bank relationship. For example, the capital gains that 
                                                 
86 See Warde (2000) page 197 and 198 for a discussion of some of the special privileges awarded Islamic 
banks in Egypt and Turkey. 
87 See Vogel and Hayes, pages 50 – 52, for a discussion of the difficulties Islamic banks face in enforcing 
Islamic laws in Muslim countries with Western-inspired legal environments. 
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Islamic banks pay their depositors are often taxed at higher rates than the interest 
payments paid out by conventional banks.88 The most important challenges Islamic banks 
face in their relationship with governments involves the manner by which the Central 
Banks deal with Islamic finance. In nearly all states, Islamic banks lack a supportive 
regulatory environment from Central Bank authorities that would offer them shari’a-
compliant lender of last resort facilities and shari’a-compliant returns on bank reserves 
held at Central Banks. While there has been some theoretical discussions concerning how 
the Islamic Development Bank could provide such services to Islamic banks on an 
international basis, the practical challenges of implementing such an idea remain difficult 
to surmount.    
 
Practical Impediments to Equity Financing 
 A perennial complaint about Islamic banks is that they have strayed far from the 
ideal theoretical premise of profit and loss sharing. The fact that they deal 
overwhelmingly in murabaha transactions is seen by many as a challenge that Islamic 
banks must overcome. In principle, Islamic banks are supposed to deal less in debt 
financing and more in equity financing.   
 Looking at aggregate data from a number of Muslim and non-Muslim countries, 
Tarik Yousef has shown that the ratio of debt financing in an economy as opposed to 
equity financing (through stock market capitalization) is closely correlated to the legal, 
institutional and political structure of the country and that the predominance of murabaha 
                                                 
88 Ray (1995), page 22. 
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and ijara contracts in Islamic banks as opposed to the equity financing schemes of 
mudaraba and musharaka contracts conforms to what is predicted theoretically and is 
seen in other regions of the world.89 Yousef‘s analysis shows that the challenge of 
moving toward more equity financing schemes is less a challenge that Islamic banks are 
capable of overcoming as it is a challenge facing Muslim countries that must reform the 
structures of their countries to allow for a more robust rule of law, better bureaucratic 
quality with less corruption, and more democratic institutions and procedures.   
 
DISPUTES OVER ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 
 The birth and rapid growth of Islamic banks in recent decades has not come 
without controversy. One dispute is over the definition of riba. While the majority of 
Islamic scholars argue that all kinds of interest are forbidden forms of riba there is an 
argument that riba should be defined as excessive usury that does not include regular 
forms of bank interest. According to this argument, there is nothing Islamically wrong 
with dealing with conventional structured financial systems that are based on moderate 
interest rates. A second and somewhat contradictory criticism is that all current modes of 
Islamic finance use disguised forms of interest and are thus not truly Islamic.   
 Both these arguments were discussed by Mahmoud El-Gamal, who argues that the 
current practice of Islamic finance has strayed from the objectives of Islamic Law and 
that by reviving medieval contracts and using ancient Arabic terminology, Islamic banks 
                                                 
89 Tarik Yousef, ―The Murabaha Syndrome in Islamic Finance:  Laws, Institutions and Politics,‖ from 
Clement Henry and Rodney Wilson ed., The Politics of Islamic Finance (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2004) pgs. 63-80. 
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give a veneer of Islamicity to a practice that is in fact just as interest-based as 
conventional financial practices, only with some extra costs.90 El-Gamal criticizes those 
who declare that all forms of interest are forbidden riba and then turn around and re-
engineer interest-based products in ways that are only technically interest-free. He 
stresses that the real work of Islamic finance should move away from contract forms and 
more into the substance of meeting the social and economic needs of society in ways 
superior to those that currently exist. 
 
Riba:  Interest or Usury 
 While the Quran and various sayings of Prophet Muhammad emphatically 
denounce the evils of riba and make its prohibition clear, the definition of exactly what 
riba entails has been controversial since soon after the death of the Prophet.  There are 
reports that some of the early Companions, most notably Umar ibn Al-Khattab, expressed 
the wish that riba had been explained in more detail.91   
 In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 Century a debate began in Egypt when the 
government issued interest-bearing postal savings accounts as a way for the government 
to collect needed capital while allowing citizens to save money.  While many Egyptians 
refused to take the interest on their accounts, some Muslim scholars, including the well-
respected Mohammed Abduh, Rashid Rida and Mahmud Shaltut argued that under such 
situations pre-specified ―profit rates‖ that clearly benefited both investors and the 
                                                 
90 Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance:  Law, Economics, and Practice, (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2006). 
91 See Vogel and Hayes p. 63. 
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economic development needs of the country did not entail the forbidden forms of riba.  In 
1934, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, an Indian scholar, wrote what remains until today the most 
recognized and widespread English translation of the Qur‘an.  In his commentary of verse 
275 of Chapter 2 which discusses the prohibition of riba, Yusuf Ali wrote that he 
disagreed with the majority of the religious scholars who defined riba as all kinds of 
interest and that his definition would exclude ―economic credit, the creature of modern 
banking and finance.‖92 
 More recently in 1989, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, who was the Grand 
Mufti of Egypt – or chief Islamic lawmaker – at the time, issued a religious ruling in 
which he clearly stated his belief that certain interest-based government investments did 
not constitute the forbidden forms of riba.93 When his ruling raised a storm of 
controversy, he retorted by going even further to announce that interest-bearing deposits 
at conventional banks were perfectly Islamic and that conventional banks were in fact 
closer to the true spirit of Islam than the ―Islamic‖ banks which imposed additional costs 
on their customers.  Tantawi and a number of other government-appointed religious 
leaders in Egypt have repeatedly argued since that ruling that mutually agreed upon pre-
specified profit rates – or interest – by government-regulated banks are Islamically 
legitimate.  While most religious scholars have vehemently disputed Tantawi‘s 
conclusions and some have gone so far as to accuse him of making religious rulings to 
                                                 
92 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an:  Translation and Commentary, (American Trust Publications, 
1977) p. 111.  Yusuf Ali‘s comments about his disagreement with the main body of scholars on the 
definition of riba was removed from later editions of the translation and commentary published after 1992.  
93 Vogel and Hayes, p. 46. 
 72 
please government officials, his arguments have found resonance in some circles in the 
Muslim world. 
 
Islamic Banks: Practice and Ideal 
 Many Muslim critics of Islamic banks assert that they are not really applying 
Islamic law but are merely using Islamic terminology to do the same things as 
conventional banks.  While Islamic banks claim that they follow the Islamic requirements 
of having asset-based rather than financial-based products, they have incorporated 
numerous clauses into their contracts that lessen to nearly zero the risks that are 
incumbent upon holding assets.  In the most obvious example, Islamic banks rarely buy 
homes or cars and then sell them to customers with a markup without first requiring 
customers to sign a binding ―promise to purchase‖ clause.94   
 Similar clauses exist in ijara and sukuk contracts that lessen the risks that a truly 
asset-based approach would entail. While such clauses are controversial Islamically they 
have become the standard practice of Islamic banks and financial institutions. As El-
Gamal has shown, the standard practice of Islamic banking is to identify a conventional 
financial product and then construct an Islamic ―analog‖ to it by breaking down the 
product into its parts and engineering Islamically acceptable alternatives at each step.95  
This process is similar to what many Islamic scholars deem ―ruses‖ that allow people to 
attain Islamically illegal ends through legal means.  While in Islamic Law such processes 
                                                 
94 See Ray, pgs. 51-54. 
95 See El-Gamal, pgs. 20 and 21. 
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are often deemed legal, those who intentionally engage in them are considered ―sinful.‖  
Many critics of Islamic banks point out that the banks have not attained the ideal that was 
promulgated by the theoreticians of the 1940s and 1950s who wrote how ―Islamic 
economics‖ was a superior alternative to the Western system and that replacing an 
interest-based financial system on a fairer profit and loss-sharing system would better 
serve the social and economic needs of the poor while also proving to be a better engine 
for economic development. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This brief overview of Islamic banking underscores one of its greatest paradoxes 
– despite overwhelming challenges including a lack of standardization, a severe 
competitive disadvantage, a less than ideal legal framework in most of the world, 
structural impediments that weigh against the kind of financing at the heart of Islamic 
banking, and continued disputes over what Islamic banking even is, the industry has 
continued to grow at a phenomenal rate. This growth has occurred despite rather than 
because of economic rationality and can only be explained through a more nuanced 
political, cultural, and social explanation. Different historical and political trajectories led 
Islamic banking and finance to grow in certain Muslim countries faster than in others and 
an analysis of any one country‘s experience with Islamic finance cannot explain the 
situation throughout the entire Muslim world. However, only through a more detailed 
analysis of one country‘s experiences can a clearer understanding of the phenomenon of 
Islamic banking and its potential future role be explicated. 
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 One of the most interesting political questions raised by the growth of Islamic 
banking is its relationship to Islamist political movements which have also experienced 
phenomenal growth rates in the Muslim world since the 1970s. While the relationship 
between Islamic finance and Islamist politics is different in different countries, the most 
interesting analysis of the relationship can be undertaken in a country in which both have 
been allowed to grow within a relatively free political and economic environment. The 
most obvious country in which that has occurred is Jordan, a country which has been a 
pioneer in Islamic Banking and in fact provided Islamic banking in the 1970s with the 
ideas and theories that continue to form the framework and structure of Islamic banking 
until today and at the same time has had one of the largest and most well-established 
Islamic movements in the region. The state in Jordan is less imposing than many other 
states in the region and both the Islamic movement and Islamic finance have been able to 
function in a relatively liberal arena removed from direct state control. It is in just such an 
environment in which it is most interesting to look into the relations between Islamic 
finance and Islamic political movements and to see how those relationships impact upon 
larger political and economic questions. 
 The nature of the Jordanian economy also makes it an ideal case for looking 
further into the role of Islamic finance in the political and economic development of a 
country. Jordan is a middle-income country that neither suffers extreme poverty nor 
enjoys the luxury of abundant natural resources. While most of the current growth in 
Islamic finance is taking place in the oil-rich Arab Gulf countries, it is in the more middle 
income countries that the growth requires an explanation and also has the potential to 
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have more of an impact. Jordan faces severe economic challenges – not the least of which 
is its overwhelming dependence on various forms of economic rent. The economic 
challenges Jordan faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s when those rents were removed 
and Jordan was forced to tackle major structural economic problems – at the very time 
that Islamic financial and Islamist political movements were at the peak of their strength 
– provides an interesting laboratory for the study of the interplay between Islamist 
political movements, Islamist financial movements and the state. 
 To the extent that Islamic banking represents a quest for cultural authenticity in a 
region of the world where the lack of political legitimacy has been an important 
inhibiting factor, Jordan is also an ideal case study. Since the breakup of the Ottoman 
Empire and the division of the Arab world by the colonial powers, issues of identity and 
cultural authenticity have been dominant political themes. States have been forced to 
establish legitimacy and defend their borders in the face of both subnational and 
supranational identities. Jordan, established as a colonial afterthought with no real 
historical basis, has faced continuous issues of authenticity, legitimacy, and identity at the 
heart of its state-building enterprise. The extent to which Islamic banking is the result of 
this quest as well as the role it can play in answering the questions the search for 




CHAPTER THREE:  POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
JORDAN 
   
 Jordan has been transformed in less than 100 years from an under-populated 
largely Bedouin entity with no significant urban concentrations and a barter economy into 
a modern state with a sophisticated financial system.  The story of that transformation is 
largely a story about how the state‘s geographic position gave it a political significance 
which the state‘s leaders were able to leverage in the international arena for the economic 
benefit of the country.  International politics and foreign policy-making has had a greater 
impact on the economic development and socio-economic structure of the country than 
actual economic policies or structural reforms.  The massive transformation that took 
place in Jordan without concomitant structural reform left the country vulnerable as the 
internal sources of revenue have not grown enough to meet the needs of its sophisticated 
economy and the leadership remains dependent on leveraging its geographic position to 
accrue outside support.   
Since its establishment, Jordan‘s need for external sources of revenue has had a 
profound impact upon its political system.  Even before its founding as a British mandate 
in 1921, the region was the recipient of large rents.  As Luciani has pointed out, the 
political dynamics of states that derive a substantial amount of their revenue from rents 
accruing from the outside world are very different from the dynamics of states where the 
government must obtain its revenue base through taxation of domestic economic 
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activity.96  Luciani posits that there is a correlation between the presence of rents and the 
lack of democratization. The Jordanian example provides strong support for this theory. 
The most meaningful political and economic reform to ever take place in Jordan occurred 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s at a time of rent scarcity. 
For decades the stability of the monarchy rested on two pillars.  First, its ability to 
use its externally-derived rents to establish generous support networks that gained it the 
support of the large and powerful East Bank tribal communities.  Second, its ability to 
maintain the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, the country‘s largest grassroots social 
and political movement, which for various reasons was aligned with the monarchy on 
crucial political and social issues. The Brotherhood‘s support was critical in that it 
provided the monarchy with political legitimacy among a large segment of the lower and 
middle class Palestinians, who formed the majority of the country‘s population.  The 
legitimacy garnered through these two bases of support enabled the monarchy to weather 
severe political crises in the 1950s and 1960s and a civil war in the 1970s. 
 A number of events in the late 1980s – most notably the dramatic fall in 
international oil prices and political instability in the adjoining West Bank - had a 
profound impact on Jordan‘s economy and its ability to continue accruing rents.  For the 
first time in its history, the country was forced to undertake meaningful economic reform 
that would enable it to establish a viable economy.  A decade of reform upset the delicate 
balances of power and networks of patronage that had been built up during the era of 
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large rents.  The stability of the country was threatened during a decade in which the 
monarchy attempted to gain new sources of regime support – mainly through political 
liberalization and economic policies that gained the support of the country‘s wealthy 
business elite - as it lost some of its older, more traditional bases in the East Bank tribal 
communities. 
Meanwhile regional events – most notably American-led wars in Iraq, and a 
prolonged peace process involving the Palestinians and Israel - again enabled Jordan‘s 
leadership to leverage the country‘s strategic geographic position and by the early part of 
the new century, Jordan had regained substantial external sources of rent.  That rent 
however came at the price of both political and economic reform.  The foreign policies 
adopted to gain those rents were unpopular and to maintain them the regime had to 
backtrack on important political reforms that had taken place in the 1980s and early 
1990s. The unpopular foreign policies and the curbing of democratic political reforms 
alienated the Muslim Brotherhood.  While the Brotherhood had been a crucial source of 
stability for the monarchy in earlier decades, by the turn of the century it had become the 
major source of ideological opposition in the kingdom.   
The new rents also allowed the regime to postpone economic reforms needed to 
establish a viable economy based on internal sources of revenue. It however remains 
unclear how stable the regime would be in the event of a real economic or political crisis.  
This dissertation explores the potential of Islamic banking to serve as a bridge that can 
allow Jordan to continue economic reform policies that will bring about the kind of viable 
economy the monarchy seeks while winning back enough Islamist support to provide the 
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regime with the legitimacy it needs to remain stable.  Understanding the political 
challenges currently facing the Jordanian regime and the socio-economic structure of the 
country requires a fuller historical analysis of Jordan‘s political economy.  This chapter 
provides a historical perspective to Jordan highlighting the central role external rents 
have traditionally played in the politics and economy of the country. 
 
JORDAN UNDER OTTOMAN RULE 
 The area that later came to be called Transjordan and then Jordan came under 
Ottoman rule in 1517 and remained so until the end of World War I.  Under the 
Ottomans, what is now known as Jordan never constituted a unified administrative entity 
but was rather part of three different regions – southern Syria, central Palestine, and the 
northern Hijaz.  For the first 300 years of Ottoman rule, there was very little Ottoman 
administrative presence in the area.  While the region was peripheral and largely 
inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouins, it did occupy a strategically important 
location along the annual Hajj caravan routes to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.  
This strategic location enabled Bedouin tribal leaders to extract subsidies (an early form 
of external rent) from the Ottomans in return for ensuring the safety of caravans traveling 
through their domains.97 
 By the nineteenth century, about half the population of the area had settled in 
small agricultural villages.  Starting in the 1840s, the Ottomans began reasserting 
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administrative control over the area by establishing a number of garrisons that would 
allow for a modicum of security, curb tribal raiding of the small villages and enable the 
central government to extract taxes from the settled population.  A sign of the increased 
security was the 1908 completion of the Hijaz Railway through Jordanian territory.  The 
railway linked Medina to Damascus and other northern cities.  With the increased 
security, merchants from Syria and Palestine began settling in Jordan.  Circassian and 
Chechen refugees from the Caucasus also immigrated to the region at around the same 
time, settling mostly in Amman. 
 The arrival of these new immigrants began changing the socio-economic structure 
of Jordan.  Trade increased dramatically and Jordanian agricultural products – most 
notably wheat – began being exported.  At first, the trade was largely undertaken through 
barter.  Money transactions remained limited with the money that was used generally 
being gold or silver coins that had an intrinsic value.98   
 However as merchants with access to capital became increasingly interested in the 
region, rudimentary financial transactions began taking place, usually in a manner that 
ultimately proved deleterious for the financially inexperienced Jordanian landholders and 
peasants.99  The merchants loaned money to cultivators who needed capital to pay taxes 
or cover agricultural expenses.  In return for cash grants, farmers would provide a part of 
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the harvest to the lender; or, in other cases, loans were contracted against land as 
collateral.  In these latter cases, the lender would enjoy the rights to a piece of land and its 
produce for a temporary period of time.  Many of both kinds of these loans were 
contracted outside of the legal Islamic courts and were undertaken at usurious rates that 
led to peasant indebtedness for life as well as the permanent transfer of substantial 
amounts of land from tribal shaykhs to the merchants, who by the early 20
th
 century had 
emerged as the economic, landed, and commercial elite of the country. 
 
WORLD WAR I AND THE BRITISH MANDATE 
 The defeat of the Ottomans in World War I and the subsequent dismemberment of 
the Ottoman state removed the security framework that had recently been established in 
Jordan.  Based on secret British and French agreements that were concluded during the 
war, Jordan became part of a British mandate and the British installed Emir Abdullah, 
from the prestigious Hashemite family of the Hijaz (in present-day Saudi Arabia) on the 
throne of a Kingdom the British created to serve its imperial interests.  At the time, 
Jordan was still a peripheral region but was seen as strategically important because of its 
geographic location.  For the British, Jordan was to serve as a bridge connecting the more 
important British-occupied areas of Palestine and Iraq as well as a buffer between the 
French who occupied Syria to the north and the Wahhabi religiously-inspired tribal 
expansionist movement that had taken over Saudi Arabia to the south.100 
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 Abdullah‘s initial desires to expand his own realm were quickly frustrated by 
British opposition as well as realities on the ground.  Under British tutelage, Abdullah 
established an administrative bureaucracy and a modern army that gave the new 
Kingdom security both internally as well as from outside threats – mainly from the Saudi 
Wahhabists.  Policies were adopted to integrate the Bedouin into sedentary society 
through land settlement.  Initially the British-led army, known as the Arab Legion, was 
made up largely of Arabs from outside of Jordan, and one of its main tasks was to pacify 
the large areas of the country still under the sway of the Bedouins.  However, with time, 
the Bedouin tribes began staffing the Arab Legion, both out of economic necessity and 
out of the realization that it provided them with a means of maintaining their influence 
after the establishment of state institutions.101 
 In addition to providing extra security, a main goal of the policy of settling the 
Bedouins was increasing the agricultural tax base of the country.  The increase in taxes 
however remained marginal and Jordan continued to rely overwhelmingly on British 
support or ―grants-in-aid.‖ This form of rent usually accounted for more than 50 percent 
of total state revenue throughout the mandate period.102   Abdullah also relied on the 
wealthy Syrian and Palestinian merchant families who had immigrated to Jordan in the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century as a source of funds that would give him some 
independence from British authorities.  In 1923, these merchants founded the Amman 
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Chamber of Commerce which quickly became a center of economic and political 
influence in the country.103   
 The first bank in Jordan was established in 1925, when the Ottoman Bank opened 
a branch in Amman.104  The Palestinian-based Arab Bank opened a branch in Amman in 
1934.105  With the presence of these banks, a financial system began to take shape and 
more capital became available to finance the merchant trade.  This trade expanded 
considerably during World War II when the Jordanian port of Aqaba became an 
important center for the importing and re-exporting of goods used by the British 
authorities in Jordan and Palestine.  The wealth of the Jordanian business elite increased 
dramatically during the war.106 
 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II 
 Soon after World War II, the British withdrew from the region and Jordan gained 
formal independence in 1946.  The Zionist Movement was able to take over the majority 
of Palestine at around the same time.  The Palestinian West Bank became part of Jordan 
after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and with the new land and the hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees from the areas that had come under Israeli occupation, the 
population of Jordan tripled between 1948 and 1950.107  The merchant communities in 
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Jordan became increasingly made up of Palestinians as did the urbanized population in 
general.  The decreased aid from Britain was replaced by American aid.  From 1956 to 
1966, the United States – recognizing the importance of Jordan‘s geostrategic position - 
provided almost 50 percent of Jordan‘s external revenue and from 1959 to 1970, foreign 
aid as a percentage of GDP averaged 22 percent annually.108  The other main source of 
revenue during this period was the customs imposed on imported goods. 
 Social, political, and economic events in Jordan were largely defined by the 
Palestinian issue in the decades following World War II and the establishment of Israel in 
1948.  With the large influx of Palestinians, the population became higher-educated and 
wealthier and the country experienced sustained growth of about 8 percent throughout the 
1950s and 1960s.109 The Palestinian-owned Arab Bank moved its headquarters to 
Amman in 1948 and quickly gained a reputation as one of the strongest and best managed 
banks in the Arab world.110 However, the strong Palestinian desire for the return of their 
homeland also led to the establishment of political movements that at times threatened 
Jordan‘s political stability.  Jordan‘s King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian 
nationalist in 1951.  His grandson, King Hussein – who had acceded to the throne in 1952 
after a brief interlude led by King Talal – was nearly overthrown in 1957 by army units 
that had a strong base of support in the elected parliament.   
 After the events of 1957, King Hussein dissolved political parties in the country, 
declared martial law, and began suppressing the radical leftist and nationalist groups that 
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were popular among the Palestinian segments of the population.  Hussein increasingly 
relied for support on the Bedouin tribes.  Their earlier co-optation into the military and 
police and their own fears of increasing Palestinian encroachment in the country made 
them loyal allies of the monarchy. 
 
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JORDAN 
 In addition to the support of the tribes, King Hussein had the support of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an international Islamist movement that was being violently 
suppressed in Egypt, whose leader Gamal Abdul Nasser was the ideological leader of the 
nationalist and leftist opposition groups trying to oust King Hussein.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood‘s support for Hussein in 1957 enabled it to remain the only political force in 
the country that escaped the ban imposed on political activism and it was able over the 
ensuing decades to build a strong foundation of support throughout the Kingdom with the 
establishment of a number of charitable, educational, and healthcare institutions. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood had been founded in Egypt in 1928, a few years after 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the Khilafa, the symbolic institution 
unifying and maintaining the Islamic character of the Muslim world.  The Brotherhood 
was founded with the objective of uniting the Muslim world under the banner of an 
Islamic state that ruled according to the shari’a.  The Brotherhood quickly spread beyond 
Egypt and chapters were formed throughout the world.  In 1945, chapters were formally 
opened in both Jerusalem and Amman and the movement spread quickly in both 
Palestine and Jordan.  After the 1948 war, the Palestinian and Jordanian movements 
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merged.  While the majority of the members in the Jordanian branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were Palestinian, the movement was headed by East Bank Jordanians, who 
were able to maintain cordial ties with the monarchy despite opposing many of its 
policies.   
 The Brotherhood came to be seen as a loyal opposition. The movement often 
criticized the Jordanian regime for its pro-British and later pro-American foreign policy 
orientation, for its lack of action on working to liberate Palestine and for the non-
enforcement of Islamic law in the country.  At times such criticism became heated and 
there have been many periods in Jordanian history during which Brotherhood members 
and leaders were harassed and arrested.  However, the Brotherhood – unlike some of the 
leftist and nationalist groups in the country – never questioned the legitimacy of the 
monarchy.  They also remained loyal supporters of King Hussein‘s decision to 
incorporate the West Bank into Jordan.  Since the early 1950s and especially after the 
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, the call for an 
independent Palestinian state including the West Bank was popular in Palestinian circles 
and throughout the Arab world.  The Jordanian monarchy was nearly alone in its 
assertion that the West Bank should remain part of the Jordanian state.  The 
Brotherhood‘s acceptance of that position cost it support and legitimacy in Palestinian 
circles.  
 Even after the 1967 war, during which Israel occupied the West Bank, the 
Jordanian Brotherhood continued to support King Hussein‘s position that the West Bank 
should return to Jordanian control, though such a position had almost no popular support 
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among lower and middle-class Palestinians, who overwhelmingly desired an independent 
state.  The Brotherhood‘s stand on the issue was based on the principle of preserving 
Jordanian-Palestinian unity until an eventual unification of the entire Muslim world.  As 
an ideological group with a mass base of support, the Brotherhood‘s stance on the West 
Bank issue as well as the preservation of the monarchy itself provided the regime with 
legitimacy.  That legitimacy proved crucial to the monarchy in times of real crises, such 
as the 1957 coup attempt and the 1970-71 Civil War, when the Brotherhood stood 
staunchly behind the regime. 
 While members of the Muslim Brotherhood were being violently persecuted in 
many parts of the Arab world, the Jordanian branch had the good fortune of having the 
same political rivals as the Jordanian monarch.  During the heyday of Arab nationalism in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the Egyptian and Syrian regimes openly derided Jordan as an 
artificial entity serving imperialist interests and the Jordanian monarchy as a British 
invention.  While those regimes were calling for the overthrow of King Hussein they 
were also persecuting the Muslim Brotherhood within their countries.  With the same 
political rivals, the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood and King Hussein found means 
of cooperating and overlooking their own political differences.   
 The Jordanian regime often provided political asylum to many Egyptian and 
Syrian members of the Brotherhood. One Egyptian member of the Brotherhood, Kamil 
al-Sharif, later went on to become a Minister in the Jordanian government and an 
appointed member of Jordan‘s Upper House of Parliament.  In the late 1970s and early 
1980s when open conflict flared in Syria between the regime and the Brotherhood there, 
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the Jordanian members of the Brotherhood opened ―training camps‖ in northern Jordan 
and provided other support infrastructure to the Syrian Islamists with the full support of 
the Jordanian regime, which was able to use its strong ties to the Brotherhood as a tool 
that enabled it to achieve some of its foreign policy objectives against Syria.  
 
THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND THE 1970-71 JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR 
 In 1967, Israel invaded and occupied the West Bank and Jordan lost a significant 
portion of its country including some of its most economically productive areas.  The 
West Bank had come to represent about 40% of Jordan‘s GDP and half of its industrial 
capacity.111  While the overall population of Jordan was significantly reduced by the loss 
of the West Bank, an additional 300,000 Palestinian refugees flooded into Jordan during 
the war swelling the population in the already existent refugee camps with people 
angered with the weak performance of Jordan and the other Arab states in the war against 
Israel and increasingly believing that only Palestinian guerrilla action could liberate their 
country.  Nationalist Palestinian groups organized under the PLO umbrella flourished in 
Jordan and began taking on the trappings of a state within a state.  Tensions between the 
Jordanian state and the Palestinian groups reached a head in September 1970 when a 
bloody Civil War broke out and culminated with the expulsion of the Palestinian 
organizations from Jordan. 
 The Civil War had a detrimental impact on Jordan‘s economy, shutting down 
commerce and closing many trade routes.  Industrial and agricultural production fell 
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dramatically and there was a flight of capital from the country.112  Jordan‘s annual GDP 
fell by 15% during the war.113  While the war exacerbated the already tense relations 
between Palestinians and Jordanians living in the kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood – 
with its overwhelmingly Palestinian grassroots membership – as well as the business 
elite, which was also almost fully Palestinian, allied themselves with the throne.   
 As the PLO had established its state within a state in Jordan, many wealthy 
Palestinians had become disenchanted with the PLO‘s arbitrary actions and the instability 
they were engendering.  In the Amman Chamber of Commerce elections which took 
place on September 15, 1970, just two days before open hostilities broke out, pro-PLO 
candidates were completely defeated in what had become a fully Palestinian institution in 
Jordan.  The Muslim Brotherhood was the only large organization with a strong 
following among poorer Palestinians that also clearly supported the throne.  As in 1957, 
the Brotherhood‘s support at a crucial time helped cement its relationship with the 
monarchy – a relationship that the Brotherhood did not enjoy in any other Arab country. 
 
THE RISE OF OIL PRICES AFTER 1973 
 After the 1967 war, the Arab countries held a summit in which they promised to 
provide substantial aid to the ―frontline‖ Arab states bordering Israel.  Jordan was one of 
the greatest recipients of this form of rent.  After the 1970-71 Civil War, public opinion 
in the wider Arab world moved decisively against Jordan and there was a brief cessation 
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of Arab aid.114  Such aid was however revived after Jordan‘s symbolic participation in the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent rise in oil prices. 
 The oil price hike brought substantial flows of capital to the oil-exporting Arab 
countries and though Jordan itself had no oil, it benefited tremendously from the 
economic changes in the region.  Foreign aid to Jordan, especially from Saudi Arabia, 
increased dramatically.  In 1975, foreign aid had come to represent 40 percent of Jordan‘s 
GDP – up from 22 percent in the 1960s.115  Between 1973 and 1980, foreign assistance 
accounted for almost 55% of government revenue.116  In 1979 alone, Jordan received 
$1.32 billion117 in gross aid while its current revenue was equivalent to only $711 
million.118    
  The price of phosphates, Jordan‘s main resource export, also increased in the 
early 1970s and by 1975 phosphate exports constituted more than 16 percent of the 
country‘s GDP.119  The foreign aid and the capital from phosphate exports flowed 
directly into government coffers and enabled Jordan to go on a decade long spending 
spree that substantially increased the size of the state in terms of both employment and 
the provision of generous social services. 
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 The regional oil boom also created a big demand for skilled labor in the 
neighboring Arab countries and much of this demand was filled by Jordanians.  An 
estimated one-third of the Jordanian workforce was working outside of the kingdom by 
the end of the 1970s and the remittances that Jordanian workers sent back to family 
members still in Jordan jumped from almost nothing in the late 1960s to a billion dollars 
in 1982.120  In 1984, a year in which total GDP was only $4.9 billion,121 $1.2 billion 
entered the country in the form of remittances.122  A large portion of this capital flowed 
into private hands and allowed for the rapid expansion of consumer spending. The 
additional private and public spending during the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s led to 
high rates of growth and the disappearance of unemployment.  While a relatively small 
amount of the money was invested in the productive sector, the service sector increased 
dramatically and the country witnessed a construction boom, with a subsequent rise in 
real estate prices.   
Because so many resources were coming from external sources, Jordan was able 
to finance chronic trade and budget deficits (in 1980 Jordan‘s trade deficit was over $1.5 
billion and its budget deficit was over $300 million)123 as well as provide generous 
governmental services without having to extract resources from its own citizenry.  
Taxation during this period typically financed only 10 to 20% of state expenditures and 
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import duties another 20 to 30% while the state was able to distribute benefits to tribal 
leaders, subsidies to agricultural capitalists (mostly of East Bank origin) and business 
entrepreneurs (predominantly Palestinian), while at the same time establish and maintain 
extensive health and education programs for the citizenry at large, subsidize many of 
their basic consumer goods and provide state employment for nearly half of the labor 
force (three-quarters of East Bankers worked for the state) without maintaining a 
productive economy124 or having to incur crippling debts.  In 1984 only 4.9% of Jordan‘s 
GDP came from agriculture and only 11.9% came from manufacturing.125  
 Governmental attempts to get Jordan‘s commercial banks to lend more toward 
productive activities were unsuccessful and commercial lending remained biased toward 
the trade sector with industrial lending moving up only slightly.126  Part of the failure was 
that the policy was more aimed at incorporating Transjordanians into the private 
economic elite (as a contrast to the Palestinian dominated business elite) than actually 
bringing about industrialization. With little movement on the level of industrialization, 
merchants involved in the importation of consumer goods grew wealthy and banks grew 
much bigger as they financed consumer purchases and construction.127  In Jordan, and in 
other neighboring countries, Islamic banks were established for the first time and they 
grew rapidly in their early years as they provided an Islamically-permissible means for 
pious Muslims to participate in the formal banking system.  
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FALL OF OIL PRICES AND THE JORDANIAN RECESSION 
 The interplay between politics and economics has been starkly apparent in Jordan 
since the mid-1980s as economic realities have forced major political transformations, 
most notably toward greater liberalization, and as political events such as the Palestinian 
Intifadha and subsequent events in the occupied territories, wars in Iraq and their direct 
and indirect effects on Jordan, and the Arab-Israeli peace process and Jordan‘s role in it 
have all had important repercussions on economic activity in the country.  While Jordan 
was long able to use politically-inspired economic rents to mask economic problems and 
delay needed economic reform, the recession of the 1980s and 1990s signaled that with 
the increasing globalization of capital, Jordan could find it more difficult to avoid the 
problems caused by an economic system that was not able to generate adequate capital on 
its own.  As in earlier crises, Jordan ultimately leveraged its geostrategic position to 
accrue external sources of revenue that enabled it to get out of its recession.128 Since the 
turn of the century Jordan‘s economy has again started growing rapidly but that growth is 
more due to politics and regional political developments than economic development or 
reform.   
While throughout its history until the mid-1980s, rents enabled Jordan to live 
beyond its means, the economy remained highly vulnerable to the external political and 
economic environment.  When changes began taking places in that environment, Jordan 
suffered.  The dramatic fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s led to a sharp decline in the aid 
provided to Jordan from the petroleum-exporting states while it also led to the return of 
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growing numbers of expatriate workers.  From the high of $1.32 billion in grants in 1979, 
Jordan received only $286 million in 1989.129  Remittances that had accounted for more 
than $1.2 billion dollars in 1984 had dropped to $623 million by 1989130 while at the 
same time current state expenditures increased from JD305 million in 1980 to JD713 
million in 1989 leading to a growing deficit and a total external debt that had increased 
from $2 billion in 1980 to $7.2 billion by 1989, making debt almost twice the value of 
total GDP which was $4.1 billion that year.131 The interest payments on the growing debt 
cost the Jordanian economy $407 million in 1988132 putting the country further in the red.  
To make the interest payments, the Jordanian Central Bank drew on its foreign currency 
reserves which dipped to dangerously low levels.133 
Meanwhile the Intifadha that had broken out in Dec. 1987 in the occupied 
Palestinian territories exacerbated tensions between King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO.  
King Hussein‘s longstanding contention that the West Bank was an integral part of 
Jordan became increasingly untenable and in July of 1988, Hussein proclaimed Jordan‘s 
total legal and administrative disengagement from the West Bank.  While politically most 
Palestinians welcomed the proclamation, it did lead to considerable anxiety among them 
regarding their status as citizens in Jordan.  Palestinian individuals as well as 
organizations subsequently withdrew an estimated $200 to $300 million in Jordanian 
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dinars (JDs) from Jordanian banks134 intensifying the country‘s financial crisis.  Cashing 
in JDs for dollars combined with the already low foreign currency reserves that had 
resulted from the last few years of deficit borrowing resulted in a decline of more than 
35% in the value of the Jordanian Dinar.135  The JD fell even further in January 1989 
when for the first time in its history Jordan failed to meet its scheduled debt payment.136  
By 1992, the JD was worth only half of its 1987 value.137 
  Prior to the 1980s, the existence of huge rents had enabled the Jordanian 
monarchy to buy political legitimacy through the distribution of economic benefits 
without the need for political liberalization.  Even throughout most of the 1980s the state 
attempted to maintain such a system by financing growing budget deficits through 
domestic borrowing, development loans, or syndicated borrowing on the Euromoney 
market - thus leading to the huge increase in external debt.138   
 The need to reschedule those debts in early 1989 required Jordan to agree with the 
IMF on a five-year economic stabilization program that aimed at solving some of the 
chronic structural problems that outside financial support had previously enabled the 
regime to ignore.  Among other austerity measures, the program entailed sharp reductions 
in state expenditures including the cutting of subsidies on a number of basic goods, which 
led to sharp price increases for bread, rice, milk and fuel.  As a response, massive 
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demonstrations broke out throughout the country in April, 1989.  For the first time in 
Jordan‘s history, riots had economic rather than political roots and, even more 
importantly, were led and almost exclusively undertaken by the East Bank Jordanian 
tribal and agricultural communities as it was this community that was most detrimentally 
affected by the inability of the regime to maintain its extensive patronage network. 
 
EXPERIMENT IN POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION 
The monarchy has always depended on the strong support of the East Bank 
Jordanians as against the Palestinian refugees and their descendants, who constitute a 
majority of the country‘s overall population but have historically had tense relations with 
the king.  Discontent within the tribal communities was seen as a direct threat to the 
viability of the monarchy that could not be suppressed through coercive measures.  The 
king thus either had to halt the austerity program (a financial impossibility) or seek 
legitimacy from a broader stratum of the population in ways other than he had in the past.  
The king opted for a program of political liberalization that he hoped would make the 
extraction of financial resources from the citizenry more legitimate.  Within six months 
the country had its first parliamentary elections in more than three decades and by far the 
freest and fairest ever held in the kingdom.  Subsequently martial law, which had also 
been imposed for two decades, was lifted, political parties were allowed to form, and the 
media was given more freedom than it had enjoyed in the past.  Jordanians increasingly 
felt that the government was accountable and the regime was able to continue with 
economic austerity measures without incurring the same resistance. 
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Less than a year after Jordan‘s parliamentary elections, Iraq invaded Kuwait 
beginning a series of events that culminated in an American-led war followed by a 
decade of economic sanctions and then another American-led war and sustained 
occupation of Iraq.  The conflict in Iraq has had a profound economic effect on Jordan.  
During the 1990-91 war, Jordan lost its main export markets in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia, while tourism and transit trade dwindled.139  Even more significantly, due to the 
political liberalization that had recently taken place, King Hussein had no choice but to 
go along with the overwhelming sentiment within the country and oppose American 
intervention in the war.  As a result, the Gulf States halted what was left of the aid that 
they had been giving to the country and sent back over 300,000 Jordanian expatriate 
workers, substantially cutting the already reduced remittances Jordan had been getting 
from workers in the region.  Remittances dropped from $623 million in 1989 to $500 
million in 1990 and $450 million in 1991.140  The financial costs for Jordan in the 
immediate 12 months following the outbreak of war were estimated at $1.2 billion by the 
World Bank and at $2.1 billion by the Jordanian Minister of Finance.141  
At the time, the longer-term effects seemed even more serious as Jordan appeared 
unlikely to regain the favor of the Gulf States, which had previously played such a large 
role in providing it with the rents that had enabled it to maintain its warped economic 
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structure.  The hundreds of thousands of people expelled from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
were putting further strains on Jordan‘s already overburdened labor market in which 
more than a quarter of the population was unemployed in 1990.142  
Throughout the 1990s, international sanctions were imposed on Iraq in a manner 
that further isolated Jordan.  In the decade before the beginning of hostilities in 1990, Iraq 
had become Jordan‘s largest trading partner with 40 percent of Jordanian manufactured 
exports going to Iraq and approximately 250 Jordanian companies established 
specifically for the Iraqi market.143  These strong ties can partly explain why Jordanian 
businessmen were strong supporters of King Hussein‘s opposition to the American 
intervention in the region despite the effect it had on Jordan‘s relations with the Arab 
Gulf States.144  
 
REGAINING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AT THE COST OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION 
The bleak economic situation faced by Jordan in the early 1990s led the monarchy 
to again seek redress through outside rents in the form of the kinds of external assistance 
that had largely sustained Jordan since its founding.  Gaining those rents would require 
Jordan to win back U.S. financial and political support and to do that the monarchy was 
willing to take unpopular political decisions that would require it to reverse many of the 
political reforms that had recently been enacted.  Jordan‘s geographic position gave it 
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importance with respect to both the situation in Iraq and the Middle East peace process.  
Jordan was able to capitalize on both to regain American favor and aid, becoming the 
fourth largest recipient of American assistance in the world by the early part of the new 
century.145 
King Hussein made the decision to embrace the Arab-Israeli peace process and go 
so far as to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.  Facing bleak financial and economic 
prospects in the early 1990s, King Hussein hoped that the normalization of ties with 
Israel would provide a huge ―peace dividend‖ in the form of increased US aid, a 
resurgence of tourism and investment as well as increased trade and economic 
cooperation directly with Israel and, even more importantly, with the West Bank—an 
area that had constituted a vital part of Jordan‘s economy prior to its occupation in 1967.   
Embracing the peace process against popular discontent with its provisions 
required the monarchy to curb some of the democratic freedoms that had just been 
instituted.  To thwart opposition to the normalization of ties with Israel, King Hussein 
decreed stifling new press laws, changed the electoral system to favor tribal elements and 
curtail the power of large parties, and reinstituted former practices of harassing and 
jailing opposition elements.  These measures led all the major opposition parties to 
boycott the 1997 parliamentary elections and the democratization process that had begun 
as a response to an economic crisis less than a decade previously quickly stalled as the 
king pursued a different political path that he hoped would lead to economic recovery. 
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 The decision to win back American aid helped the Jordanian economy but did not 
solve all of its problems.  The US forgave $700 million of Jordanian debt as a direct 
result of the 1994 peace treaty with Israel146 and did resume aid payments to the country 
as did some other European countries.  However the aid Jordan received from the United 
States in the late 1990s was modest and did not approach the amount of aid the country 
had been receiving in the late 1970s and early 1980s from the petroleum-exporting states.  
The year before signing the peace treaty, Jordan received $201 million in grants.147  
Those figures increased to $436 million in 1994, largely as a result of the peace treaty, 
but decreased to $311 million in 1996, less than one-fourth of the $1.32 billion Jordan 
had received in 1979.148   
While increased trade also helped the economy, it also did not reach the levels 
that had been hoped for.  Trade with Israel and the West Bank, what many in Jordan had 
hoped would be one of the main benefits of peace, never materialized.  Jordanian industry 
is tailor-made to meet many of the Palestinians‘ needs for medium technology goods and 
textiles as well as construction material like cement, iron bars, and ceramic tiles but as 
such it posed a threat to Israel‘s total control over the captive $2 billion Palestinian 
market and Israel imposed draconian measures that made it practically impossible for 
Jordanian traders to infiltrate the occupied territories.149   
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Population growth outpaced growth in the size of the economy during the late 
1990s.150 With a continued decline in consumption caused by IMF-imposed austerity 
measures, a slow-down in real estate investment that had dramatically increased after the 
Gulf War in the early 1990s when expatriates returned to the country, stagnant Iraqi and 
Palestinian markets, as well as the lack of any peace dividend, Jordan experienced an 
economic growth rate of only .8% in 1996.  While population growth rates were above 
3% annually, economic growth was only 2.2% in both 1997 and 1998 and then dipped to 
1.8% in 1999.151     
The economic pressures led King Hussein to work hard to re-establish ties with 
the Gulf States even at the expense of Jordan‘s relations with Iraq.  In the late 1990s, 
Jordan allowed Iraqi opposition groups to set up bases in Amman and after King 
Hussein‘s death in 1999, his successor King Abdullah was able to fully restore relations 
with all the Gulf States.  As American preparations to invade Iraq began after September 
11, 2001 and then through the war and sustained occupation, King Abdullah backed the 
Americans.  The renewed relationship with the Gulf States enabled hundreds of 
thousands of Jordanians to return to employment in the Gulf and by 2002 remittances into 
Jordan reached approximately $2.3 billion.152    Despite the economic benefits Jordan has 
received from its position toward the Iraq war, the decision remains deeply unpopular 
among the Jordanian population and to maintain it the Jordanian regime has further 
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clamped down on political and civil liberties and has increased the pervasive role of the 
security services.153   
After the turn of the century, Jordan was able to pull out of its recession but the 
economic growth it has witnessed over the past few years has more to do with regional 
events than on changes in the economic structure of the country. After Jordan‘s siding 
with the United States in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, especially 
regarding the American war against Iraq, aid levels shot up to $542 million in 2002 and 
since then Jordan has remained the fourth largest recipient of American aid in the world 
(after Israel, Egypt, and Columbia).  Jordan‘s regional stances also helped it conclude 
important trade agreements with the United States and Europe.  Jordan signed an 
Association Agreement with the EU in 1997 and joined the World Trade Organization in 
1999.  In 2000, it signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, joining Canada, 
Mexico and Israel as the only other countries in the world with such a privileged trade 
status.154 
Not only did American aid and trade increase, but unlike the 1990-91 war which 
had a profound negative impact on the Jordanian economy, the 2003 war has had a 
positive impact.  Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis flooded into Jordan in the aftermath of 
the war, including much of the Iraqi economic elite who have invested substantially in 
the kingdom.155  The infusion of investment capital from Iraqis as well as Jordanians 
working in the Gulf who have benefited from the steep rise in the price of oil that came 
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about largely as a result of the Iraqi war helped stimulate high growth rates that in 
addition to American aid and increased international trade helped pull Jordan out of its 
recession. 
 
JORDAN’S FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Even though Jordan was ultimately saved from economic collapse by its ability to 
again trade in its geostrategic position for various forms of rent, more than a decade of 
economic hardships convinced many in the Jordanian elite that economic reform cannot 
be put off forever and that the Jordanian economy must find a way of standing on its own 
to weather future crises.  During the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s, the Jordanian 
regime was forced to work on restructuring some aspects of its economy and economic 
reform has been declared the top priority of the country since Abdullah became King in 
1999.  While they were not enough to make Jordan self-sufficient, the reforms that did 
take place during the late 1990s and early part of the century were in some senses 
successful.   
Restructuring programs helped Jordan bring inflation down from approximately 
25% in 1989 to less than 2% in 2001156 and the Jordanian Central Bank was able to build 
up enough foreign-currency reserves to cover five months of imports while food 
subsidies were abolished, even in the face of violent riots.157  Jordan has worked to 
increase domestic savings and attract private sector investment and part of the success in 
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this area is what made Jordan an attractive market for the Iraqi capital fleeing Baghdad.  
In this era of economic globalization, attracting such investment and even increasing 
domestic savings depends a great deal on Jordan‘s financial system and financial sector 
liberalization has been one of the most important aspects of Jordan‘s economic reform 
programs.  The manner in which future financial sector reform takes place is likely to 
constitute an increasingly important variable in explaining the future political 
development of the country. 
Commercial banks remain the principal allocators of finance capital in Jordan but 
the stock market, which enjoyed phenomenal growth in 1992 and 1993 and then again 
between 2003 and 2005, has become an important secondary source.  There are a total of 
23 local commercial and investment banks in Jordan.158 The sector remains dominated by 
the Arab Bank but the extent of that dominance is hard to calculate accurately since in its 
consolidated banking reports, the Central Bank of Jordan does not list the statistics of 
individual banks and the banks themselves are not required to publish reports that 
distinguish between their branch activities inside and outside of Jordan.   
The Arab Bank and a number of other Jordanian banks have foreign branches and 
in their published annual reports they do not always distinguish between their domestic 
and foreign activities.  Thus while some analysts go so far as to claim that the Arab Bank 
commands about 60% of overall customer deposits, net credit facilities and net 
                                                 
158 A list of the banks is published by the Association of Banks in Jordan (ABJ) and can be found at 
http://www.abj.org.jo.  The same list is also found on the website of the Central Bank of Jordan at 
http://www.cbj.gov.jo. 299. 
 105 
shareholders equity in the country,159 this is probably overstated since most of the Arab 
Bank‘s business is outside of Jordan.  In its 2006 annual report, Arab Bank itself only 
claims to control about 20% - 25% of total assets, deposits, and direct credit facilities 
inside Jordan.160  The second largest bank in the country, the Housing Bank, probably 
commands about 15% of total customer deposits inside the country while the next four 
largest banks – the Jordan Islamic Bank, the Jordan National Bank, the Cairo-Amman 
Bank, and the Jordan-Kuwait Bank – each have about 7% - 10% of total deposits inside 
the country.161   
In 1997, the Higher Court of Investment removed the 50% foreign ownership 
restriction on the banks and some other listed stocks. More than 50% of the Arab Bank 
became owned by foreigners, mostly governments and government agencies of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman.162  Private Jordanian investors, many of whom are very 
close to palace circles, also have substantial holdings in the bank but the Arab Bank and 
Jordanian banks in general are not linked to industrial conglomerates or holding 
companies as major commercial banks are in financial systems that are based on 
concentrated oligopolistic commercial banking structures.163  While the Arab Bank has 
one of the best reputations in the region and is financially healthy, its foreign ownership 
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as well as the lack of stronger economic linkages between the bank and major industrial 
enterprises weakens the structural power of capital in Jordan. 
The Central Bank plays an important role in Jordan though it does not enjoy a 
large degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the government.  To maintain the strength of the 
Jordanian Dinar, to encourage JD over foreign denominated deposits, to prevent capital 
flight and even encourage the repatriation of some of the estimated $5-6 billion in 
Jordanian capital held abroad, the Central Bank maintained tight monetary policies with 
high interest rates throughout the 1990s bringing a lot of money into the banking sector 
but squeezing banking profits.164   
Stung by the failure of Petra Bank in 1987 and the more general banking crisis of 
1989, the Central Bank tried to encourage mergers among the smaller Jordanian banks 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, but with very limited success.165  While some banks 
have merged, new ones have also been established.  New banking laws passed in 1998 
further strengthened incentives for mergers while also increasing overall transparency in 
the sector.  The laws were intended to strengthen the banking sector and provide it with 
the means to capitalize on new trade and investment opportunities expected to materialize 
with Jordan‘s entrance into the World Trade Organization and its trade agreements with 
the European Union and the United States. 
While a strong banking sector can help Jordan avoid capital flight and perhaps 
even bring in some of the capital that has already left the country, increased foreign 
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investments depend more on stock markets than banking.  The Jordanian stock market 
witnessed a boom from 1991 to 1993 and then again from 2003 to 2005.  In the early 
1990s, the all-share index on the Amman Financial Market climbed 100 per cent in three 
years, turnover tripled from JD302 million in 1991 to JD969 million in 1993,166 and 
market capitalization rose above $5 billion.167  While the boom gained the attention of 
foreign investors, it was not led by them and in fact bureaucratic obstacles limited the 
amount that could have been brought in by external sources.  The boom was largely the 
result of the temporary infusion of cash that came into Jordan with the more than 300,000 
expatriate workers that were expelled from the Gulf after Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait and 
brought an estimated $1.5 billion in foreign currency with them to Jordan.168   
The rapid growth of the stock market led to some anxiety and in July 1993 the 
Central Bank intervened with measures to deter local speculators from buying stocks with 
borrowed funds.  As a result, annual turnover dropped by 40% while price/earnings ratios 
declined from 25 times to a more modest but still attractive 16.5 times income.169   The 
market then fell into a prolonged slump with continued growth impeded by bureaucratic 
and political obstruction.  Reforms in the late 1990s again made the stock market 
(renamed the Amman Stock Exchange in 1999 as part of the reforms)170 attractive and it 
witnessed another boom from 2003 to 2005 largely fueled by the infusion of Iraqi capital 
into the country. 
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Until 1995, foreign investors in Jordan were required to get government approval 
and between 1993 and 1995 when 56 foreign funds applied to invest $450 million in the 
stock market, the government only approved $200 million after lengthy delays that 
irritated investors.171 The stock market was also weakened by tight monetary policies that 
provided incentives for local investors to put their money in fixed interest securities. 
A number of reforms that began in 1997 increased interest in the stock market.  In 
addition to scrapping the 50% foreign ownership restrictions on banking and insurance 
stocks, the Central Bank cut interest rates for the first time in eight years and lifted 
foreign currency controls that had been imposed since 1989.172  The Jordan Securities 
Commission was also established and soon issued wide ranging financial disclosure rules 
that assured greater transparency.  Such reforms led to increased interest in the stock 
market.  Total trading for 1997 reached JD355 million which represented a 43% increase 
over 1996 even if it was still far below the 1993 high.173  The general slump however 
continued as more laws and regulations were passed to attract foreign investment, 
including serious movements toward privatization of state-owned enterprises.174 
The reforms ultimately proved successful and the boom that began in 2003 was 
even greater than the one of the early 1990s.  Stock market capitalization tripled in just 
two years to reach over $37 billion by 2005.175  In 2005, stock market capitalization 
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represented more than 325% of Jordan‘s GDP.  Since the high of 2005, the stock market 
has retreated.  Stock market capitalization in May of 2007 was approximately $32 billion 
representing about 225% of Jordan‘s GDP.176  Much of the boom was generated from 
foreign investment as indicated by the fact that non-Jordanian ownership of market 
capitalization increased from 37% in 2002 to 45% in 2005.  During the retreat in the 
market from 2005 to 2007, non-Jordanian ownership slightly increased to 46% of overall 
capitalization.  The reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s made Jordan an attractive 
area for investment and perfectly placed to capitalize on the billions of dollars that have 
fled Iraq since the outbreak of war in 2003. 
 
JORDAN’S FUTURE POLITICAL-ECONOMY 
The banking and stock market reforms that began in 1997 were a direct result of 
the increasingly dire state of the Jordanian economy.  Since Abdullah became king in 
1999, economic reform has continued at an even faster pace as the new monarch has put 
an emphasis on the economy that did not exist during his father‘s reign.  However, 
regional political events and the resumption of large amounts of rent – and not any 
underlying structural reforms - ultimately saved the Jordanian economy.  Jordan remains 
highly dependent on rents.  While aid has not regained the level of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, by 2007, Jordan was receiving in excess of $500 million in annual aid and 
the amount that Jordan received from remittances was well over $2 billion a year, much 
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higher than it was even during the peak oil boom years of the late 1970s and early 
1980s.177   
This continued rent will depend on political developments in the region, regarding 
the war in Iraq, the Middle East peace process, and the impact the Arab Spring of 2011 
has on Jordan.  The policies of the Jordanian government regarding Iraq and the Middle 
East peace process are deeply unpopular and to maintain them the regime has 
significantly reversed the political reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s.178 While the 
popular revolts that occurred in neighboring Arab countries in the first half of 2011 have 
not yet been replicated on a large scale in Jordan, the regional developments threaten to 
spill over into Jordan making the country vulnerable at a time when its king does not 
have the legitimacy that his father enjoyed. Jordanian support for the U.S. war on Iraq 
was deeply unpopular across the Jordanian political spectrum and Jordan‘s vulnerabilities 
in this respect were underscored by the November 9, 2005 attacks on Jordanian hotels 
that were masterminded by a Jordanian citizen who was at the time leading the most 
violent of all the Iraqi resistance groups.179   
Jordan‘s peace treaty with Israel is also unpopular, especially as the situation 
inside the occupied territories has deteriorated and Israel is not seen to be serious about 
making any substantial concessions toward the Palestinians.  Throughout the late 1990s, 
anti-normalization activities by Jordanian professional associations and political parties 
were often interpreted as direct attacks against the state and resulted in arrests and new 
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political restrictions.  The overwhelming victory by Hamas Islamists in Palestinian 
legislative elections in January, 2006 and the subsequent Palestinian Civil War in the 
summer of 2007 between the Palestine Liberation Organization nationalists and the 
Hamas Islamists – who have close ties to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood – have 
increased Jordan‘s vulnerabilities.180  The unstable regional environment regarding both 
Iraq and the occupied Palestinian territories has increased the risk that Jordan could again 
face an internal crisis on the proportions of the mid-1950s or early 1970s. 
These unpopular regional stances are being adopted at the same time that the 
Bedouin tribes and the Muslim Brotherhood - the two population segments that 
historically supported the regime in times of real crises – are now more alienated than 
ever from the monarchy.  The economic reform measures that began in 1989 and were 
later accelerated by King Abdullah undermined the bedrock support the monarchy has 
traditionally enjoyed in tribal communities.  This is best symbolized by the violent riots 
that broke out in 1996 when bread prices doubled.  As in 1989, these riots took place in 
purely tribal areas.  However, unlike the 1989 riots that led to political liberalization and 
electoral laws that clearly favored tribal elements, the 1996 riots were followed by further 
repression and underscored the failure of the liberalization experiment to guarantee 
political stability.  Subsequent political events and the resumption of large rents enabled 
Jordan to weather the crisis but the monarchy is now more dependent than ever on 
outside support.   
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When riots again broke out in 2011, the king replaced a prime minister who was 
from a prominent Palestinian family with Marouf Bakhit, a military man from a 
prominent Jordanian tribe. The move underscored King Abdullah‘s fear of losing tribal 
support. The announcement by the Gulf Cooperation Council in May, 2011 that it was 
inviting Jordan to become a member of the council was perceived as an attempt by Saudi 
Arabia to shore up the regional monarchies in the face of the pressures emanating from 
the popular Arab revolutions calling for political reform. Saudi willingness to provide 
Jordan with substantial amounts of aid may help buy time for the Jordanian Monarchy by 
providing it with the largesse needed to buy off the tribes but the king‘s relationship with 
the political opposition is likely to become more strained as Arab peoples throughout the 
region increasingly demand democratic reform. 
 This is especially true of the relationship between the Jordanian regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  The leftist and secular opposition to the Jordanian Monarchy that 
had been strong in earlier decades was almost non-existent in Jordan by the 1990s thus 
removing one of the factors that had previously brought the Brotherhood and the regime 
together.  While leftists had historically used their control over the elected boards of the 
professional associations in Jordan as a means of expressing their opposition to certain 
governmental actions, by the 1980s Islamists were overwhelmingly elected to lead nearly 
all the professional association boards.  The Brotherhood has demonstrated similar 
electoral dominance in university student council elections.  In the 1989 and subsequent 
parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood further proved that it was the only organized 
opposition force that could garner substantial popular support. 
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 The Brotherhood‘s strong opposition to the peace process with Israel and the 1994 
peace treaty led to a crisis in relations between the Brotherhood and the regime.  Whereas 
previously the Brotherhood‘s position on the West Bank and on the Jordanian monarchy 
as a whole was able to provide the Jordanian regime with legitimacy in the face of 
popular opposition, the Brotherhood has now come to represent the only force of real 
opposition to the regime and its position on the issue that has come to define much of 
what Jordan represents to the outside world is the main factor that threatens the continued 
legitimacy of the monarchy.  While King Hussein was able to deftly gain the support of 
the Islamists by providing haven to persecuted Egyptian and Syrian members of the 
Brotherhood, one of King Abdullah‘s first acts as a new king in 1999 was expelling from 
Jordan the political leadership of Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist group with strong ties to 
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.  Since September 11, 2001 and the renewed 
international attempts to curtail the activities of Islamists, the Brotherhood – despite its 
moderation and non-violent approach – has come under renewed pressure that threatens 
its longstanding relationship with the regime. 
 King Abdullah has sought to strengthen ties with the business community.  While 
political liberalization has been reversed, economic liberalization has picked up pace 
since Abdullah‘s accession.  Before regional events after September 11, 2001 enabled 
Jordan to again obtain large rents, King Abdullah had become convinced that the future 
stability of Jordan depended on adopting the Washington consensus version of economic 
development and that the successful implementation of such reforms would require the 
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active support of the business community.181  The king has hosted a number of 
international conferences with economic reform themes, established and given real power 
to the Economic Consultative Council, and strongly backed privatization schemes. 
Abdullah has taken a special interest in promoting certain export sectors, most notably 
information technology.182 All of his moves have been undertaken in close cooperation 
and coordination with Jordan‘s private sector business elite.   
 In an earlier era, King Hussein was able to secure regime stability through 
patronizing the East Bank tribal communities and using the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
bridge toward other segments of the population, most notably the more activist and 
urban, lower and middle-class segments of Palestinian origin.  As a large organization 
that was able to cross nearly all socio-economic divides in Jordan, the Brotherhood‘s 
support gave legitimacy to the regime during times of crises.  Abdullah‘s strategy of 
patronizing the wealthier business elite while adopting policies that have alienated the 
East Bank communities and the Brotherhood is a more insecure policy.  While the return 
of large rents has enabled the monarchy to postpone the question, it remains unclear how 
stable the regime would be in the event of a real crisis.   
The remaining portions of this dissertation will explore the potential of Islamic 
banking to serve as a bridge that can allow Jordan to continue economic reform policies 
that will bring about the kind of viable economy Abdullah seeks while winning back 
                                                 
181 Knowles (2005) pg. 141-142; also see King Abdullah‘s Harvard speech (Winter 2003). 
182 Knowles (2005) pg. 83. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  SOCIAL IMPACT OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN 
JORDAN 
 Advocates of Islamic Banking are often quick to point out the positive social role 
such banks play in society.  Islamic banks are said to be inherently more just than 
conventional banks and the growth of Islamic banking is often touted as a means to bring 
about a greater degree of social justice in society.183  Islamic banks are viewed as having 
higher objectives than merely that of being financial intermediaries and theoretically the 
structure of such banks and the manner by which they finance projects should have a 
transformative effect on the larger society, helping to lessen inequality, eliminate poverty 
while at the same time increasing economic development. 
 Finance is a powerful tool and the presence or lack of institutional structures that 
facilitate the investing and financing of surplus money can have a profound impact on 
any society.184  Islamic banks have played an important social role in Jordan in that they 
provided such structures to a large segment of the population that had previously kept 
themselves out of the conventional banking system.  The best means of gauging the 
social role played by Islamic banking in Jordan is to look closely at the annual reports of 
the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) from its inception and analyze the growth trajectory of the 
bank as well as the manner by which it obtained and used its funds.  While the bank has 
certainly not had the kind of transformative effect on Jordanian society that some of the 
theoretical advocates of Islamic banking allude to, the JIB was able to quickly become a 
                                                 
183 M. Umer Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1992); 
Munawar Iqbal ed., Islamic Economic Institutions and the Elimination of Poverty, (Leicester:  The Islamic 
Foundation, 2002). 
184 Scott MacDonald and Albert Gastman, A History of Credit & Power in the Western World, (New 
Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 2001). 
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major financial player in Jordan that has had a meaningful impact on various facets of the 
country. While the focus of this chapter will be to provide a detailed analysis of JIB, 
some allusions will also be made to the Islamic International Islamic Bank. 
   
ANALYSIS OF JIB ANNUAL REPORTS 
 Table 4.1 shows the total assets of the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) from its 
founding in 1979 through 2006.  The table underscores the tremendous growth rate that 
the bank has experienced.  Starting out with slightly more than JD7 million in 1979, the 
bank had over JD1.7 billion in assets by the end of 2006.  The growth during the first two 
years of operations, 112% and 104% respectively, underscored the wide acceptance and 
demand for Islamic banking in the Jordanian market. 
                    Table 4.1: Total Assets of the Jordan Islamic Bank (1979 - 2006) 
       
Year Total Assets Growth Rate  Year Total Assets Growth Rate 
 (millions of JD) %   (millions of JD) % 
1979 7.3    1993 528.3 21 
1980 15.5 112  1994 570.0 8 
1981 31.6 104  1995 621.9 9 
1982 45.2 43  1996 618.7 -1 
1983 71.5 58  1997 650.6 5 
1984 102.1 43  1998 706.8 9 
1985 126.8 24  1999 756.7 7 
1986 161.7 28  2000 828.3 9 
1987 197.4 22  2001 901.7 9 
1988 222.6 13  2002 1029.7 14 
1989 242.3 9  2003 1159.2 13 
1990 244.8 1  2004 1301.4 12 
1991 356.8 46  2005 1568.4 21 
1992 435.3 22  2006 1726.0 10 
Source:  Unless otherwise stated, all the tables in this chapter are based on the annual reports of the Jordan Islamic Bank.  Some of the 
figures for the early years was consolidated from the annual reports by Abdallah al-Maliki in the book, Al-Bank Al-Islami fi al-Urdun, 
(Amman: al-Dustour al-Tijari) 1996. 
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The bank experienced its most rapid growth in its first five years of operations, 
during which its annual growth rate was never less than 43%.  The bank stabilized 
somewhat from 1984 to 1988 when its annual growth rate fluctuated between 13% and 
24%.  During the next two years Jordan was in the midst of a financial crisis and regional 
events in the West Bank as well as the feelings of instability that resulted from the Gulf 
War led many depositors to withdraw their money from all Jordanian banks.  JIB‘s 
annual rate of growth fell to 9% in 1989 and only 1% in 1990.  With the conclusion of the 
crisis, JIB‘s growth skyrocketed by 46% in 1991 making up for the two years of 
relatively slow growth and the bank continued experiencing rapid growth for the next two 
years.  In 1994 and 1995, the annual growth rate fell to 8% and 9% annually and then in 
1996 the bank lost 1% in total assets, the only year in which JIB experienced a negative 
growth rate.  Jordan as a whole was in a deep recession at the time.  For the next five 
years, the bank grew by less than 10% annually and then from 2002 until 2006 the bank‘s 
annual growth rate increased to between 10% and 21% annually.   
According to the Central Bank of Jordan, there was a total of JD24.2 billion in 
total assets of licensed banks in Jordan at the end of 2006185 making the JIB‘s JD1,726 
million equivalent to 7.1% of the total assets of all licensed banks in the country.  It is 
difficult to compare the size of JIB to other banks in Jordan since the Central Bank does 
not list the assets that individual banks have in Jordan and the banks themselves are not 
                                                 
185 The annual reports of the Central Bank of Jordan can be found at http://www.cbj.gov.jo 
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required to publish reports that distinguish between their assets inside Jordan and outside 
the country.   
Adding up the figures as reported in the annual reports from just the 13 Jordanian 
banks (not including the branches of the 8 foreign banks with branches in Jordan), shows 
JD39 billion in total assets in 2006 while the Central Bank reported that the banks only 
had JD24.2 billion186 of assets in Jordan. The huge discrepancy can be explained by the 
fact that the banks‘ reports count assets inside as well as outside of the country while the 
Central Bank only counts those inside Jordan. Since JIB does not have any branches 
outside of the country the vast majority of their assets are domestic and thus the 7.1% of 
total assets in Jordan is accurate.  This would make JIB the third largest bank in terms of 
total assets inside Jordan, behind the Arab Bank and the Housing Bank.  Two banks that 
report slightly more assets than JIB, Jordan Ahli (National Bank) and the Jordan-Kuwait 
Bank, both have a number of branches outside of the country. This analysis is also in line 
with the IBIS data used to make Table 2.1 which showed that JIB‘s percentage of total 
assets fluctuated between 6% and 8% between the 1990s and early part of the new 
century while the Islamic International Arab Bank (IIAB) had garnered about 2.5% of the 
overall Jordanian market in 2003 with both Islamic banks thus accounting for about 10% 
of overall banking assets in the country. 
While it is not possible with the current data to categorically state that the 
phenomenal growth of Islamic banking in Jordan has resulted more in an increasing 
                                                 
186 The Central Bank website lists all the banks that are licensed in Jordan and provides links to the web 
sites of the banks, all of which have annual reports. 
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number of people participating in finance (rather than just switching from conventional to 
Islamic banks), the gradual but consistent increase in the overall ratio of Jordanian money 
that is held within the Jordanian banking system along with both the rapid growth of JIB 
and later IIAB while the other major banks in the country (most notably Arab Bank and 
the Housing Bank) have not reported concomitant declines seems to indicate that at least 
part of the story explaining the growth of Islamic banking in the country is the increasing 
number of people willing to put their money in an Islamic Bank while they had 
previously kept their cash out of the banking system altogether.  
Chart 4.1 depicts the Contract Intensive Money ratio (the ratio of money held 
inside the banking system to the overall money supply) in Jordan from 1951 to 2008.187 
The chart shows that Jordan has progressed from having a very low CIM ratio of less 
than 45% in 1951 to much more respectable level of more than 85% where the growth in 
the CIM ratio seems to have stabilized since 2004. 
                                                 
187 For an explanation of the importance of CIM ratios as a measure of the institutional credibility of a 
country see Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East, (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 79-82.The data for chart 4.1 comes from Clement 





Source: This chart was calculated by Dr. Clement Henry using IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
The CIM ratio in Jordan increased gradually through the years with major 
declines during periods of particular political turbulence – first in the late 1950s around 
the time that the attempted military coup against King Hussein took place and then an 
even greater decline during the turbulence between the 1967 war and the 1970 Jordanian 
Civil War. A smaller decline took place in the late 1980s when - as mentioned above - 
Jordan was in the midst of a financial crisis and regional events in the West Bank and 












CHART 4.1: CIM in Jordan 1951-2008
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From a low point in 1970 when only 36% of Jordanian money was held in the 
banking system, the CIM ratio increased at a rapid pace until 1978 when 64% of the 
Jordanian money supply was held in the banking system. From 1978 until 1980 the ratio 
stabilized at 64%. It was at that same time that JIB was established. The CIM ratio began 
another ascent from 1980 until 1987 during which time the ratio increased from 64.1% to 
72.7%. It was during this same period of time that JIB experienced its most rapid rate of 
growth. Based on the overall Jordanian money supply in 1987 (JD2.4 Billion) the 
difference between 64.1% and 72.7% represented JD864 million. It was also during that 
time that the overall assets of Islamic banking in Jordan increased from nothing to 
approximately JD200 million.  It is reasonable to assume that a large percentage of this 
JD200 million would have remained out of the banking system and the CIM ratio would 
not have risen as quickly as it had were it not for the establishment of JIB. 
From 1987 until 1990, the CIM ratio in Jordan actually declined. Then from 1990 
until 2005 it again experienced steady growth going from 71.3% in 1990 to a high of 
86.6% in 2005. Based on the overall Jordanian money supply in 2005 (JD12.4 Billion) 
the difference between 71.3% and 86.6% represented JD3.6 Billion. It was during this 
time that the overall assets of Islamic banking in Jordan increased from around JD200 
million in 1987 to JD2 Billion in 2005 (JD1.6 Billion in JIB and JD400 Million in IIAB). 
Again it is reasonable to assume that a large percentage of this additional JD2 Billion 
would have remained outside of the banking system and the CIM ratio would not have 
risen so rapidly had it not been for the existence of Islamic Banks. 
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Another indicator of JIB‘s rapid rate of growth and the demand for Islamic 
banking that it fulfilled can be seen in Table 4.2 which shows the amount, kinds, and 
growth of deposits in JIB from its founding in 1979 up through 2006.  In its first year of 
operations, JIB was able to attract about JD5 million in deposits. Ten years later, the bank 
had JD211 million and in another ten years it had nearly JD650 million. By the end of 
2006, it had over JD1.5 billion in deposits of various kinds. 
The fastest growth took place during the first ten years (1979 – 1989) of the banks 
existence in which there was only one year (1988) in which the average annual rate of 
growth in deposits was less than 20%.  The financial crisis that Jordan experienced in 
1989 and 1990 led to a year of negative growth in 1990 but JIB quickly rebounded with 
two more years of very high growth.  The next year (1993) total deposits in JIB grew by 
14% and then for the next six years the rate of growth was less than 10% annually.  The 
rate of growth picked up after that, growing by between 12% and 19% annually from 
2000 until 2005 – the same time that it was competing for deposits with Jordan‘s other 
Islamic bank, the Islamic International Arab Bank, which opened in 1998. 
Table 4.2 also shows the size of the different kinds of deposits that are made in 
JIB.  The main division is between deposits that are placed in the bank by other banks 






Table 4.2:  Deposits in Jordan Islamic Bank (1979 – 2006) 
 (Millions of JD) 
    Individual 1. Specific 2    3 Trust Accounts                         4 Joint Investment Accounts      Total Deposits  
Year From Deposits Invest. Mqrda   
% 
Growth           Total                                    
   % 
Growth  
  Banks (4 kinds) Accounts Bonds Value Rate Value 
% 
Growth Saving Fixed Notice Value Rate  
1979 0.01 4.9 1.0   2.5   1.4   0.20 1.20   4.9    
1980 0.01 12.5 0.9   4.8 92 6.8 386 1.10 1.59 4.09 12.5 155  
1981 0.01 26.2 0.9   12.2 154 13.1 93 1.86 3.23 8.02 26.2 110  
1982 0.2 36.8 0.9   16.4 34 19.5 49 3.27 4.65 11.53 37.0 41  
1983 0.6 61.4 2.9   20.7 26 37.8 94 4.90 19.45 13.48 62.0 68  
1984 0.9 89.5 6.6   22.3 8 60.6 60 6.83 38.71 15.03 90.4 46  
1985 0.7 113.5 10.7   23.7 6 79.1 31 8.06 55.18 15.87 114.2 26  
1986 0.3 142.6 15.0   26.6 12 101.0 28 10.29 74.35 16.33 142.9 25  
1987 2.1 174.4 15.9   31.2 17 127.3 26 12.53 98.28 16.45 176.5 24  
1988 3.1 195.0 17.2   35.1 13 142.7 12 14.06 110.26 18.39 198.1 12  
1989 4.1 207.0 19.7   43.7 25 143.6 1 16.28 111.04 16.28 211.1 20  
1990 4.8 204.6 14.2   38.7 -11 151.7 6 15.34 121.47 14.87 209.4 -1  
1991 2.4 313.7 16.7   60.0 55 237.0 56 23.02 195.14 18.79 316.1 51  
1992 6.0 387.0 17.7   72.9 22 296.4 25 31.80 239.90 24.72 393.0 24  
1993 5.7 442.0 21.4   85.1 17 335.5 13 24.90 275.12 25.46 447.7 14  
1994 5.6 477.0 14.8   89.4 5 372.8 11 36.50 309.02 27.25 482.6 8  
1995 6.4 521.9 13.4   91.5 2 417.0 12 43.40 344.75 28.84 528.3 9  
1996 6.3 518.3 16.0   85.6 -6 416.7 0 38.10 350.12 28.44 524.6 -1  
1997 5.3 546.5 25.3 7.8 89.7 5 423.7 2 43.84 354.24 25.56 551.8 5  
1998 3.5 593.1 52.0 13 99.4 11 428.4 1 47.74 359.35 21.64 596.6 8  
1999 4.2 642.9 82.9 16 101.8 2 441.9 3 54.53 368.78 18.60 647.1 8  
2000 4.0 734.1 118.0 52 126.4 24 438.2 -1 62.73 359.34 16.12 738.1 14  
2001 4.5 819.4 126.5 71 140.1 11 481.4 10 67.48 395.26 18.69 823.9 12  
2002 4.4 943.4 108.2 125 179.5 28 531.1 10 78.72 436.23 16.11 947.8 15  
2003 4.5 1060.6 95.2 88 236.8 32 640.2 21 104.20 517.65 18.30 1065.1 12  
2004 4.1 1201.6 79.9 101 285.2 20 735.4 15 128.04 584.02 23.30 1205.7 13  
2005 47.7 1381.7 66.9 159 351.3 23 804.4 9 148.88 629.09 26.47 1429.4 19  
2006 30.7 1490.7 87.3 167 375.4 7 861.3 7 170.80 660.90 29.60 1521.4 6  
 
 
 Throughout JIB‘s history, the amount deposited in the bank from other banks has 
always been very low with most of those funds coming from banks outside of Jordan.  
From 1979 until 2004 the percentage of total deposits in JIB from other banks was never 
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more than 2% [except in one year (1990) when it was only slightly more than 2%], this is 
in direct contrast to the Islamic International Arab Bank where 40% to 50% of its overall 
deposits have been from other banks.188 The deposits in the IIAB from other banks come 
primarily from the Arab Bank, which exchanges IIAB JD funds for Arab Bank dollars 
that are then invested in international commodity markets since the IIAB could not find 
enough investment opportunities inside Jordan that were both prudent and shari’a 
compliant.  In 2005, the amount deposited in JIB from other banks jumped more than 11 
times from the previous year, going from JD4.1 million in 2004 to more than JD47 
million in 2005.  This marked the first time that JIB began actively working in the 
interbank swap market and JD41.7 million of the total bank deposits resulted from 
swaps.189 
 Individuals can deposit money in JIB in one of four ways, through Specific 
(Restricted) Investment Accounts, Muqarada Bonds, Trust Accounts, or Joint 
(Unrestricted) Investment Accounts. 
 Trust Accounts, which are similar to checking accounts in conventional banks in 
that depositors who place funds in Trust Accounts get no return on their deposit, made up 
the majority of individual deposits in JIB‘s first year of operations with JD2.5 million.  
They then declined as a percentage of overall deposits until they became less than 20% in 
1986 (see Table 4.3) and have remained at about that level with only slight fluctuations 
since.  During the financial and banking crisis of 1990, the amount deposited in JIB Trust  
                                                 
188 See the annual reports from the Islamic International Arab Bank. 
189 2005 Jordan Islamic Bank Annual Report, page 27. 
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Table 4.3:  Percent Makeup of Different Forms of 
Individual Deposits in Jordan Islamic Bank 
(1979-2006) 
  
  Specific     Joint  
Year Investment Muqarada Trust  Investment  
  Accounts Bonds Accounts Accounts  
1979 20 0 51 29  
1980 7 0 38 54  
1981 3 0 47 50  
1982 2 0 45 53  
1983 5 0 34 62  
1984 7 0 25 68  
1985 9 0 21 70  
1986 11 0 19 71  
1987 9 0 18 73  
1988 9 0 18 73  
1989 10 0 21 69  
1990 7 0 19 74  
1991 5 0 19 76  
1992 5 0 19 77  
1993 5 0 19 76  
1994 3 0 19 78  
1995 3 0 18 80  
1996 3 0 17 80  
1997 5 1 16 78   
1998 9 2 17 72   
1999 13 3 16 69  
2000 16 7 17 60  
2001 15 9 17 59  
2002 11 13 19 56  
2003 9 8 22 60  
2004 7 8 24 61  
2005 5 12 25 58  
2006 6 11 25 58  
 
Accounts fell by 11%.  The only other year in which Trust Account deposits experienced 
negative growth was 1996, the year Jordan was in the midst of a recession and a country-
wide liquidity crisis.  The fall in Trust Account deposits was responsible for the overall 
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drop in deposits that JIB experienced in 1996 and occurred when high interest rates in the 
country pushed depositors away from accounts that did not provide returns.   
There has been very rapid growth in deposits in Trust Accounts in recent years 
with a rise from JD101.8 million in 1999 (16% of total deposits) to JD375.4 million in 
2006 (25% of total deposits).  This increase is largely due to the increased services 
provided to those with Trust Accounts as JIB, forced to compete with the Islamic 
International Arab Bank, has been improving its technology infrastructure and adding 
services that did not exist before.   
 Specific (or Restricted) Investment Accounts are the other kind of deposit that 
began at a high level in JIB‘s first year of operations but then declined as an overall 
percentage of deposits in the bank.  Specific Investment Accounts are cash deposits 
(almost always in foreign currencies) received by the bank to be invested in a specific 
project or used for a specific purpose.  The overwhelming majority of such projects 
involve commodity trading in international markets with a small percentage used for real 
estate investments or other kinds of business transactions.  Since the deposits are placed 
for specific purposes, the profits and losses from such deposits are kept separate from the 
results of other bank investments.  In 1979, JD1 million (20% of total deposits in JIB) 
were in the form of Specific Investment Accounts.  This amount however declined the 
next year to 7% of overall deposits and has remained at about that level with slight 
fluctuations ever since.  The fastest period of growth in Specific Investment Accounts 
occurred from 1996 to 2000 when Jordan was suffering from a recession and those with 
hard currencies preferred commodity trading on the international markets over investing 
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inside Jordan. During that time, the amount deposited in Specific Investment Accounts in 
JIB went from a low of JD13.4 million at the end of 1995 (3% of total deposits in JIB) to 
JD118 million at the end of 2000 (16% of the total deposits).  Since then, the amount 
deposited has declined and by the end of 2005, only JD66.9 million were invested in 
Specific Investment Accounts, making up only 5% of total deposits in JIB. 
 Muqarada Bonds, or investment portfolios, provide a relatively new way to 
deposit in JIB that began modestly in 1997 and has increased rapidly since.  Muqarada 
Bonds are issued by JIB to cover the costs of specific investment opportunities that the 
bank defines.  After defining a project, the bank issues a portfolio to cover its capital 
requirements and then invites the public to subscribe to the portfolio through the purchase 
of bonds.  The bonds mature when the project is liquidated and profits are then 
distributed among the holders of the bonds with the bank taking a pre-determined 
percentage of the profit.  Individuals can also sell their shares back to the bank or to 
others at any time before full maturation.  In 1997, JD7.8 million in Muqarada Bonds 
were issued constituting about 1% of overall deposits in JIB. By the end of 2006, there 
was a combined capital of JD167 million deposited in such bonds making them more 
than 11% of overall individual deposits in the bank. 
 The final manner in which individuals can deposit money in JIB is through Joint 
(Unrestricted) Investment Accounts which are somewhat similar to savings accounts in 
conventional banks.  The depositor places money in the bank which the bank then uses to 
make loans/investments.  The major difference is that rather than providing a pre-
determined interest rate on the deposit, JIB provides a percentage of the profit that the 
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bank earned on the investments that it conducted.  In its first year of operations, such 
deposits made up 29% of overall individual deposits in the bank, but quickly jumped to 
55% in the second year and never again fell under 50%.  Growth in Joint Investment 
Accounts was very rapid during the first years of the bank‘s existence, slowing down 
somewhat during the 1989 – 1990 recession and then increasing rapidly again until 1996.   
These accounts steadily increased as a percentage of the overall individual deposits in JIB 
reaching a peak in 1995 and 1996 when 80% of individual deposits in the bank were 
deposited in such accounts.  Since 1996, the share of Joint Investment Accounts in the 
overall percentage of individual deposits has steadily declined.  From 1996 until 2000 the 
amount deposited in Joint Investment Accounts experienced almost no growth at all as 
growth in Specific Investment Accounts increased rapidly.  Since 2000, the amount 
invested in Joint Investment Accounts has grown at about the same rate as the growth in 
overall deposits and has remained at about 60% of overall deposits in JIB while 
Muqarada Bonds and Trust Accounts have increased their overall share at the expense of 
the Specific Investment Accounts. 
 Clients can make Joint Investment Account deposits in JIB in one of three ways.  
They can either make deposits into Savings Accounts, from which money can be 
withdrawn at any time, or into Notice Accounts, from which money can be withdrawn 
with three months notice, or into Fixed Term Accounts in which the deposit is placed for 
a one year term.  At the end of the year, the bank determines how much profit it realized 
from investments made with the money deposited in Joint Investment Accounts.  Those 
with Savings Accounts get 50% of the profit rate on their average annual balance.  So, if 
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the bank made 5% profit on the investment basket from Joint Investment Accounts, those 
with Savings Accounts would realize a profit of 2.5% on their average annual balance.  
Those with Notice Accounts receive 70% of the profit rate (in our example that would 
constitute 3.5%) and those with Fixed Accounts get 90% of the profit rate (4.5% in our 
example).   
In the first four years of the bank‘s history, Savings Accounts constituted about 
15% of the overall deposits in Joint Investment Accounts and then declined to about 10% 
of the overall share (See Table 4.4).  They remained constant at about 10% until the year 
2000 when they increased to 14% and their overall share has steadily increased since 
then.  This growth can partially be explained by the relatively high profit rate that JIB has 
been providing to its depositors in recent years as compared to the interest rates on 
Savings Accounts provided by other Jordanian banks (see Table 4.5).  In 2006, Savings 
Accounts constituted 20% of the deposits in Joint Investment Accounts, the highest 
percentage in the banks history.   
Notice Accounts were not available in JIB‘s first year. In the next three years they 
constituted the most popular form of Joint Investment Account, making up about 60% of 
overall deposits in such accounts from 1980 – 1982.  Since then they have steadily 
declined in importance and since 2003 they have only accounted for about 3% of overall 
deposits in Joint Investment Accounts.  From 1980 to 1982, Fixed Accounts made up 
about 25% of the deposits in Joint Investment Accounts.  Their overall percentage then 
gradually increased until they constituted 84% from 1996 - 1998.  They have slightly 
declined in importance since then and in 2006 constituted 77% of overall deposits as the  
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Table 4.4:   Percentages Deposited in Different 
Forms of Joint Investment 
Accounts 
Year Saving Fixed Notice  
1979 14 86 0  
1980 16 23 60  
1981 14 25 61  
1982 17 24 59  
1983 13 51 36  
1984 11 64 25  
1985 10 70 20  
1986 10 74 16  
1987 10 77 13  
1988 10 77 13  
1989 11 77 11  
1990 10 80 10  
1991 10 82 8  
1992 11 81 8  
1993 7 82 8  
1994 10 83 7  
1995 10 83 7  
1996 9 84 7  
1997 10 84 6   
1998 11 84 5   
1999 12 83 4  
2000 14 82 4  
2001 14 82 4  
2002 15 82 3  
2003 16 81 3  
2004 17 79 3  
2005 19 78 3  
2006 20 77 3  
 
percentage in Savings Accounts increased.  The large percentage of deposits in Fixed 
Term Accounts enables JIB to make longer term investments without having to worry 
about providing immediate liquidity. 
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Table 4.5: JIB Rate of Return as compared to other banks in Jordan (1980 - 2006) 
           
        Jordan Islamic Bank returns on investments     Central Bank of Jordan 
  Percentage of  Return on Return on Return on weighted avg interest rate 
  Profits due Savings Notice Fixed Term Savings  Fixed Term 
Year to depositors Accounts Accounts Accounts Accounts Accounts 
1980 8.20% 4.10% 5.74% 7.38% 5.00% 6.00% 
1981 6.80% 3.40% 4.76% 6.12% 5.00% 6.00% 
1982 7.20% 3.60% 5.04% 6.48% 5.00% 6.00% 
1983 5.40% 2.70% 3.78% 4.86% 6.25% 8.00% 
1984 5.70% 2.85% 3.99% 5.13% 6.75% 8.50% 
1985 5.48% 2.74% 3.84% 4.93% 6.75% 8.50% 
1986 5.10% 2.55% 3.57% 4.59% 5.75% 7.50% 
1987 5.05% 2.53% 3.54% 4.55% 5.75% 7.50% 
1988 5.35% 2.68% 3.75% 4.82% N.A. N.A 
1989 7.25% 3.63% 5.08% 6.53% N.A. N.A 
1990 7.85% 3.93% 5.50% 7.07% 5.18% 8.23% 
1991 7.84% 3.92% 5.49% 7.06% 5.00% 7.82% 
1992 6.45% 3.23% 4.52% 5.81% 5.01% 6.95% 
1993 7.25% 3.63% 5.08% 6.53% 5.14% 6.87% 
1994 7.10% 3.55% 4.97% 6.39% 4.96% 7.33% 
1995 6.14% 3.07% 4.30% 5.53% 5.01% 7.97% 
1996 5.16% 2.58% 3.61% 4.64% 5.22% 8.85% 
1997 5.40% 2.70% 3.78% 4.86% 4.79% 8.91% 
1998 5.61% 2.81% 3.93% 5.05% 4.56% 8.33% 
1999 4.26% 2.13% 2.98% 3.83% 4.19% 7.89% 
2000 4.32% 2.16% 3.02% 3.89% 3.76% 6.55% 
2001 4.30% 2.15% 3.01% 3.87% 2.91% 5.19% 
2002 4.10% 2.05% 2.87% 3.69% 1.84% 3.97% 
2003 4.49% 2.25% 3.14% 4.04% 0.88% 2.75% 
2004 5.50% 2.75% 3.85% 4.95% 0.73% 2.49% 
2005 5.01% 2.51% 3.51% 4.51% 0.83% 3.52% 
2006 5.05% 2.53% 3.54% 4.55% 0.99% 5.13% 
Source:  the JIB figures are from the JIB annual reports and the Central Bank figures are from the Central Bank of Jordan website:  
http://www.cbj.gov.jo 
 
Table 4.5 shows the returns on investments that the Jordan Islamic Bank has 
provided its Joint Investment Account depositors from 1980 until 2006 and compares 
these rates to the interest rates provided by other banks in Jordan (weighted by the 
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volume of deposits) as published by the Central Bank of Jordan.  In its first three years of 
operations, JIB provided its holders of Fixed Accounts a profit rate that was higher than 
the average interest rate on similar kinds of Fixed Accounts in other Jordanian banks.  
The returns on Savings Accounts provided by JIB was however considerably lower than 
the average interest rates provided by conventional banks in the country. 
In 1983, the profit rates that JIB provided then fell and became substantially lower 
than conventional banks interest rates until very recently when JIB‘s rates again became 
competitive as the conventional interest rates dropped dramatically.  In 2003 and 2004, 
profits given by JIB to holders of Fixed Term Accounts was again higher than the 
average in Jordan and since 2002 the profits given to holders of Savings Accounts in JIB 
have been substantially higher than the rate of interest given to holders of Savings 
Accounts in other Jordanian banks. 
 The significant social impact of JIB in Jordanian society is underscored by the 
fact that it provided an outlet for savings and investment for such a large section of 
Jordanian society despite the fact that for most of its existence it paid much lower rates of 
return than conventional banks.  Rapid growth in years such as 1983 – 1987 when JIB 
was paying rates of return that were consistently about half of what conventional banks 
were paying highlights the willingness of a large section of Jordanian society to sacrifice 
financial gains to ensure the Islamic propriety of their investments.  This is a further 
indication that many of those who deposited their money in JIB would most likely have 
kept their money out of the banking system were it not for the existence of an Islamic 
bank. 
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Table 4.6: JIB Financing (1979 - 2006)       
          
(Millions of JD)               
       Total Financing Al-Murabaha       Loans 











  Value Rate Financing Bills (1+2)     Investments 
al-
Hassan) 
1979 0.59   0.13 0.37 0.50 0.03 0.02   0.04 
1980 7.63 1193% 0.50 5.43 5.93 0.10 0.72 0.83 0.05 
1981 13.03 71% 1.08 9.30 10.38 0.70 1.02 0.88 0.05 
1982 24.68 89% 1.17 19.44 20.61 0.71 1.95 1.23 0.18 
1983 37.51 52% 5.82 24.29 30.11 0.99 2.88 3.15 0.38 
1984 56.19 50% 20.14 25.50 45.64 0.18 4.48 5.64 0.25 
1985 64.78 15% 21.97 27.05 49.02 0.18 5.19 10.10 0.29 
1986 85.56 32% 33.94 32.24 66.18 0.16 5.67 13.18 0.37 
1987 93.65 9% 33.92 38.15 72.07 0.19 5.73 15.35 0.31 
1988 102.58 10% 37.60 43.20 80.80 0.42 5.02 15.89 0.45 
1989 125.76 23% 54.93 46.29 101.22 0.92 4.49 18.59 0.54 
1990 118.94 -5% 55.26 43.50 98.76 1.22 4.36 13.94 0.66 
1991 149.16 25% 90.34 37.39 127.73 1.12 4.65 14.97 0.69 
1992 167.13 12% 108.43 35.81 144.24 1.56 4.59 15.98 0.76 
1993 199.79 20% 134.07 35.18 169.25 3.60 4.94 21.15 0.85 
1994 254.75 28% 187.78 43.56 231.34 1.38 5.99 14.60 1.44 
1995 314.18 23% 239.88 51.42 291.30 0.72 7.53 13.15 1.48 
1996 357.02 14% 273.22 54.30 327.52 1.52 10.46 15.86 1.66 
1997 296.69 -17% 202.68 60.02 262.70 1.19 10.66 20.11 2.03 
1998 327.00 10% 199.25 67.33 266.58 0.83 11.05 46.42 2.12 
1999 356.96 9% 184.06 74.14 258.20 0.48 11.42 82.86 4.00 
2000 377.44 6% 176.54 67.27 243.81 0.00 12.05 117.94 3.64 
2001 370.39 -2% 163.31 65.02 228.33 0.06 11.90 126.50 3.60 
2002 377.49 2% 180.20 73.55 253.75 0.00 12.03 108.12 3.59 
2003 394.00 4% 201.49 80.02 281.51 0.03 12.23 95.25 4.98 
2004 424.27 8% 227.75 99.89 327.64 0.00 12.02 79.90 4.71 
2005 497.01 26% 294.97 116.65 411.62 0.00 12.44 66.86 6.09 
2006 650.08 53% 386.35 157.80 544.15 0.00 12.94 87.25 5.74 
 
 While the existence of Islamic banking seems likely to have had an impact on 
Jordan‘s CIM ratio and that in and of itself represents an important development. A 
bank‘s impact on society is even more pronounced in how it uses the money it has than in 
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the mere fact that it collects deposits.  JIB uses its money both to finance the monetary 
needs of others and to make direct investments. JIB finances others through the use of 
murabaha, musharaka, and mudaraba contracts as well as through the financing of 
specified projects and activities.  It also provides no-interest loans (al-Qirdh al-Hassan) 
for some specified purposes.  Table 4.6 outlines the amount and growth of money that 
JIB has used to finance activities in Jordan from the bank‘s inception in 1979 through 
2006.  
Just as JIB‘s assets and the level of deposits in the bank have shown rapid growth, 
the amount of money that JIB has in turn provided to finance others has grown.  Annual 
growth rates in financing were high every single year from the bank‘s inception in 1979 
until 1996, with the only exception being in 1990 during the Gulf War.  Since 1996, 
growth rates have slowed dramatically.  In 1997, there was a large drop in the amount of 
money JIB used to finance activities in Jordan and the annual growth rates were modest 
from that year until 2004.  In 2005 and 2006, the growth rates again shot up dramatically 
from a total of JD424 million in 2004 to JD650 million in 2006. 
 From the standpoint of those who advocate JIB using its financial clout to achieve 
important social and national objectives through the use of musharaka and mudaraba 
contracts, one very disappointing aspect of its financing activities has been the 
overwhelming percentage of financing that goes into murabaha transactions.  Table 4.7 
shows that the percentage of financing that is based on murabaha contracts never fell 
below 60% and that it was over 75% every year from 1979 until 1998 and then again 
from 2004 until 2006.   
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Table 4.7: Forms of JIB Financing in 
Percentages  
       
Year Murabaha Mudaraba Musharaka Specified al-Qirdh 
        Investments al-Hassan 
1979 85% 5% 3% 0% 7% 
1980 78% 1% 9% 11% 1% 
1981 80% 5% 8% 7% 0% 
1982 84% 3% 8% 5% 1% 
1983 80% 3% 8% 8% 1% 
1984 81% 0% 8% 10% 0% 
1985 76% 0% 8% 16% 0% 
1986 77% 0% 7% 15% 0% 
1987 77% 0% 6% 16% 0% 
1988 79% 0% 5% 15% 0% 
1989 80% 1% 4% 15% 0% 
1990 83% 1% 4% 12% 1% 
1991 86% 1% 3% 10% 0% 
1992 86% 1% 3% 10% 0% 
1993 85% 2% 2% 11% 0% 
1994 91% 1% 2% 6% 1% 
1995 93% 0% 2% 4% 0% 
1996 92% 0% 3% 4% 0% 
1997 89% 0% 4% 7% 1% 
1998 82% 0% 3% 14% 1% 
1999 72% 0% 3% 23% 1% 
2000 65% 0% 3% 31% 1% 
2001 62% 0% 3% 34% 1% 
2002 67% 0% 3% 29% 1% 
2003 71% 0% 3% 24% 1% 
2004 77% 0% 3% 19% 1% 
2005 83% 0% 3% 13% 1% 
2006 84% 0% 2% 13% 1% 
 
 The fastest growth in murabaha transactions took place from 1990 until 1996 
when the overall level of financing through murabaha increased from JD98.76 million in 
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1990 to JD327.52 million in 1996.  This growth was largely due to two deals that were 
contracted with the Jordanian government.  The first actually started in 1985 when JIB 
began purchasing crude oil and selling it to the Jordanian Petroleum Refinery Company 
which paid for it over a two year period on a murabaha basis.  The deal was backed up 
by strong governmental guarantees and was considered a major breakthrough for JIB.  In 
1991, the Ministry of Planning made a deal with JIB that included many of the same kind 
of guarantees that the earlier oil deal included.  Throughout the early 1990s the amount of 
goods that JIB purchased and sold to the Ministry of Planning increased until it reached 
over JD100 million in 1996, representing 22% of the banks overall financing and 
investing for that year.190   
The financing granted to the Government or under its guarantee then began a 
precipitous decline.  It dropped from a total of JD113 million in 1996 to JD56 million in 
1997, JD40 million in 1998, JD30 million in 1999, JD20 million in 2000, JD9 million in 
2001, JD4 million in 2002, JD6 million in 2003, and JD2 million in 2004.  In 2005, JIB 
was not involved in any financing granted to the Jordanian Government.  The decline in 
al-Murabaha deals with the government after 1996 largely explains the fall in overall al-
Murabaha transactions after that year.  The high of JD327 million in al-Murabaha 
transactions in 1996 was not again matched until 2004.  Since 2004, the amount that JIB 
has financed through al-Murabaha has again increased significantly from JD327 million 
                                                 
190 For a good discussion of these deals see Abdullah Abd al-Majeed al-Maliki, The Jordan Islamic Bank:  
Vol. 7 Encyclopedia on the History of Banking in Jordan, (Jordan Printing and Publishing, Amman, 1996) 
pgs. 167-170. 
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in 2004 to JD544 million in 2006 with most of the increase in the areas of general trade 
and transportation services. 
 Mudaraba and musharaka contracts together never constituted even 15% of JIB‘s 
overall financing deals and since 1988 they have together never made up more than 5% 
of its financing agreements.  Despite the fact that much of the theoretical work on the 
potential social benefits of Islamic banking deal with the inherent justice of mudaraba 
and musharaka contracts as opposed to more conventional loans, JIB has found it very 
challenging to actually make such agreements because of the difficulties in identifying 
projects that would fit into these kinds of Islamic financing schemes and then accurately 
administering them and reporting and sharing profits. 
 Another form of financing that JIB provides is based on funds deposited in the 
bank for specific projects or purposes.  Most of these funds are deposited in the bank as 
foreign currencies and are used to finance commodity trading in international markets 
with the bank getting a pre-arranged percentage of the profit from such transactions.  This 
form of financing is by far the second largest form after murabaha and constituted more 
than 30% of total financing in 2000 and 2001.  By 2006 the amount of money to finance 
such purposes had declined from JD126 million to JD87 million or from 31% of total 
financing from JIB to 13%. 
 The final form of financing that JIB provides is through interest-free loans.  From 
1979 to 1983 all such interest-free loans were bills of exchange granted to some of its 
customers for trading purposes.  In 1983, the bank began providing interest-free loans (al-
Qirdh al-Hassan) to needy citizens as a means of contributing to the overall welfare of 
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society.  Most of these loans are granted to help pay for the University expenses of 
students, the expenses related to marriage, or for medical needs.  In 1985, JIB established 
an al-Qirdh al-Hassan Fund to which depositors could place funds for the use of such 
social purposes.  The bank uses this Fund as well as some of its own resources to finance 
the interest-free social loans.  As Table 4.7 shows, these loans have consistently 
constituted about 1% of total financing recorded on JIB‘s annual balance sheets.  While 
this amount is relatively insignificant from the perspective of the bank‘s overall financing 
and investment schemes, the funds granted through such loans have had a profoundly 
positive impact on tens of thousands of Jordanian citizens who could not have acquired 
the funds needed to pay for their education, get married or pay needed medical expenses 
without the bank‘s intervention. 
 The amounts shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are taken from end-of-the-year balance 
sheet totals. Such totals do not fully account for the amount of financing that JIB 
undertakes since part of what is financed is paid back before the end of the year.  In the 
case of the interest-free loans it is worthwhile to look at the total amount of interest-free 
social loans granted annually to gauge the social impact the bank has had on Jordanian 
society.  Table 4.8 shows the amount of interest-free social loans granted by the bank 
annually from 1985 to 2006 as well as the number of needy citizens who benefited from 
the loans.  It also shows the total amount of money granted for such purposes and the 






Table 4.8:  Amount of Interest-Free Social Loans granted by JIB 












 1985 238 595  1996 2700 7935 
 1986 381 1107  1997 3200 8435 
 1987 523 1421  1998 3500 9776 
 1988 516 1430  1999 3800 10953 
 1989 859 1625  2000 4000 12078 
 1990 1100 2664  2001 4200 11212 
 1991 1130 3131  2002 4400 15319 
 1992 1280 3962  2003 5400 13618 
 1993 1500 4235  2004 5600 14613 
 1994 2200 5792  2005 6700 14369 
 1995 2100 6318  2006 7300 15506 
     Total 
   
62,627      166,094 
 Table 4.8 shows that over 166,000 individuals benefited from more than JD62 
million (about $100 million) in interest-free loans granted by JIB from 1985 to 2006.  In 
2006 alone, over JD7 million was provided in interest-free loans to more than 15,000 
persons.  The JIB interest-free social loan program is well-known in poorer areas of the 
country and has helped JIB gain credibility as an institution that is concerned about 
improving overall Jordanian society. 
 Besides financing others, JIB has used a substantial amount of its available funds 
to undertake direct investments.  JIB first published a classification of its direct 
investments in its 1994 annual report in which five categories were detailed: participation 
in investment funds, investments in commodities, investments in securities, real estate 
investments, and miscellaneous investments.  In 1997, the JIB annual reports also began 
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listing investments in portfolios.  In 2000, they began breaking down investments in 
securities into investments in traded securities, investments in affiliated companies and 
investments in subsidiary companies, and they also began publishing the new category of 
investments in leasing.  Investments in sukuk began being published in 2002.  Table 4.9 
provides the total direct investments JIB has made in these various categories as well as 
the percentage of each category in overall direct investments for every year from 1994 to 
2005. 
Table 4.9: Categorization of JIB Direct Investments (millions of JD) 
             
Kind of 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Investment    Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % 
Investment Funds 31.4 27 25.9 22 16.1 16 23.1 14 27.4 19 24.9 19 
Commodities 9.9 8 15.0 13 1.6 2 49.4 30 21.8 15 11.9 9 
Securities 52.2 44 53.5 45 54.0 52 56.9 35 62.7 44 62.4 48 
Real Estate 22.5 19 22.6 19 24.8 24 23.9 15 25.8 18 25.5 20 
Portfolios   0   0   0 2.4 1 1.9 1 3.0 2 
Miscellaneous 1.4 1 1.6 1 6.5 6 6.7 4 1.7 1 1.4 1 
Total 117   119   103   162   141   129   
             
             
Kind of 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Investment   Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % 
Investment Funds 18.9 14 21.2 12 13.1 6 13.8 8 13.1 6 11.0 5 
Commodities 16.4 12 35.6 20 43.0 20 45.3 25 60.6 30 78.2 32 
Securities (total) 63.2 47 60.9 35 60.9 28 50.7 28 65.1 32 70.9 29 
a.  Traded 36.9 27 34.6 20 34.6 16 18.3 10 37 18 42.6 18 
b.  Aff. Comp. 15.0 11 15.0 9 15.0 7 21.1 12 16.8 8 21.6 9 
c.  Sub. Comp. 11.3 8 11.3 6 11.3 5 11.3 6 11.3 6 6.7 3 
Real Estate 25.6 19 25.2 14 24.8 11 22.5 13 22.5 11 27.4 11 
Portfolios 3.1 2 27.8 16 64.3 30 33.6 19 32.7 16 40.0 17 
Leasing 3.3 2 3.1 2 3.2 1 3 2 2.8 1 10.2 4 
Sukuk         6.0 3 8.4 5 5.9 3 3.3 1 
Miscellaneous 5.0 4 1.3 1 2.5 1 1.2 1   0   0 
Total 136   175   218   179   203   241   
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 Securities (or shares in companies) have constituted the main avenue of JIB direct 
investments throughout the years, constituting 44% of total investments in 1994.  They 
fell to 35% of total investments in 2001 and have remained under 40% ever since, though 
the largest percentage of investments remained in securities every year except 2002 and 
2005.  JIB invests in both domestic and foreign securities.  JIB‘s shari’a board approves 
all security investments to ensure that the companies invested in comply with Islamic 
laws.  A large percentage of its overall foreign security investments are in other Islamic 
banks outside of Jordan.   
Part of JIB‘s security investments also involves ownership or substantial interests 
in a number of companies inside Jordan.  The largest subsidiary company owned by JIB 
is Al-Omariyya Schools, a chain of private K-12 Islamic schools with a reputation of 
providing a strong academic program combined with Islamic religious principles and 
character development.  JIB also owns FACT (Future Applied Computer Technology 
Co.), a company formed in 1998 to provide technology consultations and services to 
Islamic banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions throughout the 
Middle East.  JIB also owns Al-Samaha Real Estate Company and Al-Rizq Trading 
Company.  JIB serves as an affiliate owning from 25 to 40% of a number of other 
commercial, real estate, manufacturing, and service companies including Jordan‘s largest 
Islamic Insurance Company.  
 JIB‘s investments in foreign-based investment funds have steadily declined over 
the years as an overall percentage of its investments.  In 1994 JIB invested more than 
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JD31 million, constituting 27% of its overall investments, in such funds; whereas, in 
2005 JIB only invested JD11 million constituting less than 5% of its overall investments 
in these funds.  A reverse trend has occurred with respect to investments in portfolios.  
JIB started out modestly in 1997 by investing less than JD3 million in portfolios.  This 
increased dramatically starting in 2001 with a jump from 2% of its overall investments to 
16% in 2001 and then 30% in 2002 with over JD64 million invested in portfolios.  By 
2005, investments in portfolios declined slightly to JD40 million, constituting 17% of 
JIB‘s total investments.  Other major areas of investment for JIB include commercial real 
estate and residential housing complexes that have fluctuated between 11% and 24% of 
JIB‘s overall investments and investments in internationally traded commodity exchanges 
which have fluctuated widely between 2% and 32% of JIB‘s overall investments.  
Table 4.10 shows the growth in JIB investments over the years as well as the 
percentage of funds that JIB has used for direct investments as compared to financing. 
The Table shows that growth in the amount of funds invested by JIB has grown rapidly 
over the years.  A big jump occurred between 1983 and 1984 when invested funds 
increased from less than JD3 million to nearly JD13 million.  Invested funds continued 
increasing rapidly until 1993 when JIB had JD129 million in investments constituting 
39% of total financing and investments.  Since then, the amount of money invested by 
JIB has fluctuated up and down based on market conditions and investments declined as 
an overall percentage of financing and investment, though they have remained between 
22% and 39% since 1986.  In 2005, JIB had JD241 million in investments constituting 
33% of overall financing and investments.  It is rare for a conventional bank to  
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Table 4.10: JIB Direct Investments as % of Total 
Financing and Investment 1979-2005 
(millions of JDs) 










as a % 
of total 
 1979 0.8 0.6 0.2   23 
 1980 7.6 7.6 0.0   0 
 1981 16.0 13.0 2.9   18 
 1982 27.9 24.7 3.2 9 11 
 1983 40.1 37.5 2.6 -18 7 
 1984 68.9 56.2 12.7 387 18 
 1985 81.4 64.8 16.6 31 20 
 1986 109.0 85.6 23.4 41 22 
 1987 124.7 93.7 31.0 32 25 
 1988 140 103 38 22 27 
 1989 163 126 37 -1 23 
 1990 163 119 45 19 27 
 1991 209 149 60 34 29 
 1992 260 167 93 56 36 
 1993 329 200 129 39 39 
 1994 372 255 117 -9 31 
 1995 433 314 119 2 27 
 1996 460 357 103 -13 22 
 1997 459 297 162 57 35 
 1998 468 327 141 -13 30 
 1999 486 357 129 -9 27 
 2000 513 377 136 5 26 
 2001 545 370 175 29 32 
 2002 595 377 218 25 37 
 2003 573 394 179 -18 31 
 2004 627 424 203 13 32 
 2005 738 497 241 19 33 
 
consistently employ between a fifth and a third of its funds in direct investments but 
Islamic banks perceive direct investments as an important aspect of its overall financial 
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role.  JIB‘s impact on Jordanian society has been enhanced significantly over the years by 
the fact that it has been a major direct investor in the economy. 
 The manner by which JIB‘s financial and investment employments have had a 
social impact on society can better be seen through an analysis of where such funds have 
actually been spent.  JIB has over the years either financed or directly invested in various 
economic and social sectors including hospitals, clinics, universities, schools, educational 
institutions, transport services and industrial and commercial projects.  Table 4.11 breaks 
down the sectoral distribution of total financing and investment by the JIB from 1979 to 
2005.  The Table shows that in the bank‘s initial years it‘s financing and investing was 
heavily skewed toward General Trade and Commercial activities.  The financing of such 
areas fell dramatically in the late 1990s but then picked up again starting in 2003 and 
constituted more than one-fourth of overall financing and investing in 2006. 
  Financing and investment in industry and mining has fluctuated over the 
years with relatively high levels between 1983 and 1992.  Much of the financing during 
those years dealt with the deals backed up by the government in which JIB financed the 
purchase of large amounts of crude oil.  After those deals phased out in the early 1990s, 
the overall employment of funds in mining and industry declined, ranging from 4.9% to 
11.4% of overall financing and investment between 1993 and 2006.   
The financing of construction projects and directly investing in real estate 
companies has also constituted an important part of JIB‘s role in society, especially since 
the mid-1990s.  The construction sector has taken 20% of overall funds every year since 
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1994 and has constituted the largest single sector since 1997.  In 2006, more than a third 
of JIB‘s overall financing and investment went to this sector. 
 Table 4.11: Sectoral Distribution of JIB Financing and Investment 
  
Industry 
& General     
 Year Mining Trade Construction Transport Agriculture Other 
 1979 5.7% 65.0% 1.3% 26.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
 1980 10.6% 63.5% 11.3% 10.9% 0.0% 3.7% 
 1981 6.4% 43.1% 22.1% 16.6% 1.1% 10.7% 
 1982 5.5% 35.7% 22.5% 22.4% 0.7% 13.2% 
 1983 15.8% 35.8% 18.0% 14.5% 1.0% 14.9% 
 1984 26.6% 21.9% 17.3% 13.7% 0.4% 20.1% 
 1985 28.6% 23.8% 18.2% 9.4% 0.6% 19.4% 
 1986 34.9% 22.9% 17.2% 9.9% 0.5% 14.6% 
 1987 32.8% 23.5% 16.2% 5.3% 0.5% 21.7% 
 1988 25.9% 27.9% 13.4% 4.7% 0.7% 27.4% 
 1989 32.0% 22.2% 15.1% 3.5% 0.7% 26.5% 
 1990 22.1% 24.0% 15.1% 3.9% 0.7% 34.2% 
 1991 21.6% 26.0% 10.9% 2.5% 0.5% 38.5% 
 1992 14.6% 26.7% 13.3% 1.4% 0.4% 43.6% 
 1993 9.2% 28.3% 10.1% 2.2% 0.2% 50.0% 
 1994 7.4% 29.3% 29.8% 6.3% 0.3% 26.9% 
 1995 7.3% 31.2% 24.5% 5.6% 0.3% 31.1% 
 1996 11.4% 25.5% 20.7% 6.0% 0.3% 36.1% 
 1997 10.8% 11.2% 21.6% 6.4% 0.3% 49.7% 
 1998 10.5% 11.3% 22.5% 6.0% 0.4% 49.3% 
 1999 7.7% 13.2% 23.6% 7.4% 0.3% 47.8% 
 2000 5.5% 12.6% 24.6% 8.7% 0.3% 48.3% 
 2001 4.9% 12.5% 23.7% 9.3% 0.3% 49.3% 
 2002 6.6% 11.5% 23.7% 9.5% 0.2% 48.5% 
 2003 7.1% 20.1% 24.7% 12.1% 0.3% 35.7% 
 2004 9.4% 22.8% 29.3% 15.7% 0.4% 22.4% 
 2005 8.8% 22.2% 33.2% 18.6% 0.8% 16.4% 
 2006 7.0% 26.0% 34.0% 19.0% 0.4% 13.6% 
 
   The JIB has also played an important role in the transport sector.  When the JIB 
opened in 1979 it provided the first opportunity for many devout Muslims to finance the 
purchase of vehicles and the bank used a large percentage of its funds in this sector.  The 
 147 
transport sector then declined precipitously and in 1992 less than 2% of its funds were 
used in the transport sector. The sector has risen significantly since then and by 2006 
almost a fifth of its overall funds were employed in the transport sector.   
JIB has never been actively involved in the agricultural sector and in only two 
years did it employ more than 1% of its funds toward agriculture.  This has actually been 
an area that political Islamists strongly advocate and the political Islamists have been 
especially critical of JIB for not doing more to help this sector. 
JIB‘s bank statements note that in a number of years the largest single sector was 
―Other,‖ constituting half of JIB‘s overall financing and investment in 1993 and more 
than 40% in a number of years.  This category largely constitutes the financing of and 
investment in professional and business activities that don‘t fall under the government 
definition of general trade.191 
 While Table 4.2 on total deposits and Table 4.6 on total financing showed the 
total amount of funds either deposited in JIB or loaned out from JIB, perhaps the overall 
social role of the bank is better underscored by looking at the number of people the bank 
has served.  In its 30
th
 Annual Report, the JIB provided detailed numbers for both the 
number of deals it financed as well as the number of deposits that were held in the bank 
from 1999 to 2008.  In previous years, these figures were recorded in a different manner 
that makes it difficult to show growth over time (they had previously included dormant 
accounts and the figures were given in general rather than specific form). 
                                                 
191 Abdullah Abd al-Majeed al-Maliki, The Jordan Islamic Bank:  Vol. 7 Encyclopedia on the History of 
Banking in Jordan, (Jordan Printing and Publishing, Amman, 1996) page 216. 
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Table 4.12:  Number of People Dealing with JIB 
 












1999 54.5 365.1 4,681 
2000 54.4 497.9 4,798 
2001 52.5 524.6 4,918 
2002 55.3 548.5 5,038 
2003 62.6 545.3 5,164 
2004 67.3 543.0 5,290 
2005 77.6 578.5 5,412 
2006 84.0 597.6 5,538 
2007 96.6 632.9 5,719 
2008 108.3 702.3 5,906 
 Source:  JIB 30th annual report, Population Figures from 
World Bank Development Indicators. 
 
  Table 4.12 shows that in 2008, JIB was financing more than 108 thousand deals 
and there were more than 702 thousand active accounts in the bank.  Considering that the 
population of the country was less than 6 million people and about 37% of the population 
was under 15 years old,192 this means that there was approximately 1 active account for 
every 4 Jordanians over 15 years old and there was one loan or financing deal for every 
28 Jordanians over 15 years old.  The large number of deposits and financing deals 
relative to the country‘s population perhaps more than any other figure underlie the 
extent to which JIB has infiltrated the Jordanian market.  The large numbers also are an 
indication that many customers of JIB are dealing with small amounts of money and that 
the bank is willing and able to serve those dealing in such amounts. 
                                                 
192 Population Reference Bureau, 2009 World Population Data Sheet, available at: 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2009/2009wpds.aspx. 
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 The JIB has played an important social role in bringing banking services to the 
poorest residential areas of the country, areas that are underserved by conventional banks.  
While JIB has not been able to play a leading role in attracting large businesses as 
customers and has faced challenges in competing with conventional banks in offering the 
kinds of financing services required by large commercial and industrial interests, it has 
been a leading bank in Jordan in providing banking services to Jordanians of low socio-
economic status.  The majority of Jordan‘s population lives in areas that would be 
considered of low socio-economic status and JIB has played a trailblazing role in 
bringing into the banking sector thousands of Jordanian families that had previously not 
been involved in banking. 
Table 4.13: Distribution of Bank Branches in Jordan  
  
 Residential Areas Industrial/  
Low 
SES Low SES 
 SES Commercial  as % of as % of 
 High Mid. Low Zones Total total residential 
Housing Bank 2 24 36 33 95 38 58 
Arab Bank 4 20 13 40 77 17 35 
Bank of Jordan 2 10 16 34 62 26 57 
Jordan Islamic Bank 3 11 21 21 56 38 60 
Cairo-Amman 0 11 7 35 53 13 39 
Bank Ahli 1 4 7 36 48 15 58 
Jordan-Kuwait 5 13 4 22 44 9 18 
Int. Islamic Arab Bank 1 2 2 12 17 12 40 
Total 18 95 106 233 452 23 48 
The data for this table was obtained from an analysis of bank branches undertaken with help from the Middle East Studies 
Center located in Amman, Jordan for the purposes of this dissertation. 
 
 Table 4.13 captures the significance of JIB‘s role in serving the residential 
banking needs of Jordan‘s poorest sectors by comparing the locations of the branches of 
all Jordanian banks which have at least 40 branches (with the International Islamic Arab 
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Bank included for comparison purposes).  Of all Jordanian banks, only the Housing Bank 
has more branches in areas of low socio-economic status than JIB.  The Housing Bank 
was established in Jordan in 1974 as a quasi-governmental bank aimed at serving the 
residential banking needs of Jordanian citizens.193  The Jordanian Minister of Economy at 
the time, Mohammed Saeed Nabulsi, came up with the idea for the bank and it was 
largely established by the Jordanian Central Bank.194  JIB has more branches in areas of 
low socio-economic status than every other bank in the country including the Arab Bank 
which is about 20 times larger than JIB in terms of overall assets. 
 Of JIB‘s total of 56 branches, 21 are in areas of low socio-economic status 
making 38% of its banks in such areas. This is the same percentage as that of the Housing 
Bank and a much larger percentage than any other bank in the country.  When not 
including bank branches located in commercial or industrial zones, 60% of JIB‘s 
residential banks are located in areas of low socio-economic status as compared to 58% 
of the Housing Bank‘s residential branches.  The comparison of bank branch location 
shows that JIB depends on low income residential customers for a greater percentage of 
its business than any other bank in Jordan and that JIB is playing a crucial role in serving 
the needs of Jordan‘s neediest citizens.  
 A growing body of literature highlights the importance of inclusive financial 
systems and how financial systems that are able to serve lower socio-economic classes 
                                                 
193 Abdullah Abd al-Majeed al-Maliki, The Housing Bank, The Industrial Development Bank:  Vol. 3 




profoundly impacts income distribution and a country‘s growth rate.195  Even in countries 
with well-developed financial systems to which the poor have access, Islamic cultural 
sensitivities often prevent a large proportion of the population from using such facilities.  
In Jordan, governmental support for the Housing Bank indicates an awareness of the 
importance of providing finance to all segments of the population.  However the rapid 
growth of the Jordan Islamic Bank and its prominence in poorer areas of the country 
indicates strong popular resistance to conventional interest-based finance.  The JIB filled 
an important need by providing a culturally authentic means for many Jordanians – 
especially from lower socio-economic classes - to gain a foothold in the Jordanian 
economy.  By providing a culturally authentic means of finance and investment, the JIB 
helps reduce the damaging concentration of economic power in Jordan and empowers a 
segment of the population that had earlier been marginalized. 
 Much of the commercial and business sector within Jordan is predominantly 
Palestinian in origin and the large Arab Bank has often been described as a bank that 
predominantly serves the Palestinian population.196  While both Jordanians and 
Palestinians have freedom to live throughout the country, there are certain areas that are 
predominantly inhabited by people of Palestinian origin and others by people of 
Jordanian origin.  While this is a very sensitive issue in the country and determining these 
areas is not exact, the location of bank branches can underscore the extent to which the 
                                                 
195 Patrick Honohan, Financial Sector Policy and the Poor:  Selected Findings and Issues, (World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 2004).  Also see Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the 
Capitalists, (Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 2004). 
196 Rodney Wilson, ―The Growth of Islamic Banking and Product Development Among Islamic Retail 
Banks,‖ in Sohail Jaffer (ed.), Islamic Retail Banking and Finance:  Global Challenges and Opportunities, 
(London:  Euromoney Books, 2005), 18 
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large banks in Jordan serve both communities.  Table 4:14 shows that the Jordan Islamic 
Bank is one of the few banks in Jordan that evenly distributes its branches among both 
Palestinian and Jordanian communities.  Only the Housing Bank, the Bank of Jordan, and 
the Jordan Islamic Bank have a nearly equivalent number of branches in predominantly 
Jordanian areas as they do in the more banked Palestinian areas.  This is another indicator 
that JIB serves an important social function of providing banking services to a portion of 
the population that had previously not had adequate access to credit facilities. 
   
Table 4.14: Palestinian:Jordanian Distribution of Bank Branches in Jordan 
 
Pal. Jord. Mixed. Total Pal:Jor 
Jordanian 
branches as 
% of Total 
Housing Bank 34 34 27 95 1.00 36 
Arab Bank 30 18 29 77 1.67 23 
Bank of Jordan 22 20 20 62 1.10 32 
Jordan Islamic Bank 19 17 20 56 1.12 30 
Cairo-Amman 26 14 13 53 1.86 26 
Bank Ahli 21 15 12 48 1.40 31 
Jordan-Kuwait 17 9 18 44 1.89 20 
Int. Islamic Arab 
Bank 8 3 6 17 2.67 18 
Total 177 130 145 452 1.36 29 




 While the JIB has not lived up to the utopian expectations of many of the 
theoretical writers of Islamic banking and Islamic economics in general, it has played an 
important social role in Jordan.  Its rapid and continuing growth rate – despite providing a 
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smaller return for most of its history than were provided by conventional banks – is a 
clear indication of the bank filling a needed void and thus playing an important role in 
bringing banking services to a segment of the population that had not been comfortable 
with the interest-bearing conventional banking system.  This is further underscored by the 
large number of depositors and lenders that use the bank and the fact that it has made a 
deliberate attempt to reach out to those of lower socio-economic levels that were ignored 
by most of the other banks in Jordan.  Tens of thousands of people have benefited from 
JIB‘s no-interest social loan program and the bank has spent millions on different 
charitable causes over the years.  It is also an important investor in Jordan in its own right 
investing in schools, hospitals and numerous other projects. 
 On the downside, the JIB has not been able to break away from its dependence on 
Murabaha financing, which in fundamental economic terms is almost no different than 
interest-bearing loans.  The benefits that profit-sharing finance could theoretically 
provide to an economy and the social justice component that is often claimed accompany 
Islamic banking schemes have not been adequately tested by JIB since almost none of its 
actual financing follows true profit-sharing formulas.  Much to the chagrin of many of the 
theoretical advocates of Islamic banking, JIB – like other Islamic banks worldwide – is 
fundamentally a profit-seeking business concerned much more with maximum efficiency 
and the economic interests of its shareholders than with social justice.   
At times, the JIB was spending almost a third of its funds on international 
commodity exchanges – a type of financing that brought absolutely no social or 
economic benefit to Jordan and there is no evidence that JIB ever deliberately sought out 
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major financing schemes that were aimed at bringing about social justice in the country.  
Critics note that by cooperating closely and coordinating their actions with conventional 
and global financial systems, Islamic banks have served the role of bringing Muslims into 
a global financial order that violates Islamic principles and that they have thus delayed 
the kind of transformational social and economic changes that Islam calls for rather than 
spur their development. This is precisely the critique that Tariq Ramadan, perhaps the 
world‘s most well-known Islamic philosopher and intellectual, has leveled against 
Islamic banking.197  Certainly, after closely analyzing JIB, an argument could easily be 
made that the JIB is guilty of the accusations those like Ramadan are making.  Muslims 
who had previously boycotted conventional banks and finance have been accommodated 
through the JIB in a way that hinders them from devising other kinds of financial devices 
that would be more true to the deeper principles of Islamic economics. 
This underscores the importance of looking closely at how political Islamists in 
Jordan have viewed the JIB. While supportive of the idea of Islamic banking and finance, 
Islamists in Jordan have become increasingly critical of the JIB in recent years.  The 
relationship between financial Islamists and political Islamists in Jordan could potentially 
have transformative political effects in the country even if the transformative social and 
economic changes promised by Islamic banking have not been realized.   
Chapter Five will look closely at the relationship between political and financial 
Islamists in Jordan and as well as the relationship of both to the government.  The 
                                                 
197 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, (Leicester:  The Islamic Foundation, 
2004), 171-174.  Also See the online dialogue between Tarek El Diwany and Muhammad Nejatullah 
Siddiqi, ―A Discussion with Professor Siddiqi,‖ Islamic Finance.com. Available from http://www.islamic-
finance.com/item141_f.htm. Accessed on December 10, 2010; Internet. 
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interplay of these relations is important not only for the growth and development of the 
Islamists – both financial and political – but could also have ramifications on larger 
political issues, such as the state‘s relations with the Islamist political movement and 




















CHAPTER FIVE:  ISLAMIC BANKING & ISLAMIST POLITICS IN 
JORDAN  
 The main contention of political Islamists is that Islam is a complete way of life 
that encompasses rules and regulations, not only for spiritual and moral uplift, but also 
for how to establish and maintain political, economic, social and other systems.  This was 
the first of twenty basic principles that Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, stated in a treatise198 he wrote to explain the understanding of Islam held by 
his movement, which was the first Islamist organization of the modern era and the largest 
and most well-known of those groups until today.  Al-Banna believed that the main role 
of his movement, and of Islamists in general, was to re-establish those aspects of the 
comprehensive Islamic religion that had been lost or destroyed before, during, or after the 
colonial era.  The establishment of Islamic Banks in the second half of the twentieth 
century could be seen as a practical application of the ideological view that Islam 
contained within it an alternative means of running economic and financial affairs.  
 The ties between Islamic banks and Islamic movements have not, however, been 
as strong as might be expected.  In this chapter, the role Islamists played in the early 
history of the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) is examined, as well as the ongoing relationship 
and kinds of interaction between Islamists and both the JIB and the Islamic International 
Arab Bank. The economic agenda of the Islamic Action Front Party is also discussed, as 
is that of Islamist activists in professional organizations and other aspects of civil society. 
                                                 
198 Hasan al-Banna, ―Risalat al-Ta‘aleem,‖ from Majmu’at Rasail al-Imam al-Shaheed Hasan al-Banna, 
(Dar al-Da‘wa, Alexandria, Egypt).  Al-Banna is the grandfather of Tariq Ramadan, the intellectual quoted 
at the end of chapter 4, who, like his grandfather, continues to advocate the notion that Islam is a complete 





THE ROLE OF ISLAMISTS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JORDAN ISLAMIC BANK 
 The 1970s was a decade of extensive institutionalization for Islamists in Jordan.199  
In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the popularity of Islamic movements and Islamism as 
an ideology increased dramatically throughout the Arab world, including in Jordan.  By 
siding with the monarchy in Jordan‘s 1970 civil war, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 
also began enjoying an almost semi-official status in the 1970s, a status that enabled it to 
establish numerous new charitable, educational, and healthcare institutions in the 
Kingdom.   
It was in this milieu of both increased popularity and increased institutionalization 
that many Jordanian Islamist leaders and intellectuals began discussing the concept of 
―Islamic economics‖ and thinking about the possibility of establishing Islamic financial 
institutions in Jordan and elsewhere.  The books and articles of the Pakistani Islamist 
intellectual Abu‘l-A‘la Mawdudi, who had been writing about Islamic economics since 
the 1940s, were widely discussed among Islamists in Jordan in the 1970s. The success of 
                                                 
199 See Ali Abdul Kazem, ―Al-Seera al-Tareekheya Li-Jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen wa-Murji‘iyyatiha 
al-Fikriya,‖ from Hani Hourani ed., al-Harakaat wa-Tanzhimaat al-Islamiyya fil-Urdun, (al-Urdun al-Jadid 
Research Center, Amman, Jordan, 1997). 
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the Mit Ghamr savings/investment houses in the Egyptian countryside were also looked 
to by Islamists as proof of the feasibility of Islamic banking.200 
  The Mit Ghamr houses were established in Egypt in 1963 by Ahmed Al-Najjar.  
While al-Najjar was not himself an Islamist the institutions he established worked on the 
principle of interest-free financing and many members of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood worked and invested in them.  The Mit Ghamr experiment came to a quick 
end in 1968 when the banks were liquidated by the Egyptian government.201  The short-
term experiment was influential, however, as Islamists perceived it as having provided a 
practical example of Islamic banking in the modern era.  The banks fueled the aspirations 
of Islamists in Jordan and elsewhere to establish a more enduring Islamic alternative to 
the prevailing economic and financial institutions.202 
The establishment of two Islamic banks in 1975 also encouraged Jordanian 
Islamists.  In that year, the Organization of the Islamic Conference established the 
Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah to finance government projects in the Muslim 
                                                 
200 For the social and economic workings of the Mit Ghamr banks see: Ahmed El-Ashker, The Islamic 
Business Enterprise (Croom Helm, London 1987) and Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ―Islamic Banking and Credit 
Policies in the Sadat Era:  The Social Origins of Islamic Banking in Egypt,‖ Arab Law Quarterly, 1.1 pp. 
32-50 as reprinted in Tim Niblock and Rodney Wilson ed., The Political Economy of the Middle East 
(Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar, 1999), Vol. 3, pp. 389-407. 
201 The reason for the liquidation of the Mit Ghamr banks is a source of controversy.  The Egyptian 
government claimed that the banks were being mismanaged, however both Mayer (Arab Law Quaraterly, p. 
395-396) and El-Ashker (The Islamic Business Enterprise, p. 158-161) argue that political reasons were 
behind the demise of the bank.  Islamists in Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere continue to argue that the 
Egyptian government closed the banks because of the fear that they would strengthen Islamist sentiments. 
202 Jamil Abu Bakr, the spokesman for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, noted in an interview on July 
23, 2001 that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were the first to discuss the idea of establishing an 
Islamic bank in Jordan in the early 1970s. 
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countries and the Dubai Islamic Bank was established in the United Arab Emirates.203  
These two banks were dedicated to working on Islamic principles, but it was still unclear 
at the time exactly what that entailed. 
The person who perhaps did more than any other to provide substance to the 
concept of Islamic banking in the 1970s was Sami Hamoud, a Jordanian economist who 
had been working at the Jordanian National Bank since 1956.  Hamoud was not himself a 
member of any Islamist organization nor did he have any outwardly Islamist 
tendencies.204  His father, however, was an Islamic scholar who had always encouraged 
his son to use his knowledge of economics and finance to devise methods of interest-free 
banking.  After working at the National Bank for a number of years and witnessing many 
of the shortcomings of an interest-based financial system, Hamoud became convinced 
that an interest-free system was not only feasible but also ultimately more just and 
superior to conventional banking methods.  Believing that all the earlier writings about 
Islamic banking were superficial, Hamoud became determined to write his PhD 
dissertation on the concept of interest-free banking and how it would work in the modern 
world.  Published in 1976, the dissertation was widely viewed as the most substantial 
academic piece on Islamic banking that had been written until that time.205 
                                                 
203 See chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation of the historical context behind the establishment of the 
Dubai Islamic Bank and the Islamic Development Bank. 
204 For the feelings, motivations and ideas of Sami Hammoud as well as for the historical incidents about 
the establishment of the Jordan Islamic Bank see Abdullah Abd al-Majeed al-Maliki, Al-Bank al-Islami al-
Urduni, (al-Dustour al-Tijaria, Amman, Jordan, 1996). 
205 For a translation of Hamoud‘s PhD, see Sami Hamoud, Islamic Banking (London:  Arabian Information 
Ltd, 1985). 
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After finishing his PhD, Hamoud began feeling out-of-place at the National Bank 
and started actively advocating for the establishment of an Islamic Bank in Jordan. The 
idea was still new and seemed risky from the perspective of other bankers.  When 
Hamoud took his idea to Abd al-Majeed Shoman, the head of Arab Bank, Jordan‘s largest 
and most well-respected bank, the latter was unwilling to invest any of his own resources 
to work with Hamoud in turning his idea of an Islamic bank into reality.  Nevertheless 
Abd al-Majeed Shoman‘s children did establish the Islamic International Arab Bank 
(IIAB) in 1998.  The IIAB quickly became Jordan‘s second largest Islamic bank and the 
only real competition to the JIB.  However, in the mid-1970s, the Shomans‘ and other 
bankers were still not willing to take the risks inherent in establishing a new kind of bank 
that would work on principles very different from conventional banking practices.  
Initially, the Chief of Jordan‘s Central Bank, Mohammed Saeed al-Nabulsi, was also very 
hesitant about even allowing for the establishment of an interest-free bank in Jordan. 
Hamoud was, however, strongly supported in Islamist circles and the Muslim 
Brotherhood began using its institutions and its connections in royal and governmental 
circles to help bring Hamoud‘s ideas into reality.  Ishaq Farhan, the most prominent 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood in the National Consultative Council at the time, 
noted that the Islamists in that semi-parliamentary institution played an important role in 
advising the government to permit for the establishment of an Islamic Bank.206  Sheikh 
Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani, one of the most prominent leaders and Islamic scholars within the 
ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, invited Hamoud to be a guest on a weekly television 
                                                 
206 Interview with Dr. Ishaq Farhan, July 27, 2001. 
 161 
show that Sheikh Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani hosted.  Hamoud ended up coming back for four 
consecutive weeks to discuss Islamic banking.  The show played a tremendous role in 
popularizing the movement for the establishment of an Islamic Bank in Jordan.   
The establishment of an Islamic Bank would require a special law that would 
have to be passed by the Council of Ministers.  The Minister of Awqaf at the time, Kamil 
al-Shareef, was a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood.  After the airing of 
Sheikh Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani‘s show, Shareef adopted Hamoud‘s plan as his own and, 
according to Hamoud, became one of his closest and most trusted advisors.207 
Shareef convinced Hamoud to establish a Preparatory Committee that would 
serve as an official organizational body calling for the establishment of an Islamic bank 
in Jordan.  In a process that largely repeated itself later when the Islamic International 
Arab Bank was established in 1998, those working to establish the Jordan Islamic Bank 
in the mid-1970s worked to both appease and gain the support of the Islamists, while at 
the same time being very careful to remain independent of the Islamists and thus not 
seem to pose any threat to the political regime.  In establishing the Preparatory 
Committee for the JIB, Shareef deliberately advised Hamoud to choose members who did 
not have strong political party or ideological affiliations.  Shareef knew that if the bank 
was seen as too closely connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, or any other Islamic 
political party, it would be much more difficult to obtain a license. 
Shareef nominated Yousef al-Mbeideen, a respected lawyer known for his piety 
and strong Islamic beliefs yet who was not connected to any Islamist party, to be the 
                                                 
207 See interview with Hamoud as reported in al-Maliki, p. 25. 
 162 
second member (along with Hamoud) in the Preparatory Committee.  Mbeideen was 
highly respected in both governmental circles as well as in Islamist circles208 and, with 
his legal skills, proved to be an adept partner to Hamoud.  Hamoud and Mbeideen then 
jointly chose six other members to serve on the Preparatory Committee.  While at least 
three of those members had some ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, none were considered 
political leaders of the movement and were known more for their technical skills and 
business acumen than their participation in the Islamic movement.  Dr. Mohammed Saqr, 
a Harvard-graduated economist, was one of the most prominent economists in Jordan, 
and Sa‘d al-Din and Misbah al-Zumeili were from a very wealthy business family that 
provided a substantial amount of economic support to the bank in its early years. 
Hamoud‘s dissertation, the four-part television series on Islamic banking, and the 
establishment of the Preparatory Committee attracted attention in Saudi Arabia.  The 
Saudi Prince Mohammad al-Faisal invited Hamoud to the Kingdom to discuss the bank 
and while there Hamoud also met Sheikh Saleh Kamel.  Prince Mohammad and Sheikh 
Saleh Kamel were both interested in the idea of Islamic banking and promised Hamoud 
they would support his endeavor by investing the full 40 per cent of initial capital that 
Jordanian law would allow to be invested by non-Jordanians.  Prince Mohammad also 
followed Hamoud‘s visit with a visit of his own to Amman, where he met the Jordanian 
Crown Prince Hassan.  Prince Hassan responded favorably to the idea of an Islamic bank 
                                                 
208 Mbeideen‘s ties to both governmental and Islamist circles is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that 
when he was elected as a member of the Lower House of the Jordanian Parliament in 1989 he was the only 
member to join both the pro-Government Constitutional Bloc and the Islamic Action Front bloc, a bloc 
made up of Muslim Brotherhood and independent Islamist deputies.  See Tim Riedel, Who is Who in the 
Jordanian Parliament 1989 - 1993, (Freidrich Ebert Foundation, Amman, Jordan, 1993). 
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in Jordan and soon thereafter the issue was brought to the Council of Ministers.  In May, 
1977, the Council of Ministers agreed to permit the establishment of an Islamic Bank.  
However, an interest-free institution could not operate under the legal codes that 
governed how other banks operated, so the Council also asked the Preparatory 
Committee to prepare a blueprint for a Special Law that would detail the rules and 
regulations under which the Islamic Bank would operate. 
The Preparatory Committee formed a Fatwa Committee including mostly Islamic 
legal scholars, but also some economists and lawyers responsible for devising a blueprint 
for the new law.  As in the Preparatory Committee, there were some Islamists in the 
Fatwa Committee, including most notably Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani, but again there seems 
to have been a deliberate attempt to choose shari’a scholars who were acceptable to both 
the government and the general masses and who were not too closely linked to Islamist 
groups or parties.  The Fatwa Committee held 15 meetings from July 6 until September 
11, 1977.  During the meetings, the scholars discussed the kinds of contemporary 
financial transactions that were Islamically permitted.  The Islamic scholars were not in 
full agreement on all the issues but after heated debates the Fatwa Committee issued a 
blueprint for a law that was approved by both the official Jordanian Fatwa Agency and 
later the Jordanian Central Bank and Council of Ministers, which passed a temporary law 
entitled ―The Jordan Islamic Bank Law For Finance and Investment: No. 13, 1978.‖ 
The final law included some controversial matters that some claimed violated the 
shari’a.  These issues influenced Prince Mohammad al-Faisal to back out from his earlier 
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commitment to the bank,209 but Sheikh Saleh Kamel quickly agreed to cover the full 40 
per cent of the non-Jordanian capital that he and Prince Mohammad had earlier agreed to 
split among themselves. 
In June 1978, a meeting was held by those who were committed to becoming 
initial shareholders in the bank.  Interestingly, the meeting was chaired by Misbah al-
Zumeili, who had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.  However, the Founders Committee 
that was elected at that meeting, like the earlier Preparatory Committee, had some 
Muslim Brotherhood members but no prominent leaders from the movement or other 
Islamist movements.  The Founders Committee completed the remaining requirements 
for the Bank to become registered and obtain a license, including finding shareholders 
willing to invest JD4 million in initial capital.  The bank became officially registered on 
November 28, 1978 and obtained a license permitting it to begin its work on March 26, 
1979.  The first shari’a advisor for the bank was Sheikh Abd al-Hameed Al-Saih, who 
had closer ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization than any Islamist group but who 
was well-respected by Islamists as well as the public at large. 
                                                 
209 Prince Mohammad never clearly stated the reasons for pulling out of the Jordan Islamic Bank. But 
being one of the most prominent sons of the recently assassinated King Faisal (assassinated in 1975) it 
could be politically controversial for him to be openly supporting an institution claiming to represent Islam 
that was involved in something that scholars asserted was violating Islamic principles.  One controversial 
aspect of the 1978 Bank Law was over the Islamic legitimacy of the modern murabaha contract that 
Hamoud had developed in his book, but it is unlikely this would have led Prince Mohammad to withdraw 
from the bank, as these contracts were also widely used in other banks that Prince Mohammad sponsored.  
An even more controversial part of the Bank Law was article 22, which stated that the bank would be 
responsible for any losses that occurred for reasons of mismanagement or corruption.  Some Islamic 
scholars feared that mismanagement could be interpreted too broadly, thus providing the kind of deposit 
guarantee that goes against the very essence of Islamic banking.  For a copy of the Bank Law, see al-
Maliki, Al-Bank al-Islami al-Urduni, Appendix 1, pp. 277-93. 
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In reviewing the role of Islamists in the establishment of the Jordan Islamic Bank, 
it is clear that they played an important supportive role.  The importance of the backing 
of prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders like Ishaq Farhan, Kamil al-Shareef, and 
Sheikh Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani, as well as the financial support of the al-Zumeilis, cannot 
be underestimated.  Their assistance, advice and lobbying on behalf of the bank, as well 
as their deliberate work through their mass media outlets to popularize the bank and give 
it legitimacy, probably played a decisive role in helping the bank gain early support and 
ultimately come to fruition.  However, the Muslim Brotherhood itself recognized that 
being too closely linked to the bank, might lead to apprehension in some government 
circles, and thus it accepted playing a secondary role in the actual decision-making and 
leadership of the bank and never attempted to make the bank an institution of their 
movement.  While many Muslim Brotherhood members were among the initial 
shareholders in the bank, they did not constitute a sizable enough portion to control 
General Assembly votes nor does it appear that they ever tried to use their votes to 
support any Brotherhood or other Islamist agenda.  
When the Islamic International Arab Bank (IIAB) was established in the late 
1990s, the Islamists played a less central role.  With the backing of the conventional Arab 
Bank, the IIAB did not need nor did they seek the help of Islamists in gaining the 
necessary governmental approval to become registered in 1997 and begin operations in 
1998.  Nor did the Islamists have any meaningful influence over the Banking Law of 
2000, which restructured many aspects of banking in Jordan and included a major section 
that formalized the laws regulating Islamic Banks in Jordan.    
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The support of the Islamist leadership for the establishment of the IIAB did, 
however, prove important in helping the bank gain legitimacy.  The Arab Bank, Jordan‘s 
largest and most well-respected bank, financed the establishment of the IIAB as an 
independent Islamic bank whose dealings were wholly separate from those of the 
conventional bank.  While many Muslims were distrustful of an Islamic bank that was 
owned by a conventional bank, the IIAB was able to get the support of important 
segments of the Islamist leadership thus providing their bank with the legitimacy it 
needed to be recognized as a true Islamic bank.  It was the two most notable international 
Islamic scholars linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar and 
Faisal Mawlawi in Lebanon, who wrote the most convincing fatwa stating that the 
financial transactions undertaken by IIAB were Islamically legitimate.210  The leader of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Abd al-Majeed Thuneibat, also sent a letter of 
congratulation to the bank when it officially opened and Muslim Brotherhood leaders 
have taken the official position that the IIAB is a legitimate Islamic bank that should have 
the support and patronage of Islamists in the country. 
 
THE ISLAMIST VIEW OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN JORDAN 
 From the time Islamic banks were first established in Jordan, political Islamists 
have been keen to ensure their success and have often looked to them as points of pride, 
especially during the years when the banks were doing well.  Political Islamists pointed 
to the success of Islamic banks in their speeches and in numerous newspaper and 
                                                 
210 Interview with Saud Abu Mahfudh, July 25, 2001. 
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magazine articles as proof that Islam was a complete way of life that could not be 
restricted to the merely spiritual realm and that it could also provide economic solutions 
to the country‘s problems.  The success of such banks gave concrete weight to the 
assertions of the Islamists that Islam as a religion was suitable for modern times in all 
aspects of life. 
 This does not mean that the political Islamists have always been supportive of 
everything done by the Jordan Islamic Bank and the Islamic International Arab Bank.  
There are deep frustrations among Islamist leaders and even more so at the grassroots 
Islamist level regarding the inability of the Islamic banks to realize many of the 
expectations that had been set out for them.  There is a feeling that the banks could do 
much more in terms of providing social services, such as interest-free loans to the needy 
or to students, and that they should concentrate their investments in areas that better 
promote Islam, such as Islamic schools, or what they see as national security interests, 
such as agriculture, while avoiding dealing with the West. 
 Dr. Mohammed Saqr, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who served on both 
the Preparatory Committee and the Founding Committee of the JIB in the late 1970s and 
maintained close relations with the bank ever since, was himself very critical of the bank 
during a conference on investment opportunities in Jordan in the summer of 2001.211  He 
noted that the bank was too traditional, not innovative enough and, most importantly, did 
not in any way serve the developmental role that it potentially could.  He derided the 
                                                 
211 Dr. Saqr served as a discussant during a roundtable discussion concluding the conference:  Investment 
in Jordan: Opportunities and Prospects that was held in the Amman Chamber of Commerce on July 17-18, 
2001.  The conference was sponsored by the Middle East Studies Center. 
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bank for investing outside Jordan rather than fulfilling its responsibilities toward helping 
Jordanian development and noted that the bank had never even come close to fulfilling 
the early hopes that it could serve a developmental role similar to the role played by 
German banks, or even Bank Misr in early twentieth-century Egypt.  Saqr noted that, 
while Bank Misr was a conventional bank, its founder Talaat Harb had some Islamic 
inclinations and that those inclinations led him to use his bank to help develop and 
industrialize Egypt, an Islamic responsibility that Saqr noted was just as important as the 
legalistic prohibition of interest. 
 Jamil Abu Bakr, the spokesman for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, noted that 
while the Muslim Brotherhood continued to support both the JIB and the IIAB, the group 
hoped the banks would do much more in terms of helping to industrialize Jordan.212  He 
noted that the banks had not adequately fulfilled their role of undertaking innovative 
studies and research in the fields of Islamic economic and financial practices.  Ali Abu 
Sukur, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood and the General Secretary of the 
Jordanian Engineers Association, criticized the JIB for not using its extensive resources 
to buy land and ensure the country‘s agricultural resources remained in Jordanian 
hands.213  Saud Abu Mahfudh, another prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the editor of Jordan‘s Islamist newspaper al-Sabeel, said that both the JIB and IIAB 
failed to play any social or developmental role in Jordan whatsoever and that while their 
activities were not forbidden – they did not deal in interest – they were not really true 
                                                 
212 Interview with Jamil Abu Bakr, July 23, 2001. 
213 Interview with Ali Abu Sukur, July 25, 2001. 
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―Islamic‖ banks because they did not fulfill any other Islamic conditions besides the 
prohibition of interest.214 
 One of the best references for how political Islamists viewed the JIB during the 
banks halcyon years in the late 1980s and early 1990s is the 1990 doctoral dissertation of 
Ramadan Shallah, who, a few years after he wrote the dissertation, became the leader of 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement.  Shallah was very critical of the JIB for not 
providing enough social services and for not undertaking its developmental 
responsibilities.  He was also critical of some managerial aspects of the bank, especially 
the fact that the bank at the time had only one shari’a advisor, rather than a shari’a board 
or committee, and that the board of directors of the bank could at any time appoint or 
dismiss the advisor, whose salary was also set by the same board.  Shallah pointed out 
that such a status threatened the independence of the shari’a scholar to give correct 
judgments without undermining his own position.215   
 Despite his criticisms, Shallah went out of his way to show how the bank was 
successful and was playing an important role in helping Jordan solve some of its major 
economic problems.  Jamil Abu Bakr, while criticizing some aspects of the bank, also 
acknowledged that the bank was in general doing a good job and that the dreams many 
Islamists had for the bank were perhaps unrealistic under the circumstances.  The main 
thesis of Shallah‘s dissertation echoed this sentiment.  He ultimately concluded that the 
difficulties the bank was facing were the result of governmental restrictions that had 
                                                 
214 Interview with Saud Abu Mahfudh, July 25, 2001. 
215 Since Shallah‘s dissertation was written, the JIB has appointed a three-member shari’a Committee.  
Members of the Committee however can still by appointed or dismissed by the bank‘s board of directors at 
any time and the board still sets their salary. 
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established what he called ―a hostile and unencouraging environment‖ that put the bank 
at a severe disadvantage with respect to conventional banks. 
 A decade after Shallah completed his dissertation Islamists had become less 
forgiving of the bank‘s shortcomings.  In looking at the poor performance of the JIB in 
the mid to late 1990s and early part of the new century, Islamists are now more likely to 
blame mismanagement at the bank itself than governmental restrictions on Islamic 
banking activities.  Abdul Lateef Arabiyyat, the leader of the Islamic Action Front Party, 
said that his party had worked to pressure the Central Bank to deal with Islamic banks in 
a manner that would be less discriminatory but acknowledged that the major reasons for 
the bank‘s poor performance lay not in governmental dealings, but with mismanagement, 
lack of expertise and lack of vision by the bank itself.216  Arabiyyat said that the bank 
dealt with its customers and depositors in a less professional manner than other 
conventional banks.   
A frustrated Islamist small businessman echoed these sentiments, saying that the 
JIB took its customer base for granted and treated them poorly.217  The businessman said 
that the only reason Islamist businessmen use the JIB is because they consider other 
banks forbidden Islamically and that loans from the JIB always end up much more 
expensive than loans from conventional banks.  The businessman said the central 
problem with the JIB was much more with their administrative shortcomings and 
                                                 
216 Interview with Abdul Lateef Arabiyyat, July 27, 2001. 
217 Interview with a small businessman who is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood but asked to remain 
anonymous.  The interview was conducted in Amman, Jordan on July 4, 2001. 
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mismanagement than with any state laws, regulations or restrictions hindering Islamic 
financial practices.   
 Political Islamists are not the only ones to complain about the administrative 
shortcomings and mismanagement at JIB. The general perception of the JIB within 
Jordanian society has become very negative since the mid-1990s.  The belief that the 
bank uses an Islamic veneer to coerce Muslims into dealing with it is widespread and 
most non-Islamist Jordanians asked about the bank asserted that it takes and gives interest 
under the guise of different names.  Islamists and non-Islamist Jordanians were very 
critical of the high mark-ups charged by the bank, the bank‘s unwillingness to engage in 
any even remotely risky ventures, and the relatively low ―profit‖ margin the bank returns 
to customers. 
 One major difference between Islamists and non-Islamists, however, is in the 
general view of who controls and manages JIB.  Many non-Islamists assume that the 
bank is an institution of the Muslim Brotherhood; while Islamists are very quick to point 
out that the JIB is in no way connected to their movement.  Islamists now recognize that 
association with the bank carries more negative than positive baggage and that while they 
will continue dealing with, advising and working for the success of the bank, they want to 
make it clear that the bank‘s shortcomings are due to the human faults of its managers 
and not to the Islamic Movement or to the inability of Islamic economic principles to 
work in the modern world. 
 Many Islamists were quick to point out that while the bank itself did not have any 
political affiliation, it historically had many more business dealings with the Palestine 
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Liberation Organization than it did with the Muslim Brotherhood or any Islamist groups.  
Saud Abu Mahfudh noted that many top administrators of the JIB were or had earlier 
been members of Palestinian nationalist groups such as Fatah and the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), while none of them were members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  He noted that while Musa Shehadeh, the general manager of the JIB since 
1982, had become a devout Muslim who prayed regularly, he had earlier been a member 
of the radically secular PFLP.  Saud Abu Mahfudh pointed out that, in the early years of 
the bank, the JIB did not hire any known member of the Muslim Brotherhood, even for 
minor clerical positions. 
 Many Islamists were also very critical of the JIB‘s largest stockholder, the Saudi 
Sheikh Saleh Kamel.  While some Islamists noted that Sheikh Saleh Kamel is a generous 
benefactor who has been willing to support the building of Mosques and other charitable 
causes, others asserted that he was only interested in profit and were quick to point out 
that a famous satellite television station he owns is far from Islamic.   
Just as there are conflicting views within Islamist circles about the JIB, there are 
conflicting views about the only other Islamic bank in Jordan, the Islamic International 
Arab Bank (IIAB). While some Islamists expressed wariness about the Islamic nature of 
the IIAB, others were supportive, noting that competition might force the JIB to become 
more efficient and innovative.  Jamil Abu Bakr, the Brotherhood spokesman alluded to 
earlier, noted that, while some members of the Muslim Brotherhood were against the 
IIAB on the grounds that it was too closely linked to a conventional bank and thus that 
the source of its money and the methods with which it invested depositors‘ funds was 
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suspect, the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization encouraged its establishment and 
believed that competition would be good for Islamic banking in general.  Saud Abu 
Mahfudh, who has worked extensively with both the JIB and the IIAB, noted that the 
IIAB was much more professional and easier to work with than the JIB.  Ali Abu Sukur 
said most of the JIB‘s shortcomings would probably be solved if there was true 
competition in Jordan for the Islamic banking market, his only reservation being that the 
IIAB was still not trusted by most Islamists, or Muslims in general, and thus did not 
represent real competition. 
 The Islamist view of Islamic banking in Jordan is complex.  The frustrations 
about the mismanagement, administrative shortcomings, lack of innovation and 
unprofessional conduct of the JIB are deep and real but, as Jamil Abu Bakr pointed out, 
they are perhaps expressions of the unrealized and unrealistic expectations many 
Islamists had of the bank.  Islamist leaders with a more acute understanding of the 
political realities in Jordan were quicker to find excuses for the bank than many of the 
grassroots Islamist cadres and Islamist businessmen whose dealings with the bank on a 
personal level had increased their misgivings.  Ishaq Farhan said that, despite their 
shortcomings, the Islamic banks in Jordan continued to be appreciated by Islamists for 
the alternative to conventional banking practices that they were providing, and that one or 
two relatively small banks could not be expected to play a more political or 
developmental role than they already were.  While Islamists in Jordan are quick to 
criticize some specific aspects of the JIB and the IIAB, they are also quick to defend the 
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general principles that govern how the Islamic banks undertake financial transactions and 
they continue to be optimistic that the banks will overcome their problems. 
 
THE ISLAMIST ECONOMIC AGENDA 
Islamists in general recognize that banking and finance is only one aspect of the 
larger economic questions facing Jordan.  While they would prefer Islamic banks that 
more actively worked for larger Islamic economic principles and undertook their business 
in a more professional and efficient manner than is the current case with the Jordan 
Islamic Bank and International Islamic Arab Bank, they also acknowledge that, in the 
absence of other conditions and policies, the banks cannot be expected to fulfill the larger 
goal of implementing a comprehensive Islamic economic agenda.  However, Jordanian 
Islamists also concede that they themselves have not done enough to define what exactly 
that agenda entails. 
Jamil Abu Bakr, the official spokesman for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, 
acknowledged that economic affairs and policies are an area in which the organization 
remains weak.  Saud Abu Mahfudh, the editor of Jordan‘s main Islamist newspaper and a 
leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, recognized that the lack of a clear economic 
vision remains a major shortcoming of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.  He asserted 
that Islamists tended to shy away from discussions about economics, seeing economic 
policy-making as a ―dirty job‖ that bordered on Islamically-prohibited areas.  Musa 
Hantash, a Jordanian businessman who is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
bemoaned the fact that Islamists did not play a larger role in working to build up the 
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Jordanian economy.218  Hantash represented the views of many young Islamists frustrated 
with the leadership of the Brotherhood for not having any well-thought-out economic 
plans, or for using their influence in Parliament and in civil society to effect important 
economic change.  Hantash noted that Islamists hardly ever even talked about economic 
issues, much less worked out plans to solve the various economic problems facing 
Jordan. 
What the Muslim Brotherhood and other Jordanian Islamist groups have offered 
by way of economic policy is little more than a populist agenda.  Islamist members of 
Parliament and official statements from Islamist groups have opposed all IMF reforms, 
asserted that corruption is at the root of all the country‘s economic problems, called for a 
breaking-off of the ties of dependence with the West and all economic relations with 
Israel, and, occasionally, called for the Islamization of the economy without really 
detailing what that means. 
By far the most detailed outline of an Islamist economic agenda for Jordan can be 
found in the political platforms that the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF) releases before 
each of the parliamentary elections in which it puts forth candidates.219 As Nathan Brown 
has pointed out, it is during the election campaign, that Jordan‘s Islamists – who have 
                                                 
218 Interview with Musa Hantash, July 25, 2001. 
219 The platforms all under the title: Al-Burnamij al-Intikhabi li-Murashihee Hizb Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami 
li-Intikhabaat al-Majlis al-Niyabi al-Urduni (The Electoral Platform for Candidates of the Islamic Action 
Front Party for the Elections to the Jordanian Parliament) were published in 1993, 2003 and 2007. The IAF 
boycotted the 1997 and 2010 parliamentary elections. 
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never really faced the possibility of actually ruling - are compelled to put together a 
platform that provides a more specific set of positions than it normally provides.220  
In the introduction to the 1993 platform, the IAF describes the achievements of 
the Islamists in the previous parliament which was elected in 1989, the first parliamentary 
elections since 1967 and an election in which Islamists had won more than 40% of the 
seats.   The 1993 platform noted that in the economic realm the Islamists played a 
decisive role in the decision to form a parliamentary committee to monitor administrative 
and financial corruption by government officials and in the passage of a number of laws, 
such as one forgiving the interest on the debts of small farmers and another lowering 
custom duties on the cars of Jordanians returning to Jordan from the Gulf countries.  The 
introduction also mentioned that the Islamists had taken a strong stand opposing tax 
increases and price-hikes on subsidized goods. 
The introduction to the 2003 platform (which came after the party‘s decision to 
boycott the 1997 elections) discussed the rationale the party uses to decide whether to run 
candidates or boycott an election. The introduction listed a number of objectives that the 
movement had and noted that the decision of whether to participate or boycott an election 
was based on an analysis of what would best help them achieve those larger objectives. 
The only objective that was even remotely connected to economic matters was one that 
stated their desire to ―put an end to administrative, financial and moral corruption.‖ The 
                                                 
220 Nathan Brown, Jordan and its Islamic Movement: The Limits of Inclusion?, (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, No. 74, Nov., 2006) p. 9. 
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2007 platform had a similar introduction but did not mention corruption and for the first 
time mentioned their desire to help with ―development.‖ 
After the Introduction, the 1993, 2003, and 2007 IAF Platforms all included a 
section on legal changes the party would attempt to bring about in the upcoming 
parliament and each platform included a statement asserting that they would ―work to 
reevaluate financial legislation to ensure the banning of interest and other Islamically 
forbidden practices and would orient policies toward the Islamic shari’a.‖221 The 
platforms then listed the party‘s positions in a number of policy arenas.  All three 
platforms included a statement under ―Housing Policies‖ which stated that they would 
―Encourage Housing contracts that are in accordance with the Islamic shari’a and exempt 
those who have benefitted from Housing Projects from paying interest charges.‖  The 
1993 platform had a section entitled ―Trade and Industrial Policy‖ which was dropped 
from the 2003 and 2007 platforms.  The first policy proposal under that section in the 
1993 platform called for: ―providing governmental support to the existing Islamic 
financial institutions and working to increase their number and develop their services so 
that they will become models for other financial institutions.‖   
Most of the party‘s economic agenda was explained under a section that was 
included in all three platforms entitled ―Economic, Monetary, and Financial Policies.‖  In 
the 1993 and 2003 platforms, the first point in that section called for: ―Amending 
                                                 
221 The wording in the three platforms is slightly different and the quote here is from the 1993 platform. 
While much of the platform remained the same in all three elections, the section concerning legal changes 
did see a number of changes over the years and the fact that the statement calling for forbidding interest 
remained in all three is significant. The 1993 platform included 18 points, the 2003 platform 13 points and 
the 2007 platform 8 points – one of which was the call to forbid interest. 
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financial and economic legislation in accordance with the Islamic shari’a.‖ This 
statement was dropped from the 2007 platform.  Much of the remaining platform 
remained nearly identical in all three years.  All three platforms stressed working for the 
establishment of a pan-Arab Common Market and Arab economic integration, while 
calling for resistance to all economic programs aimed at normalizing relations with Israel 
and monitoring all foreign investment to ensure foreigners did not gain a hold over any 
strategic Jordanian industries.  The platforms further supported providing governmental 
incentives for investment in industry, agriculture and other economic sectors.  
The Islamists‘ concern for the poor was shown in a number of points calling for 
better-distributed developmental programs throughout Jordan, working to cure poverty at 
its roots by providing training and developmental funds to those in need, establishing a 
national strategy to overcome the problem of unemployment, increasing welfare funds, 
increasing the salaries of governmental workers and putting a halt to price hikes on 
subsidized goods.  The Islamists also showed a strong concern for lowering the trade 
deficit, the national debt and the current accounts deficit.  The platforms further called 
upon the government to increase its gold and foreign currency reserves as a means of 
stabilizing the Jordanian dinar and lowering inflation.   
There were also a number of points aimed at decreasing corruption, such as one 
calling for increased monitoring of how governmental ministries and agencies spent their 
money, another for increasing the power and scope of the governmental accounting 
bureau, and one for placing the budgets of all public sector institutions under 
parliamentary scrutiny.  Throughout the platforms, the Islamists also called for policies 
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that might provide a cultural cure to some of Jordan‘s economic problems.  One article, 
for example, called for ―spreading awareness of Islamic values against excessive 
consumerism, for encouraging productivity, and for guiding consumption.‖ 
In addition to the political platforms, statements issued by the IAF since its 
founding in 1992 also provide insight into the depth of the party‘s understanding of 
economic issues and the kinds of economic policies promoted by Islamists.  The relative 
lack of concern Islamists have shown for economic matters is underscored by the fact that 
out of more than 100 statements issued by the party in the first ten years after its 
inception in 1992 only a handful dealt even remotely with economic issues.222 
The IAF was very critical of the peace process with Israel in both its political and 
economic aspects.  One statement, dated October 31, 1994, condemned the Israeli 
participation in a Middle East Economic Conference being held in Morocco.  The 
statement called upon the Arab nations to avoid dealing with Israel, and to work with 
each other in promoting Arab economic integration in a manner that would solve the 
economic problems of the region.   
The IAF was also extremely critical of an American-Jordanian-Israeli agreement 
that allowed for duty-free access to the United States market for any goods manufactured 
in special Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan, in which there are no customs 
duties on imported materials and at least 8 per cent of the industrial inputs come from 
Israel.  The IAF was also critical of a Special Economic Zone established in Aqaba in 
                                                 
222 The statements were taken from a detailed analysis of all statements issued by the IAF from 1992 to 
2002. The statements are all kept in ―The Binder of Statements and Official Correspondence of the Islamic 
Action Front Party‖ that is kept at the IAF Party Headquarters in Amman, Jordan. 
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2000, and in a statement dated July 24, 2000 the IAF complained that Israeli and Western 
investors could exploit the zone.  The statement attempted to refute governmental 
arguments that the free trade zone would solve Jordan‘s economic problems and provided 
counter-arguments explaining how the zone would in fact exacerbate existing problems 
and lead to new ones. 
An IAF statement dated May 14, 1996 dealt with a number of economic issues.  
The statement was critical of a rise in the price of water and electricity, and called for the 
establishment of a tangible plan to solve the problems of unemployment and poverty.  A 
similar multifaceted statement dated January 17, 2000 was critical of governmental 
privatization policies, contending that only the most profitable state enterprises were 
being sold and that no tangible benefits were accruing from the sales, which, the 
statement asserted, were also allowing for Israeli and foreign penetration into important 
Jordanian companies, including most notably the Jordanian Water Authority.  The 
statement was also critical of an increase in sales taxes and educational fees.  A few other 
statements criticized the government for increasing taxes or fees.  An earlier June 16, 
1993 statement was very critical of price hikes and an expansion of the consumption tax 
to cover more goods, and a July 3, 2001 statement expressed the IAF‘s opposition to a 
governmental plan to sharply increase the price of fuel in response to demands from the 
World Bank. 
The Islamist party‘s statements and actions concerning economic issues since 
2002 have remained consistent with their earlier positions. The most prominent economic 
issue that the IAF was concerned about in the 2003-2007 Parliament was fuel price 
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increases and in 2006, IAF members of parliament took the lead in denouncing those 
increases and leading public marches calling for a rollback.223  
The IAF website lists every statement the party has made since late 2009. Of the 
252 statements the party made in 2010, there were numerous statements on foreign policy 
issues (mostly concerning Palestine), a number of statements criticizing violations of 
human and civil rights and numerous calls for political reform and more political rights, 
but only a handful dealing with economic issues.224 The economic issues were all 
criticisms of the rise in prices of goods, most of which were subsidized. An August 10 
statement called upon the government not to increase subsidized fuel prices, then an 
August 14 statement as well as a Nov. 28 statement criticized the government‘s decision 
to increase fuel prices by 4%. A Sept. 19 statement had also criticized the decision to 
increase the price of subsidized livestock fodder and a Sept. 21 statement said that 
governmental policies were responsible for the huge increase in the price of vegetables. 
Economic issues were notably absent from an April 12 statement that outlined the 
agenda for a General Assembly meeting of the party leadership. The most notable 
sentence dealing with the economy in that statement asserted that the party would 
―support the national economy and participate in its independence and growth while 
giving special concern to the agricultural sector.‖ Another sentence that was not solely 
related to the economy asserted that the party would ―encourage and put into effect all 
forms of Arab and Islamic coordination.‖ 
                                                 
223 Nathan Brown, Jordan and its Islamic Movement: The Limits of Inclusion?, (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, No. 74, Nov., 2006) p. 13. 
224 IAF website, http://jabha.net, accessed Jan. 1, 2011. 
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The most comprehensive economic statement on the IAF‘s website was an 
October 24, 2009 statement which asserted that the country‘s rising deficit and debt were 
early indicators of the country again falling into the kind of crisis it had suffered from in 
the late 1980s and calling upon the government to cut non-essential spending, better 
manage their finances, end corruption, pass a new income tax law that would increase 
rates for the wealthy while lowering them for the needy, and consolidate governmental 
programs and agencies in a way that would make them more efficient. At the same time, 
the statement said the government should not cut subsidies needed by the poorest 
elements of society and should continue and even increase stimulus programs aimed at 
ending unemployment and poverty. 
IAF officials acknowledge that the number of their statements that deal with 
economic matters are almost negligible.  Ahmad Tannash, the IAF board member with 
the strongest economics background, recognized that during the 1990s Islamists in the 
Jordanian parliament had almost no input and, more often than not, did not even take a 
stand on the many economic issues discussed in parliament.225   Jamil Abu Bakr, a 
member of the IAF Administrative Board, as well as the spokesman for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, said that Islamists felt that the real solution to the major economic problems 
facing Jordan lay in political rather than economic remedies.   
He listed the major economic problems as corruption, poverty, unemployment, 
high taxes, a large income-and-wealth gap, and no consistency in government economic 
policies.  He was especially vocal about corruption, noting that the problems of bribery, 
                                                 
225 Interview with Ahmad Tannash, July 29, 2001. 
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nepotism and embezzlement were rampant.  The need for connections to get any matter 
through Jordan‘s bureaucracy was another major problem he addressed, as was the 
existence of commercial monopolies for a number of important goods. To solve those 
problems, Jamil Abu Bakr said the Islamists worked to expose and bring an end to all 
forms of corruption, allow for more democratic freedoms and demand more transparency 
in governmental and business dealings.  
 To be fair, the problems enumerated by Jamil Abu Bakr and repeated by other 
Islamists are real problems in Jordan and the political remedies he put forward would 
likely do a great deal to begin tackling them.  However, as the Islamists themselves 
concede, they have not adequately addressed specific economic issues and their 
inexperience in economic affairs has been evident in their lack of action in Parliament.  
While more transparency in government affairs and an end to corruption would likely 
lead to major improvements in Jordan‘s overall economy, it is far too simple to assume 
that an increase in democratic freedoms would by itself bring about more just economic 
policies that could solve the problems of unemployment, poverty and the huge gap 
between the rich and poor.  As by far the largest political party in Jordan, the IAF has a 
responsibility to better study the specific economic problems facing Jordan and to begin 
offering detailed economic solutions to those problems.  The past failure to fulfill that 
responsibility has had a detrimental effect on their legitimacy.226 
                                                 
226 For a more in-depth analysis of the shortcomings of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic 
Action Front in the area of providing modern realistic solutions to problems facing Jordan and how that has 
effected their legitimacy see: Hani Hourani, ed. al-Harakaat wa-Tandhimaat al-Islamia fi-l-Urdun, 1996 
(al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, Amman Jordan) pp. 283-287. 
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ISLAMIST ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN JORDAN 
 Outside the activities of the Islamic banks in Jordan, a growing number of 
grassroots, usually young and well-educated Islamists are undertaking a number of their 
own economic activities in accordance with Islamic principles.  These activities 
constitute an increasingly important segment of Jordanian civil society and have the 
potential to effect gradual but real political and social change in the country.  These 
grassroots Islamists are distrustful of the government and its corrupt practices, are 
frustrated by the Islamic banks and their timidity, and are often impatient with the slow 
pace and seeming lack of awareness by the political leadership of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. 
 The most significant arena for such activities is in Jordan‘s professional 
associations, most notably the Jordanian Engineers Association.  When Islamists 
decisively won the 1990 elections for the leadership position of the Engineers 
Association, it was already the largest of Jordan‘s professional groups and had assets of 
about $10 million.227  In less than a decade, the Islamists had increased its assets to nearly 
$70 million, which was partially invested in stocks and partially used to provide 
financing for engineers who wanted to buy land, houses or cars.  Most significant for our 
purposes is that all such financing, as well as the other kinds of financial transactions 
undertaken by the Association, is done in strict accordance with Islamic principles, 
                                                 
227 For general information on Jordan‘s professional associations see Hani Hourani ed. Professional 
Associations and the Challenges of Democratic Transformation in Jordan, 2000 (al-Urdun al-Jadid 
Research Center Amman Jordan). 
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though it is done almost completely outside the purview of the official Jordanian Islamic 
banks.228 
 The establishment of a businessman‘s association in 1997 that brought together 
seventy-nine Islamist businessmen with the explicit goal of using their economic and 
organizational power to influence political, social, and cultural change, marks another 
important kind of activity that grassroots Islamists adopted.229  The establishment of the 
Jami’yat al-Rakha, or Businesmen‘s Prosperity Association, in Jordan occurred after a 
visit to Jordan by members of Turkey‘s MUSIAD organization.230  The MUSIAD is a 
powerful Islamist business association in Turkey whose success and economic power is 
believed to have played an important role in helping an Islamist political party in that 
country.  Like the Engineers Association, many of the businessmen in Jami’yat al-Rakha 
have become disenchanted with the Islamic banks in Jordan.  While members of Jami’yat 
al-Rakha are more likely to use the Islamic banks than other Jordanian businessmen, 
many of them privately finance their business activities without seeking bank loans and 
others have resorted to using conventional banks out of frustration with the shortcomings 
of the Islamic banks. 
Ali Abu Sukur, a founding member of the Jami’yat al-Rakha Association, said the 
first goal of the group was to form an organization that could begin influencing the 
elections for different Chambers of Commerce in Jordan.  While Islamists control nearly 
all the professional associations in Jordan, they have never fared well in Chamber of 
                                                 
228 Interview with Ali Abu Sukur. 
229 See Membership Directory of the Jami‘yat al-Rakha‘ Li-Rijal al-A‘maal. 
230 Interview with Musa Hantash, a member of the Jami‘yat al-Rakha in Jordan.  
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Commerce elections.  Ali Abu Sukur noted that business in Jordan currently plays a very 
marginal role in influencing Jordanian politics.  Most business owners, fearful of 
governmental retaliation, try to keep their businesses separate from politics and do not try 
to use their capital to influence the larger political issues facing the country.   
Ali Abu Sukur, in addition to being the General Secretary of the Jordanian 
Engineers Association, also heads the Anti-Normalization Committee that calls for 
exposure and boycotting of any Jordanian professional or business interest that deals with 
Israel.  His activities with the committee have placed him in direct opposition to policies 
of the Jordanian king and royal family, and he has suffered because of that with 
imprisonment and harassment.  Ali Abu Sukur is thus a living example that attempting to 
use one‘s professional or business power to influence politics can be dangerous in Jordan; 
but he and the other members of Jami’yat al-Rakha believe that business and capital have 
responsibilities toward their country.  Ali Abu Sukur noted that all businesses have a 
strong interest in political stability and that such stability can best come about through a 
more democratic polity.  Al-Rakha thus aimed to influence Chamber of Commerce 
elections in such a way that they could begin transforming Chambers of Commerce in 
Jordan into mouthpieces for increased democratization of the country. 
Musa Hantash, another founding member of al-Rakha, pointed out that the 
association has not even come close to achieving the ambitious goals it set out for itself.  
Al-Rakha remains very small because even the most Islamically-minded businessmen are 
scared that joining the group and becoming openly labeled as Islamist could lead to 
governmental harassment in a country in which governmental connections and favors are 
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indispensable for the success of any business venture.  Saud Abu Mahfudh observed that 
there were thousands of Islamist businessmen in Jordan, yet less than one hundred had 
the courage to join al-Rakha because of such fears.  Hantash noted that a few large 
Islamist businessmen could have marginal influences on some minor political affairs but 
that such influences came about through their own personal contacts with members of the 
royal family or government officials, and not through the organizational activities of 
business associations or Chambers of Commerce.  It is only such organizational power, 
however, that could lead business and capital to play the kind of political role in 
transforming the polity that Ali Abu Sukur and other Islamists feel is necessary. 
Another phenomenon that perhaps more than anything else underscores the 
shortcomings of the Islamic banks in Jordan is the huge informal economy in Islamic 
finance.  Networks of support exist throughout Jordan in which extended families, 
neighbors, friends and co-workers help each other purchase homes, jointly invest their 
money in various ventures, or undertake other kinds of financial transactions in strict 
accordance with Islamic principles.  Most of those that use such networks are 
uncomfortable using conventional banks, but at the same time have become frustrated 
with the unwillingness of the Islamic banks in Jordan to provide the kind of long-term 
financing needed to purchase homes or to help launch new businesses, as well as the 
disappointing returns the banks provide on investments or deposits.  While the mutual 
trust and close ideological ties found among Islamists encourage the formation of such 
networks in Islamist circles, similar networks can also be found among other Muslim 
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Jordanians who, while not sharing Islamist ideological affinities, remain committed to 
abiding by the Islamic prohibition on taking or using interest. 
The extensive economic activities of Islamists outside the structure of Islamic 
banks, whether through unofficial networks, control over the funds of professional 
associations, or in terms of their business and organizational strengths, in addition to their 
disappointment with the Islamic banks that currently exist in Jordan has led some 
Islamists to consider setting up their own Islamic bank in the country.  Ali Abu Sukur 
noted that the Engineers Association had in the past considered opening its own bank to 
take over and ultimately expand the extensive financial assets under its control.  
However, he recognized that it would be nearly impossible for the organization to obtain 
a license, both because the Central Bank was convinced that there were already too many 
banks in Jordan and were not keen to provide new licenses, and because the government 
would likely prohibit Islamists from having their own bank.   
Jamil Abu Bakr said that the Muslim Brotherhood itself had also considered 
opening a bank but that the organization did not have the initial capital required.  He also 
noted that the government often removed Islamists from local zakat committees, fearing 
that controlling zakat funds could give the Islamists too much power, and thus the idea of 
an Islamist-run Islamic bank would likely find very strong opposition in some 
government circles.  
The widespread feeling by Islamists that they would not be allowed to establish 
their own bank, the fear by many Islamist businessmen to join an Islamist business 
association, as well as numerous cases of actual governmental harassment of those who 
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attempt to use their economic or institutional powers to influence political change, 
underscore the reality that the state remains dominant over civil society in Jordan and that 
private-sector activities are still not powerful enough to challenge state authorities on 
sensitive political topics.  At the same time, however, the actual formation of the 
businessmen‘s association and continued activities by professional associations indicates 
that there is a growing societal awareness that their activities can lead to meaningful 
change and that there are a growing number of people willing to sacrifice some of their 
own interests to help bring about such change. 
 
ISLAMIST RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC BANKS IN JORDAN 
As mentioned earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood played a decisive role in providing 
needed support for the initial establishment of the Jordan Islamic Bank.  The bank 
authorities, however, later took on the delicate balancing act of deliberately distancing 
themselves as much as possible from the Islamists, so as not to bring upon themselves 
governmental scrutiny, while at the same time maintaining enough legitimacy in Islamist 
eyes to keep their business and moral support. 
The Islamic bankers were especially wary of exposing any ties whatsoever 
between their banks and political Islamists.  Bakr Rehan, the executive manager for the 
Planning and Organizing Department at the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB), discounted any 
ties between JIB and political Islamists and said that the bank had never requested and 
had received only marginal help from Islamists in Parliament, despite the bank‘s concern 
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about a number of laws and regulations that had recently been debated in that body.231  
Nihad Maraqa, the Manager of Planning for the Islamic International Arab Bank (IIAB), 
also asserted that IIAB was a business with no political agenda.232  While he noted that 
the bank played an important social role in Jordanian society, he was insistent that 
Islamic banks had no direct ties to Islamist political groups and certainly could not play a 
mediating role between governments and Islamic movements.  Like Rehan, he said that 
the bank had never requested nor did they expect to get much assistance from Islamists in 
parliament. 
Despite the insistence by bank managers that there is absolutely no relationship 
with Islamist movements, there are some ties that the Islamists were more willing to 
allude to than were the bank managers.  First of all, the vast majority of members of the 
Islamic Movement who have money in a Jordanian bank have deposited it in the Islamic 
banks, not necessarily because of their support for the institutions themselves but for the 
basic reason that they believe it is the only Islamically legitimate means to deposit 
money.  Furthermore, nearly all of the Islamist-run businesses in Jordan use only Islamic 
banks for all of their financial dealings.  While Musa Hantash stressed that the level of 
influence the Islamists played over JIB policies was minimal, he noted that Islamist-run 
businesses provided a huge percentage of JIB‘s overall clientele and perhaps had the 
potential to begin influencing the JIB if they attempted to do so in an organized fashion. 
                                                 
231 Interview with Bakr Rehan, Executive Manager for the Planning and Organizing Department at JIB, 
June 18, 2001 in Amman, Jordan. 
232 Interview with Nihad Maraqa, the Manager of Planning for the Arab Islamic Bank, June 19, 2001 in 
Amman Jordan. 
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While the Islamic banks are adamant that they have no ties to political Islamists, 
they do recognize the importance of Islamic movements and try not to alienate them.  It 
was only after the establishment of the IIAB in 1998 that the JIB - after 20 years of 
existence - set up its own marketing department.  Yet even without a marketing 
department for most of its existence, the JIB witnessed extremely fast growth during its 
first decade, largely on the basis of the political Islamists‘ ability to popularize the idea 
that any kind of banking interest amounted to forbidden riba, an idea that government 
officials throughout the Arab world, sometimes with the support of Islamic scholars close 
to government circles, often try to debunk.  Ishaq Farhan, the former leader of the Islamic 
Action Front Party, pointed out that Islamic scholars associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood had passed clear fatwas asserting that it was forbidden to deal with 
conventional banks and they always insisted that Muslims deal only with Islamic banks. 
This kind of support from the Islamic Movement gives Islamic banks a degree of 
legitimacy and a guaranteed clientele that they could easily lose without such backing.  
Islamic banks recognize that the Islamists could have a profound impact on their ability 
to retain customers by such simple things as harshly criticizing some aspect of the bank‘s 
activities, publicly asserting that the bank‘s methods were not in conformity with Islamic 
law, or even just ending their continued support and encouragement for the bank.  Islamic 
banks thus recognize that their strength is in many ways affected by the strength of the 
Islamic movements and there are a number of indirect means the banks employ to 
maintain the continued support of the Islamists. 
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While in its early years the JIB may have gone out of its way to avoid hiring 
Islamists, that seems to have changed.  Many young Islamists, hopeful of jobs with 
Islamic banks, are now studying economics and finance - once subjects that Islamists 
avidly avoided.   Even more significantly, when the JIB expanded its shari’a advisor to a 
3-member shari’a board, it included two Islamists, one with ties to the Islamic Liberation 
Party and the second Sheikh Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani, one of the leading figures in the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  Musa Hantash pointed out that being known as a committed 
Islamist is often seen by JIB loan officers as a sign of honesty that could help them get 
business loans, sometimes on easy terms. 
 The JIB also spends hundreds of thousands of JDs a year on charitable 
contributions and donations to various Islamic causes,233 many of which are linked to the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  The project to which the JIB is most closely linked is the Afaaf 
Charitable Committee, which provides needy couples help in getting married.  The 
Committee is headed by the former IAF Party leader Abdul Lateef Arabiyyat.  Arabiyyat 
noted that the JIB donated JD5000 (approximately $7,500) to the Afaaf Committee 
annually in addition to providing every groom married with the assistance of the 
Committee with a JD100 gift.  Even more significantly, the JIB provides hundreds of 
thousands of JDs annually through Afaaf as interest-free loans to grooms.234  The JIB 
provided a total of JD21.8 million in interest-free loans in 2008 benefiting more than 
                                                 
233 See Jordan Islamic Bank Annual Reports.  In 2008, the JIB spent JD 340,000 (more than half a million 
dollars) in charitable donations, see 30
th
 Annual Report, page 15.  
234 Interview with Abdul Lateef Arabiyyat.  Arabiyyat noted that in the year 2000 alone,  JD 400,000 in 
interest-free loans was provided from the JIB to grooms associated with the Committee. 
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19,000 citizens,235 many of whom were members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The JIB 
has been a frequent donor to the Muslim Brotherhood-run network of Quranic schools in 
Jordan as well, providing about JD37,000 in direct contributions for Quranic 
memorization prizes and easy financing arrangements for the building of new Quranic 
schools in 2008 alone.236   JIB also provided easy finance arrangements to projects of the 
Zarqa National University, a Muslim Brotherhood-run institution led by Ishaq Farhan.237  
 While the IIAB‘s links to Arab Bank provide it with a cushion of support most 
Islamic banks do not enjoy, it also recognizes the important role Islamists can play in the 
success or failure of an Islamic bank.  Musa Hantash noted that perhaps as many as 80 
per cent of Islamists are still distrustful of the IIAB because it is owned by a conventional 
bank.  The IIAB has, however, benefited greatly from the support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood leadership.   
When debates were raging in the mainstream Jordanian press about whether the 
IIAB could be considered a legitimate Islamic bank, the Muslim Brotherhood newspaper, 
al-Sabeel, clearly sided with the opinion that the bank was legitimate.  When the IIAB 
returned the favor by placing ads in al-Sabeel, the JIB broke its long-running contract 
with the newspaper.  Al-Sabeel now does most of its business with the IIAB.238  It will be 
recalled that the two most notable international Islamic scholars linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar and Faisal Mawlawi in Lebanon, wrote the 
                                                 
235 JIB 30
th
 Annual Report, page 16. 
236 Interview with Jamil Abu Bakr and 30
th
 Annual JIB report. 
237 Interview with Ishaq Farhan. 
238 Interview with Saud Abu Mahfudh. 
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most convincing fatwa stating that the financial transactions undertaken by IIAB were 
Islamically legitimate.239  A sign of how much IIAB recognizes the importance of the 
Muslim Brotherhood support is underscored by the fact that when the leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Abd al-Majeed Thuneibat, sent a letter of congratulations 
to the bank on its official opening, the bank had the letter enlarged, framed, and placed in 
the lobby of its bank headquarters. 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has illustrated the many-faceted relationship between Islamic banks 
and the Islamic movement in Jordan.  It is clear that, in Jordan, Islamic banks are 
organizationally distinct and have very few direct ties with the Islamic Movement, yet the 
two institutions have many interests in common and recognize that a stronger relationship 
could serve the needs of both.  The main barrier to stronger ties is fears on the part of the 
banks that being too closely linked with a political opposition group could lead to 
governmental harassment.  Thus, the state forms a barrier blocking what would be a 
natural tendency for the two to increase their levels of coordination and cooperation.  If 
this barrier were removed and the political environment in Jordan opened up in the sense 
that the Islamists were allowed to compete against other political movements for real 
political power, rather than just seats in a constricted parliament, it is likely that there 
would be much closer ties between the Islamic banks and the Islamic movements. 
 The Islamic movement has acknowledged its own shortcomings in terms of 
providing concrete policy proposals in a number of realms, especially economics.  
                                                 
239 Ibid. 
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Islamic banks, on the other hand, have been forced to deal for decades with the practical 
problems of implementing Islamic economic principles in the modern era.  Further 
coordination with the Islamic banks would thus help the political Islamists better define 
their economic policy platform, something the Islamists would need if there were true 
political liberalization in Jordan.   
Jordan is now facing major economic transformations, as increased globalization, 
the free-trade pact with the United States and entry into the World Trade Organization is 
forcing them to compete globally in a way they never had to in the past.  Islamists have 
been critical of such moves toward globalization without being able to define a clear 
alternative.  Islamic banks in Jordan and elsewhere however have been forced to deal 
with the more globalized world in concrete terms and have often devised strategies by 
which they can benefit from such trends through using Islamic economic and financial 
principles.  If Islamists want to make the transformation from being a populist 
organization into being a serious political party with the experience and technical skills to 
lead Jordan in the modern era, while at the same time maintaining their strict adherence 
to Islamic principles in economic affairs, they will need the technical acumen and 
experience of the bankers. 
On the other hand, a more liberal political environment is likely to strengthen the 
political Islamists to the extent that they could also provide much needed assistance to the 
financial Islamists, in terms of bringing about the kinds of legislative reforms that the 
financial Islamists need to overcome the very real problems and challenges they are 
currently facing.  The fear of being too closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood has 
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prevented Islamic banks from even seeking the support of Muslim Brotherhood 
parliamentarians for such simple things as changing laws that in effect tax goods 
purchased through Islamic banks twice,240 or prevent Islamic banks from participating in 
a government-sponsored house mortgage refinancing company.241  In a more politically 
liberal environment, it is likely that political Islamists would work very closely with the 
Islamic banks to ensure that the government provided the kind of legal and regulatory 
environment that would not only remove restrictions and hindrances faced by Islamic 
banks but also provide government sponsorship of the banks through such measures as 
using Islamic banks for the financial business of the state. 
 In addition to serving each other‘s needs, closer ties between Islamic banks and 
Islamic movements would have profound political consequences.242  Again, to the extent 
that real political liberalization comes about, a scenario could be imagined in which 
Islamic banks increasingly serve the role of financial and political intermediary, relating 
Islamic political figures to Islamist-oriented businesses and investors.  Such a role would 
tie the banks to political patrons in ways that could substantially reduce their information 
costs.  High information and transaction costs are one of the greatest challenges facing 
Islamic banks and hindering their ability to compete fairly with conventional banks.  It is 
                                                 
240 When someone wants to finance a purchase through an Islamic bank, the bank first purchases the good 
then resells it to a customer.  Current Jordanian laws tax both transactions. 
241 This company was established in 1996 to help Jordanian banks provide long term housing finance to 
banks with mostly short-term deposits by channeling long-term funds – such as pension funds or insurance 
companies controlled by governmental agencies through Jordanian banks with the express purpose of 
providing housing finance. 
242 For a seminal piece that first hypothesized the notion that Islamic banks would benefit from a more 
liberal political environment in which Islamic movements could more freely advocate for them see Clement 
Henry, ―Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in the Arab World and Turkey,‖ Middle East Journal, 44:2 
(Spring, 1990). 
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possible that closer ties would thus greatly reduce some of the structural disadvantages 
the Islamic banks have with respect to conventional banks. 
 It is also likely that closer ties between Islamic political and financial actors 
would have a significant impact on the incentive structures of the political actors, leading 
them to lessen their demands upon the state, become more amenable to cooperation and 
coexistence with opposing ideological trends, and ultimately to provide stronger support 
for the democratization of society. 
 Thus, in the case of political liberalization, Islamic banks could play an extremely 
important role in mediating the transition of political Islamist groups from mass-based 
populist organizations into conservative, religious political parties in a multi-party 
system, similar to the Christian Democrats in Germany, or the Justice and Development 
Party in Turkey.  The problem is that there is not a very big likelihood of political 
liberalization in the near future, especially in the new international and regional order that 
has been established in the wake of September 11, 2001.  One major problem in the post-
September 11
th
 order is the increased scrutiny and targeting of Islamic banks, often 
labeling them the financiers of terrorism.  The attempt to escape such a label has made 
Islamic banks even more wary of any dealings with Islamists.  If this last problem can be 
avoided, the ties between Islamic banks and Islamic movements are likely to increase 
gradually in Jordan, even in the absence of political liberalization, because of increasing 
competition between the IIAB and JIB.   
The existence of competition within the Islamic financial market has forced 
Islamic banking in Jordan to become more efficient, better managed and more innovative 
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than it had been in the past.  Competition has also forced the Islamic banks to compete 
for the large Islamist market, rather than take it for granted.  As Musa Hantash pointed 
out, loan officers in Islamic banks had already been more likely to provide business loans 
to committed Islamists.  With increased competition between the JIB and the IIAB, the 
banks became more innovative, and the higher level of trust the banks have in committed 
Islamists is likely to lead the banks to provide such clients with the more risky kinds of 
Islamic financial instruments.  The first istisna contract in Jordan thus went to a 
committed Islamist to build an Islamic hospital.   In competing for the Islamist market, 
banks will be likely to make more such concessions to Islamist demands in a way that, if 
it proves successful, will both financially empower the political Islamists while also 
making the Islamic banks more efficient by reducing their monitoring costs and providing 
them with new kinds of financial instruments.   
 The extent to which this takes place will depend on two factors, both relating to 
the Islamic movement: first, the level to which the Islamic movement can better organize 
itself and begin making use of its economic weight and strength in a more structured 
fashion; and second, the degree to which the Islamists can maintain a good enough 
relationship with the government and royal family to not be seen as too dangerous of a 
political threat.  If these two conditions are met, the increased coordination and 
cooperation between Islamic banks and Islamic movements is likely to have important 
political effects even in the absence of increased political liberalization.  In this more 
realistic scenario, Islamic banks can be expected to play an important role in mediating 
the transformation of political Islamists and making them into a more effective voice for 
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION 
 Karl Polanyi recognized the importance of culture, history, and institutions in the 
economic life of society.243  In discussing the establishment of unified national markets 
that came about with industrial capitalism in Western Europe, Polanyi did not deny 
Marx‘s contention that the process was exploitative.  But rather than focus on economic 
exploitation, Polanyi looked at the cultural context and found that the establishment of 
national markets detached the economy from its social base, creating widespread cultural 
alienation and removing people from the cultural framework that had previously 
constituted the matrix of their human existence and identity.   
Polanyi‘s work has had a huge impact on anthropology.  His theories led to the 
establishment of a new paradigm in anthropology called substantivism.  Substantivists 
argue that the formalist neo-classical economics paradigm based on utility maximization 
and rational actors does not adequately explain the social and cultural context that plays 
an important role in the economy.  Polanyi has, however, largely been ignored by 
economists and political scientists despite the fact that his work could provide important 
insights into the debate on society and the state, economic institutional change, and 
cultural politics. 
One key concept of anthropological substantivism is that economies are 
embedded in both economic and non-economic institutions and that economic exchange 
is regulated by many of these non-economic social institutions, such as religion and 
                                                 
243 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, ( Boston: 
Beacon, 1944).  Also see Gregory Baum, Karl Polanyi on Ethics and Economics, (Quebec:  McGill-
Queen‘s University Press, 1996).  
 201 
government.  According to this paradigm, any analysis of an economy without looking at 
these institutions will be flawed. 
While Polanyi saw the importance of culture, he did not see it in the same way as 
Max Weber.244  He did not believe that there were any cultural prerequisites to the 
establishment of certain political or economic institutions or that certain cultural traits 
were superior to others in the development of society.  What he did believe was that for 
any kind of political or economic institutional change to be successful and enduring, it 
should be undertaken within known and developed cultural and social institutions.   
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi explained the social and political upheavals 
that took place in England during the rise of the market economy.  He noted that the rise 
of powerful modern states was a requirement for the establishment of a national market 
because only such a state could push through the revolutionary changes in social structure 
that accompanied the market‘s rise.  The damage, according to Polanyi, was above all 
cultural as the economy was disembedded from its social base thus tearing apart the 
cultural bonds by which people constituted their very identity.  Long-held values and 
inherited institutions were shattered leading to widespread cultural alienation.  Relying on 
extensive anthropological research, Polanyi predicted that this radical disembeddedness 
could not last and that societies would ultimately generate counter-movements to protect 
themselves from disintegration.  The Great Transformation that he foresaw was the 
inevitable pushing back of civil society against the self-regulating market and ultimately 
the establishment of more cooperative social economies.  
                                                 
244 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism, (New York:  Penguin Books, 2002). 
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Perhaps one of the reasons Polanyi has not been taken very seriously by 
economists and political scientists is that the great transformation he predicted never took 
place.  Since 1944, when Polanyi‘s book was published, national markets continually 
gained in strength alongside the growth and spread of democratic institutions – Polanyi 
had believed that the self-regulating economy and democracy were irreconcilable and 
that the conflict between the two would either lead to authoritarian rule or a return to 
more traditional values, historical symbols and social institutions.  In fact, it seems the 
market itself became a defining characteristic of much of Western, especially American, 
culture.  While civil society has remained strong and has generated the establishment of 
numerous new institutions, those institutions have existed alongside and rarely 
challenged the very market systems that Polanyi thought they would be set up to oppose.  
With the increasing globalization of the free-market system beginning in the late 
twentieth century, the idea that economic relations will be restructured along social and 
cultural lines seems even less credible. 
However, the fact that Polanyi did not accurately foretell economic and political 
institutional development in Western Europe does not take away from the insights he 
made about the revolutionary impact that occurred with the rise of national markets. 
Polanyi notes that part of what made the transformation so revolutionary was that it did 
not come about through a gradual, incremental process.  However, in the Western 
European context that he was describing, this radical disjuncture did occur as a result of 
internal elite manipulations and interactions and while the process may not have been 
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gradual, it was rooted in internal structural foundations and had internal driving 
mechanisms.   
The establishment of national markets in the colonial context was not only sudden 
but was violently imposed by outsiders who were driven by external rather than internal 
motivations.  The colonial national markets were set up to serve external interests and 
were built on the smashed remains of local, internally-driven economic and cultural 
institutions.  The political and economic institutional frameworks that the colonial powers 
established further resulted in the rise of new internal elites who assumed new-found 
powers and prestige while stripping former elites of the institutional frameworks that had 
formerly sustained them.  Polanyi‘s insights about the cultural alienation that occurs 
within society as a result of the establishment of national markets are thus much more 
relevant in the colonial context than they ever were in the Western European context and 
understanding the impact of that cultural alienation can help explain much of the political 
and economic trajectories of formerly colonized societies.  
As Henry and Springborg point out nothing defines the Middle East better than its 
tradition of external intervention.245  Because the Middle East was closer to the European 
heartland and it held greater stakes for the colonizers, it was competed over more intently 
and for a longer period of time than most other colonies. The distinctive experience of 
being ensnarled for nearly two centuries in great power politics left an enduring legacy on 
the kinds of political and economic institutions established in the Middle East and on the 
                                                 
245 Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle 
East, (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3-11. 
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cultural matrix and identity politics of the region. The competitive nature of Middle 
Eastern colonial history resulted in internal fragmentation and sectarianism, the impeded 
development of institutions of public accountability, and disunified elite structures.  
Henry and Springborg explain that the most successful movements of 
emancipation from colonialism involve a three part dialectic in which native elites first 
attempt to be assimilated into the colonial structure leading to a second phase backlash by 
those who remain excluded and then a third phase synthesis in which nationalist elites 
combat alien rule by assimilating its positive elements linked to the skills and values 
derived from a Western education while still maintaining cultural authenticity.  In most of 
the Middle East, this third phase was never able to be fully articulated resulting in 
disunified and fragmented elite structures.  The nationalist elites that replaced the 
colonialist rulers have not been able to forge durable and culturally authentic linkages 
with mass constituencies and are thus often perceived more as extensions of the former 
colonial powers than as culturally and socially legitimate rulers.  
In looking at the psychological impact of colonization, Frantz Fanon described the 
cultural alienation experienced by peoples whose very identity had been undermined by 
the institutional development of colonial structures.246  In the Middle East this alienation 
remains real.  The colonial powers established modern states with national markets 
bringing about the same kind of economic and cultural transformation that Polanyi had 
described for Western Europe.  But in the Middle East the process was even more 
revolutionary and even less embedded in society.  The impact was not only on economic 
                                                 
246 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (New York:  Grove Press, 1961). 
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and political structures but also reached the psycho-affective realms of the population. 
Polanyi‘s discussion of the need for a civil society counter movement that would 
establish economies with social meanings may not have occurred to the extent he 
predicted in the West, but in the Middle East where the disjuncture was greater and 
externally-driven, the cultural alienation has remained and the quest for a counter 
movement that would more securely embed the political and economic structures of the 
state with the cultural and social structures of society continues to explain much of the 
politics of the region. 
Political economists have long studied the impact colonial structures and 
institutions have had on the economies of colonized or peripheral societies, with 
dependency theorists arguing that integration into the world system can increase material 
poverty.  While such theories have come under criticism since the 1990s, what Polanyi 
asserts is that cultural poverty can be as meaningful as material poverty and the societal 
need for cultural authenticity can have a significant impact on political realities.  
Jordan can almost be seen as a controlled study of this process.  The borders of 
the country were drawn up by colonizers in a manner that had no historical or cultural 
rationale and a royal family that came to wield nearly absolute power was imported from 
outside those borders. What had previously been a tribal Bedouin society was 
transformed almost overnight.  A modern state with a national market and one of the 
most modern armies in the region was established, but the state, market, and army were 
all detached from the population.  As the old order was smashed and a new order built on 
top of it, many of the newly established institutions had no intrinsic meaning or value for 
 206 
the majority of the population.  A modern banking system anchored with one of the 
largest and most professional banks in the region was established yet the bank and 
financial system as a whole excluded huge portions of the population who continued to 
see meaning in the religious values and principles rooted in the social and cultural 
institutions that had just been trampled upon. 
The study of Islamic Banking in Jordan highlights the importance of cultural 
authenticity and represents an important example of the kind of civil society counter-
movement that Polanyi asserted would occur where the disjuncture between the economy 
and society had become so pronounced as to tear apart the cultural bonds by which 
people constituted their identity.  Before the onset of colonialism, the social and cultural 
structure of the society in what came to be known as Jordan was largely defined within an 
institutional framework dictated by Islamic ethos, mores and values.  Even after the 
establishment of the modern state of Jordan, the colonizers and the internal elite that was 
installed to replace them attempted to maintain some semblance of continuity with that 
previous cultural and social value system by importing a royal family with impeccable 
Islamic legitimacy, incorporating Islamic terminology into the constitution and 
maintaining Islamic law family courts to ensure that the social and cultural institutions 
that had the most immediate impact on the people‘s livelihoods were maintained. 
 The ruling elite maintained a façade of adherence to pre-existing social and 
cultural norms through these institutions. While Islamic scholars and activists assert that 
Islam is a comprehensive religion covering all aspects of the state and society, Islamic 
law is not specific on most issues of state rule and as long as the state allowed for the 
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continuity of some of the most basic social and cultural institutions on the level of the 
family and did not directly contradict a specific Islamic injunction, they could actually 
use Islam as a legitimating institution in the context of their rule.  
However, in Jordan as elsewhere in the region, the clearest and most specific 
transgression against Islamic law that took place in the colonial and post-colonial era was 
in the area of finance. Larger issues such as the institution of the Caliphate and Islamic 
unity were theoretical in nature, far removed from the people‘s daily lives, and had 
already undergone much internal erosion, but finance was an area that dealt with both 
individuals and the state and the state could not hide the fact that it was dealing with 
international financial institutions and was promoting within society – either directly or 
indirectly - financial practices and institutions that a significant portion of the population 
believed were directly contradictory to their religious values. 
In a 2006 University of Michigan led barometric survey of people in 7 different 
Arab countries, 77.6% of the Jordanians surveyed either agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement that: ―Banks in Muslim countries must be forbidden from charging even 
modest interest on loans because this is forbidden by Islam.‖247 Of the 42 questions on 
the survey that were asked in the same format (which allowed the respondent to reply to a 
statement by stating that they either strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, 
can‘t choose, or decline to answer), only 4 questions obtained higher levels of support – 3 
of which dealt with gender issues and one supporting shari’a.  Of those surveyed, 79.9% 
                                                 
247 The data on the Arab Barometric Survey is online at a University of Michigan sponsored site:  
http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/comparisonresutls06.html 
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agreed or strongly agreed that: ―A married woman can work outside the home if she 
wishes,‖ 78.9% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that: ―On the whole, men 
make better political leaders than women do,‖ and 77.8% agreed with the statement that: 
―Men and women should receive equal wages and salaries.‖  
On the shari’a question, 79.8% of the Jordanians surveyed either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement that: ―The government should implement only the 
laws of the shari’a.‖ Of all the questions on the survey, the statement that even modest 
amounts of interest must be forbidden in Muslim countries had the highest percentage of 
people stating that they strongly agree – 45.9%. Another question on the survey asked 
respondents if they identified themselves primarily as a Jordanian, a Muslim, an Arab, a 
Christian, or other and 63% replied that their primary identity was that of a Muslim. The 
survey underscores the deep seated resistance to conventional financial practices among 
the majority of the Jordanian population, a population which identifies itself much more 
with Islam than with any ethnic or national identity and which also overwhelmingly 
supports the implementation of shari’a in the country. 
 The alienation resulting from the imposition of an alien financial system upon the 
population contributed to the problems of political illegitimacy, societal fragmentation, 
and economic stagnation in Jordan as well as other regional states. The backlash that 
Polanyi would have predicted has occurred with the rise of Islamist movements that call 
for a return to an idealized vision of an Islamic society – a society in which political, 
societal, and economic institutions are all linked to authentic Islamic institutions and 
practices. The Islamists have put forth a culturally authentic vision of society that is 
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however often removed from the political, financial, and economic realities of the 
modern era. Henry and Springborg posit that the rise of Islamic Banking can conclude the 
third part of a dialectic synthesizing global financial systems and realities with culturally 
authentic financial practices. In doing so, Islamic banking can both help bring closure to 
the still lingering political and societal alienation brought about by the lack of full 
independence from colonial strictures as well as help integrate a country like Jordan into 
the world economy in a manner that remains culturally authentic. 
 Islamic banking was introduced to Jordan in 1979. Compared to other more 
established banks in Jordan, the Jordan Islamic Bank has been relatively inefficient, has 
proven incapable of providing the same level of banking services as its competitors, and 
has generally provided less of a return on deposits while charging higher rates for loans 
that conventional banks (see Chapter 4). Yet despite these shortcomings, the bank has 
enjoyed a phenomenal growth rate – even though for most of its history it did not even 
have a marketing department. JIB has become one of the largest banks in Jordan and 
while Islamic banking attracts less than 10% of Jordan‘s overall deposits in terms of 
capital, the number of deposits – at over 700,000 – is huge for a country of less than 6 
million people of whom 37% are under the age of 15. The fact that the JIB – despite its 
lackluster performance and its lack of marketing - has been able to attract approximately 
1 deposit for every 4 Jordanians over 15 years old underscores the widespread demand 
for Islamic finance in the country – a demand that proves the importance of cultural 
authenticity in societal institution building. 
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 This phenomenal growth rate is despite the indirect hindrances imposed on the 
growth of Islamic finance that have been created by the state‘s fear of political Islamists, 
the natural allies of financial Islamists. Political Islamism has had an interesting history in 
Jordan. During the heyday of Arab Nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s when Gamal 
Abdul Nasser of Egypt enjoyed widespread popularity throughout the Arab world and 
threatened the stability of the moderate, pro-Western regimes in the region, the Jordanian 
Monarchy forged close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest pan-Islamic 
movement in the region. The Brotherhood provided the monarchy with a culturally 
legitimate counterweight to the calls for Arab nationalism and socialism which were 
resonating with many of the educated youth in the Arab world and which led to 
revolutions in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. King Hussein‘s alliance with the 
Brotherhood was an important factor in saving the Jordanian Monarchy from being 
overthrown during a period of intense political upheaval which led to an attempted coup 
in 1957 and then again during a civil war pitting the monarchy against Palestinian 
movements based in the country in 1970. 
 The alliance between the Jordanian Monarchy and the Muslim Brotherhood was 
predicated upon their mutual opposition to the secular, leftist, nationalist movements 
sweeping the region at the time. While Egypt and Syria were engaged in an often 
competitive struggle to lead the Arab socialist movement, they both were active in 
supporting opposition to the Jordanian Monarchy while also severely repressing their 
Muslim Brotherhood chapters internally. Brotherhood members from both countries often 
found refuge in Jordan. The Jordanian Monarchy needed the Brotherhood to shore up its 
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grassroots base of support at a time when the real threat to the regime was from leftist, 
nationalist elements. The Brotherhood also found in the Monarchy an ally that could 
provide a haven against the repression they were suffering from elsewhere. This alliance 
of mutual convenience was more a surface than a principled alliance. The Jordanian 
Monarchy and the Brotherhood could benefit from each other‘s support while 
maintaining different worldviews and seeking different objectives. 
 Jordan‘s close ties – even political and economic dependence - to Britain and later 
the United States rankled the Islamists who sought security and economic development 
through the establishment of a true ―Islamic State‖ and a vision of pan-Islamic unity 
rather than ties to the West. While indebted to the Islamists for providing crucial 
grassroots support at critical junctures, the Jordanian Monarchy remained wary of the 
Islamists themselves and always kept them at some distance from real political power 
while also keeping them under close observation and not shying away from using light 
forms of repression against them as a means of keeping them in check. Jordan remained 
the only country in the region in which the Brotherhood could maintain a legal status and 
the Brotherhood leadership understood and accepted the limitations placed upon them by 
the Monarchy in return for the benefits that accrued from this legal standing.  
The limited freedom in a context in which both the Monarchy and the Islamists 
understood that the Islamists would never partake of real political power led to a situation 
in which the Islamists were free to vocally express a utopian vision of an Islamic state 
and Islamic economy without ever having to face the responsibilities of true economic 
and political decision-making. When the Nasserist and Ba‘athist secular Arab nationalist 
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experiments throughout the region proved unable to bring about the kind of political and 
economic development and progress that they promised, the popularity of such 
movements declined and the Islamists largely filled the void on the grassroots level and 
among the educated youth. The Islamists became the only real grassroots threat to the 
stability of the Jordanian as well as the other regimes in the region. 
 With the decline of the leftist movements and the rise in Islamic sentiments 
throughout the region, it became even more important for the Jordanian Monarchy to use 
Islamic symbols as a way of legitimating its rule. Permitting the establishment of Islamic 
banking in the country was certainly one element in this process of popular legitimation. 
Even by the late 1970s when Islamic banking got its start in Jordan, the political Islamists 
had already replaced leftist nationalists as the most threatening political force in the 
country.  
While Islamists played a key role in the formation and development of the ideas 
and institutions of Islamic Banking in Jordan (see Chapter 5), they themselves recognized 
that the success of the enterprise depended in large part on it remaining apolitical. 
Finance is power and for an opposition movement to openly control a major financial 
institution could be interpreted as a quest for political power when the political Islamists 
were less interested in using banking as a means of increasing their political strength 
against the monarchy than in proving that Islamic economic and financial theories could 
work in the modern era and in providing Muslims in the country with an Islamically valid 
manner of conducting simple financial transactions. The state and the Brotherhood 
leadership had an unspoken understanding of the extent to which political Islamists 
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would be tolerated within the financial Islamic sector and the Brotherhood never crossed 
the lines of what would be seen as acceptable. 
 By preventing the establishment of a natural alliance between political and 
financial Islamists, Jordan has however lost the opportunity to use Islamic finance as a 
means of strengthening societal institutions and civil society in ways that Henry and 
Springborg argue would promote the kind of political and economic development that 
would best equip Jordan with the tools to succeed in the era of globalization.  
 As long as Islamists continue to form the most cogent political force in the 
country yet remain removed from any level of decision-making responsibility, the 
country‘s fragmented and disunified political elite structure will impede opportunities for 
political and economic growth. A 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Project that looked in detail 
on how peoples in different parts of the world viewed globalization found that people in 
the Middle East had by far the most negative views of globalization and international 
organizations and among the most negative views of multinational corporations in the 
world.248 Noland and Pack argue that these popular attitudes form one of the greatest 
obstacles to economic reform in the region.  
Such attitudes can be traced largely to the region‘s colonial experiences during 
which foreign companies and organizations exploited the region and supported policies 
that impeded economic growth. However the region‘s colonial experiences cannot fully 
explain the prevalence of such attitudes in the Middle East as opposed to Africa or Latin 
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Economies in a Changing World (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 
187-207. 
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America, where the colonial experiences were even more exploitative. Such attitudes are 
more attributable to the manner by which the Middle East‘s colonial experiences resulted 
in an elite structure in which the most popular societal leaders can make populist anti-
globalization diatribes yet have no responsibility for economic and political decision-
making. 
 Bringing the colonial experience to a closure through the three part dialectic 
described by Henry and Springborg does not guarantee democratization or economic 
growth; it however does help bring about an elite structure and elite-mass relations that 
make such political and economic development more likely. The fact that most countries 
of the Middle East did not complete this dialectic process has resulted in a disunified elite 
structure and a near constant quest for legitimacy by the ruling elites of the region – a 
quest which distracts them from pursuing policies needed for economic and political 
development.  
Henry and Springborg argue that Islamic finance offers states in the region the 
opportunity to go through a belated dialectic in which the Islamist opposition is brought 
into the already existing alliance between shari’a scholars, government officials, and 
Islamic bankers. Bringing political Islamists into the alliance would strengthen the 
Islamic banking sector while providing political Islamists with the opportunity to play a 
more responsible economic decision-making role. To allow for this natural alliance to 
take place would end the dichotomy between a modernizing elite around the monarchy 
and a culturally centered Islamist elite that is seen as authentic and garners widespread 
popular support though has little real political power.  This disunified elite structure has 
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resulted in a situation in which the monarchy, while theoretically pro-business and 
supportive of globalization, is hindered from fully articulating these views because the 
lack of a national consensus forces it to rely on business-inhibiting patronage networks 
for support and legitimacy while not allowing the country to break its dependence on 
economic rents to keep the country afloat. 
From a political perspective, Jordan would be an ideal country to allow this 
dialectic to play out. The Islamists in the country have strong grassroots support and yet 
have always recognized that it is within their interest to shore up the monarchy rather 
than seek its overthrow. While the divide between Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians 
has constituted the most explosive and potentially destabilizing factor in the country, the 
Islamists have been the only movement in the country able to cross the divide and bring 
about a semblance of unity and shared interests. The Islamists have advocated a populist 
economic and foreign-policy agenda that often conflicts with the policies pursued by the 
monarchy but keeping them at arm‘s length from real power has provided them the 
luxury of being able to continue calling for such policies without having to account for 
the impact such policies would actually have on the country. 
While an agreement between the Monarchy and the Islamists on contentious and 
divisive foreign policy issues seems unlikely at the present time, allowing Islamists into 
an alliance that ultimately gives them a stake in the economic development of the country 
and allows them to play an economic decision-making role could provide the opening 
that results in closing the gaps and bringing about a more unified elite structure in the 
country. Political Islamists have already played a central role in the development and 
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progress of Islamic banking in Jordan. Establishing an environment in which that role is 
allowed to take its natural course would force the Islamists to go a step beyond discussing 
a theoretical vision and toward articulating that vision in ways that would likely be very 
similar to the vision espoused by the pro-globalization elements of the ruling elite, thus 
helping establish a national consensus in the country. 
Islamic finance is well-suited to the role of being a conduit for the integration of 
political Islamists into the ruling elite not only because it provides an arena of policy-
making that is removed from the more contentious security and foreign policy arenas but 
also because the theoretical foundations of Islamic finance are even more in tune with the 
demands of globalization than are traditional banking methods and theories. Islamic 
finance cannot work properly unless there is a regulatory framework in place that allows 
for transparency and accountability. Whereas conventional banks work on fixed interest 
rates, Islamic banks work on profit-sharing formulas that require firms to accurately 
calculate and report their profits and losses.  
Conventional banks - especially in systems in which banking provides the 
predominant form of credit - can establish strong ties to business elites within a country 
without a concomitant need for an overall environment of transparency, accountability 
and regulatory authority. Equity rather than credit-based financial systems that follow the 
Anglo-American model of providing capital through financial markets and have strong 
stock exchanges require a much greater level of transparency to be successful. In the era 
of globalization in which the attraction of foreign capital through financial markets is a 
key to the success of emerging economies those with Anglo-American systems have 
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certain advantages. The equity-like financing model of Islamic banks have the same 
kinds of regulatory and transparency needs that Anglo-American financial systems have 
and can only reach their full potential in environments in which such systems are 
embedded.  
Thus not only will an alliance between Islamic banks and Islamist political 
movements give the Islamist opposition a stake in the economic success of a country but 
will also provide them with an incentive structure leading them to advocate the kinds of 
policies that are needed for a country like Jordan to move away from a patronage based 
business-state framework (which is dependent for its success on the continuation of rents 
- in the form of foreign aid and remittances) and toward a business-state framework and 
elite structure that is more in tune with the demands of globalization. With Samuel 
Huntington‘s theory of the Clash of Civilizations and the post 9-11 media hype about the 
incompatibility of Islam with the West and the supposed dangers inherent with the spread 
of shari’a law in the West, it may be counterintuitive to find that within economics and 
finance, the spread of shari’a – and an alliance that forces Islamists to root their policy 
proposals on actual shari’a sources rather than irresponsible populism - may move 
Islamist movements toward a more accommodationist stance vis-à-vis the West, at least 
in the realm of economics and global capital flows.  
Shari’a-compliant banking has become a buzzword that is well-known and 
respected in the corridors of international financial institutions. The World Bank has 
concluded numerous studies on the phenomenon and Islamic banking is well-covered in 
the world‘s top economic journals and newspapers. Harvard University has dedicated a 
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center to the study of Islamic Finance and holds annual Islamic Banking conferences 
while European countries are now competing to become the Western world‘s hub for the 
Islamic finance industry – with London clearly in the lead, having established numerous 
Islamic banks in the city while nearly all the large corporate law firms in the country have 
large Islamic Finance groups and the British Government has worked assiduously to 
bring about a legislative framework that accommodates the needs of Islamic banking.249 
Pete Moore has rightly argued that political context best explains the problems 
with Jordan‘s business climate.250 Business-state relations are embedded within a larger 
political context and just as patronage networks establish distortions in the functioning of 
an economy in its most efficient manner, the politically inspired break up of what would 
be a natural political and economic alliance establishes distortions in the most efficient 
political and economic functioning of a polity. In the case of Jordan, these distortions are 
best represented by the rapid growth of Islamic banking in a way that can only be 
explained by a clear societal based quest for what Polanyi would describe as cultural and 
institutional authenticity and the simultaneous politically-inspired constraint on 
permitting those banks to be linked to the popular Islamist movement. These distortions 
have intensified the fragmentation of the country‘s elite structure thus impeding 
Jordanian political and economic development.  
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